National Identity and Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy by Canada and New Zealand

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This thesis is for examination purposes only and is confidential to the examination process.
Abstract

Nuclear disarmament dynamics are under-studied and under-theorised. Constructivists hold that identities determine interests and thus, policy preferences, but there has been virtually no investigation of national identity as a driver for nuclear disarmament policy. This thesis investigates the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy by Canada and New Zealand, focusing on the activation of anti-nuclear weapon national identities as a key explanatory factor. The thesis presents four comparative case studies—two each from Canada and New Zealand. Each case examines the dominant nuclear weapons-related national identity tropes of three constituencies—senior government ministers, bureaucrats and the public—and traces the processes through which various actors seek to have these identities expressed in policy. Since identities inform preferences but do not necessarily determine policy, the case studies also consider how contextual factors—alliance commitments, normative context, civil society activity and great power relations—affect the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities.

Canada’s decision not to acquire nuclear weapons, despite being able to, is a touchstone for a popular, pro-disarmament ‘peacemaker’ identity. However, security policymakers almost always prioritise the identity of Canada as a strong US ally and supporter of nuclear deterrence. The Canadian cases examine two attempts by prominent norm entrepreneurs to break this mould—first, during a Cold War crisis in superpower relations, and second, during the post-Cold War superpower rapprochement. In both cases, transnational alliance-related identities significantly constrained expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities, while the public remained ambivalent, offering limited political support for nuclear disarmament advocacy.

In New Zealand, unique geography and public and political norm entrepreneurship generated early anti-nuclear testing advocacy, but bounded by alliance-based nuclear deterrence norms. During political upheaval in the 1980s, an identity crisis and public anti-nuclear activism created a ‘New Zealand nuclear taboo’, institutionalised in law. This delegitimised acquiescence to pro-nuclear policies, including for alliance imperatives. Activation of internalised public anti-nuclear sentiment produced universalistic nuclear disarmament advocacy from the government—initially for instrumental reasons, but later, due to bureaucratic socialisation towards anti-nuclear identities. The New Zealand cases support the hypothesis that norm institutionalisation facilitates identity transformation in officials through the iterative practice of norms.
Acknowledgements

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Warm thanks also to my supervisors, Anita Lacey, Chris Wilson and Maria Rublee, for their support, wise council and patience with my many meanderings.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian countries</td>
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<td>CCD</td>
<td>Conference of the Committee on Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>Disarmament &amp; Security Centre (New Zealand)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand)</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>MPI</td>
<td>Middle Powers Initiative</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>New Agenda Coalition</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCCD</td>
<td>National Consultative Committee on Disarmament (New Zealand)</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<td>NWFZ</td>
<td>Nuclear weapon free zone</td>
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<td>NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>NZHR</td>
<td>New Zealand House of Representatives</td>
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<td>NZIIA</td>
<td>New Zealand Institute for International Affairs</td>
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<td>NZPD</td>
<td>New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)</td>
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<td>OIA</td>
<td>Official Information Act (New Zealand)</td>
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<td>PACDAC</td>
<td>Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (New Zealand)</td>
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<td>PTBT</td>
<td>Partial Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCFAIT</td>
<td>Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canadian Parliament)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asian Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDC</td>
<td>United Nations Disarmament Commission</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>WCP</td>
<td>World Court Project</td>
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1. What causes nuclear disarmament advocacy?

I was not so naive as to think we could decisively, or even importantly, influence the policies of the Great Powers, but I hoped that we could influence the environment in which they were pursued.

~ Former Canadian prime minister, Lester Pearson¹

What I hoped to do, not by offering answers for others but by describing what New Zealand had done, was to make the point that alternatives were possible. What we needed was the political will to look for them.

~ Former New Zealand prime minister, David Lange²

Introduction

The political dynamics of nuclear disarmament are under-studied and under-theorised. In particular, there is little theoretically-informed analysis of the policies, perspectives or role of non-nuclear weapon states regarding nuclear disarmament.³ In policy terms, this is a significant omission since non-nuclear weapon states will necessarily play an important role in making any disarmament agreement possible, as the West’s fixation with the Iranian nuclear programme attests. This thesis addresses the lack of scholarly engagement with the nuclear disarmament-related experiences of non-nuclear weapon states by examining one specific type

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of behaviour: nuclear disarmament advocacy. The core research question of the thesis is what causes nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states?

To answer this question, the thesis presents four theoretically-informed, comparative case studies—two each from Canada and New Zealand—that draw on the insights of International Relations (IR) constructivism. A key characteristic of constructivist scholarship is its focus on how interactions between material factors and non-material factors, such as actors’ beliefs and identities, and the related norms of appropriate behaviour, drive policy outcomes. This research adopts a commonly-cited definition of a norm, that being ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.’ As this definition makes clear, constructivists see an important link between norms and identities: norms only apply to actors if they identify with a group which is committed to the prescribed standard of behaviour. In this sense, norms and identities are interdependent and mutually constitutive. Both are also socially constructed, historically contingent and often, contested.

Fundamental to IR constructivism is the notion that national identities determine national interests, and therefore, policy preferences. Given the centrality of this causal chain to constructivist thinking, it is striking that the constructivist literature most relevant to nuclear disarmament has largely ignored the issue of identity. This thesis is one of only two works, in

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6 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 399.


8 See, for example, Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

9 For examples of this trend, see, Erika Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001); Marianne Hanson, “Advancing Disarmament in the Face of Great Power Reluctance: The Canadian Contribution” (Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, June 2001); Marianne Hanson,
fact, to examine the relationship between national identity and nuclear disarmament policy. As such, the thesis makes a significant contribution to the security studies literature in theoretical terms. Given the lack of theorisation regarding nuclear disarmament dynamics in general, and in particular, regarding the experiences of non-nuclear weapon states in this field, the thesis adopts an exploratory, hypothesis-generating approach regarding when and how national identity informs nuclear disarmament policy.

An important first observation is that a country’s non-nuclear armed status is not a useful explanatory factor for nuclear disarmament advocacy. There are many non-nuclear weapon states that don’t actively advocate nuclear disarmament, and several that do. Norway, Canada and Australia, for example, despite their claim to shelter under the US ‘nuclear umbrella,’ have put much more effort into nuclear disarmament initiatives than many other non-nuclear weapon states. In this sense, a country’s non-nuclear armed status is a historically-contingent fact, but has no meaning or explanatory power until it is interpreted through human agency and turned into policy. Constructivist scholars generally examine policy advocacy through the frame of norm entrepreneurs—actors that ‘seize windows of opportunity’ to ‘alter the prevalent normative structure.’ In this frame, the current research examines the causes of nuclear disarmament norm entrepreneurship by non-nuclear weapon states.

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10 For the other one, see, Mariana Budjeryn, “NPT and National Identity: The Politics of Nuclear Disarmament in Ukraine (1990-1994),” in The Making of Nuclear Order (Zurich, 2014). In contrast to causal dynamic presented in the current thesis, Budjeryn (pp.14-18) states that Ukraine sought to declare its administrative control of nuclear weapons in order to establish itself as a sovereign state, to be dealt with on an equal footing to Russia. This reinforces arguments made here about the structuring role of sovereignty as a metanorm that governs international relations. Maria Rost Rublee highlights the relevance of the relationship between identity and nuclear nonproliferation policy, and in her more recent work, suggests that there is an opening for further exploration of this relationship in the context of nuclear disarmament. Maria Rost Rublee, “Scholarly Research on Nuclear Exits: The Role of Civil Society,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 30, no. Sup.1 (July 29, 2014): s43–s44.


Based on the core constructivist principle that national identity determines interests, and therefore, foreign policy preferences, nuclear disarmament advocacy must be caused at least in part by the activation of a national identity that sees nuclear weapons as reducing national and/or international security—in shorthand, an ‘anti-nuclear weapon’ identity. Without such an identity to inform policy, there can be no presumed interest in pursuing nuclear disarmament advocacy. In sum, it is hypothesised here that the core driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy as a policy outcome comes from the activation of ‘anti-nuclear weapon’ national identities.

This thesis does not claim, however, that the activation of an anti-nuclear weapon identity causes nuclear disarmament advocacy in any automatic or deterministic way. Competing identity claims—and contextual factors, as outlined further below—may reduce the likelihood of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment being expressed as disarmament advocacy. Pro-alliance identities, for example, might constrain the expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment—especially if the relevant alliance includes a nuclear weapon state—by contesting pro-disarmament policy claims. Identification with such alliances implies, at a minimum, acquiescence to pro-nuclear weapon norms. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, such acquiescence may also lead to entrenchment of pro-nuclear norms in foreign policy institutions, and potentially, in the national identity beliefs of the individuals that populate those institutions.

Identity contestation affects the policy process through human agency. That is, different actors may invoke competing visions of national identity and thus seek to advance their preferred policy outcomes. These visions may be purely personal, or may be representative of broader, institutional affiliations. To account for this observation, the thesis separates each country’s population into three parts: senior government politicians; foreign policy officials; and the public.\footnote{This segmentation distinguishes the thesis from other related constructivist work on nuclear policymaking. Rublee, for example, focuses specifically on ‘state elites and policymakers’, defining elites as ‘those with decision making authority or substantial influence over decision making.’ This, of course, implies that public opinion cannot wield substantial influence on nuclear weapons policy. The case study in chapter seven, below, demonstrates that this cannot be taken for granted. Maria Rost Rublee, \textit{Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint} (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 2.} This segmentation allows the analysis to identify the dominant beliefs about national identity held by each segment of the population, and to assess how the resulting foreign policy preferences compete or complement each other in the democratic policymaking process.
Various contextual factors—both domestic and international—may also increase or decrease the likelihood of a government expressing anti-nuclear weapon identities as nuclear disarmament advocacy. Each case study accounts for the potential influence of four key contextual factors: alliance relationships, normative context, civil society activity and great power relations. A process-tracing method is applied to within-case analysis, to assess whether and how contextual factors have either affected actors’ identities and thus, preferences, or have intervened in the policy process to affect the expression of those preferences. This method makes it possible to identify the unique set of agents, structures and interactions—including the sequence in which events occurred—that lead to the specific policy outcomes in each case. Chapter three provides further discussion of this, and other methodological choices.

As the core research question makes clear, the thesis does not explore, or claim to demonstrate, the influence of non-nuclear weapon states on the nuclear disarmament behaviour of nuclear weapon states. That is an enormously complex issue that is beyond the scope of this research. Rather, given the increasing international focus on nuclear disarmament as a credible potential response to the existential threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity, this thesis seeks to contribute to the development of scholarly debate around nuclear disarmament that is both empirically-grounded and theoretically rigorous. As the late UK nuclear expert, Michael Quinlan, notes, ‘the theme of abolishing nuclear weapons is one on which there is broad and serious analytical work to be done.’

The focus here on nuclear disarmament advocacy speaks to significant puzzles in both policy and IR theory. On the first point, this thesis addresses a fascinating policy problem—the enormous gap between rhetoric and reality on multilateral nuclear disarmament. The international community has repeatedly, and often unanimously, highlighted the urgent need to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. The first ever resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1946, passed unanimously, sought the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Article VI of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a ‘cornerstone’ of the international nuclear regime, obliges both nuclear armed and non-nuclear armed members to work to achieve complete nuclear disarmament.\(^{20}\) At the first UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD) in 1978, UN member states unanimously concluded that, ‘Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.’\(^{21}\) In 2010, NPT members—representing 97 percent of UN members (188 of 193)\(^{22}\)—unanimously expressed deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, and reaffirmed that ‘the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.’\(^{23}\) Moreover, critics can no longer claim that disarmament advocates are all naive idealists. In recent years, a raft of influential international military and political experts—including many who helped develop or implement nuclear deterrence theory—have advocated urgent, practical steps toward the elimination nuclear weapons.\(^{24}\)

In contrast to these widespread disarmament aspirations, however, nuclear deterrence theory—which holds that the threat of nuclear war contributes to international peace and security—is institutionalised in the core national security strategies of eight, possibly nine, nuclear armed

\(^{20}\) In full, Article VI reads, ‘Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.’ UNODA, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Treaties Database, 1968, http://goo.gl/2lv8FR.


\(^{22}\) India, Israel and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and have never joined the NPT. North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in 2003 and subsequently tested nuclear weapons using technology developed while it was an NPT member, leading to disagreement over the status of its NPT membership and obligations. The UN’s youngest member state, South Sudan, is embroiled in a civil war and has not yet joined the NPT. See, UNODA, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Status of the Treaty],” December 2014, http://goo.gl/dZw2Cf.


As will be seen throughout this thesis, norms related to nuclear deterrence are the primary ideational competitors for those related to nuclear disarmament; the two are largely mutually exclusive. As such, achieving the international community’s policy objectives will be impossible without a significant shift in the nuclear status quo, in terms of national security norms and institutions. The relevance of this discussion to the current thesis is that all political change begins with human agency, generally in the form of some type of advocacy. For policymakers seeking to narrow the gap between international aspiration and action, determining the causes of nuclear disarmament advocacy is thus of considerable interest.

Furthermore, non-nuclear weapon states can and have played a significant role in this regard. The only legally-binding nuclear disarmament provision in a multilateral agreement, for example—NPT Article VI—exists as a result of the nuclear disarmament advocacy of several non-nuclear weapon states. Yet there has been almost no attempt by IR scholars to explain in theoretical terms of why these particular states believed nuclear disarmament was an important foreign policy objective, and thus, caused them to take on this advocacy role. The NPT itself, moreover, is the downstream result of the advocacy of non-nuclear-armed Ireland, as well as

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27 Wendt defines an institution as, ‘a relatively stable set or “structure” of identities and interests...often codified in formal rules and norms...Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world works.’ Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 399.


29 Many studies look at the notion of ‘middle power’ states as disarmament advocates, a notion that has potential identity-related aspects, as discussed further below. However, the middle power concept is so amorphous that its operationalization as a causal factor is highly problematic in theoretical terms. For a recent attempt to grapple with this issue, see, Allan Patience, “Imagining Middle Powers,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 2 (October 31, 2013): 210–24.
Sweden, advocating to put the concept of nonproliferation on the international agenda. In the absence of theoretically informed analysis, the world’s only multilateral nuclear disarmament obligation appears to be a historical fluke. This brings discussion to the theoretical puzzle that this thesis addresses, which results from the inability of dominant IR theories to account for nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states.

The nuclear disarmament puzzle

The rationalist theories that dominate IR scholarship portray nuclear disarmament as neither feasible nor desirable, and therefore, as unworthy of serious study (more on IR rationalism below). Early writings dismissed nuclear disarmament efforts as a ‘maze of unrealism’ dominated by ‘fictional utopias.’ The concept of arms control demonstrates this point well. While disarmament seeks to eliminate entire weapons classes, arms control seeks negotiated limits on the development or deployment of weapons, as a way of managing what are assumed to be inherently conflictual relations between states. Advocates of arms control developed the concept explicitly to distance themselves from what they saw as the unrealistic idea of nuclear disarmament.

In light of these observations, nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states represents a significant theoretical puzzle for rationalist IR scholarship, especially the structural

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34 James Lee, “Arms Control and Disarmament” (Ottawa, February 15, 1999), 2, https://goo.gl/0jX5M.
realism that has dominated security studies for several decades.\textsuperscript{36} Realist theories are underpinned by three common assumptions which typify the materialist bias of rationalism more broadly (that is, the tendency to explain outcomes in reference to material, as opposed to ideational, structures).\textsuperscript{37} First, realism treats states as rational, often monolithic actors primarily seeking survival in an anarchic international system, defined by the absence of a global authority capable of ensuring peace. In this view, states necessarily pursue self-interested, power-maximising behaviour in order to ensure survival. Secondly, realists assume that this state of affairs creates inherently conflictual relations among countries. And thirdly, the relative distribution of material capabilities is seen as a central determinant of state behaviour. In the rationalist view, national interests are thus a function of system-level structure; they are largely predetermined, static and uniform across all states.\textsuperscript{38} Some rationalist theories, such as neoclassical realism and neoliberal institutionalism, open space to consider national-level drivers of policy, but they maintain the assumption of materially-derived, fixed state interests.\textsuperscript{39} Neoliberal institutionalism, for example, assumes an inherent desire for nuclear weapons, but argues that this may be tempered by other factors that increase the material costs of pursuing such weapons.\textsuperscript{40}

The dominance of rationalism in IR nuclear weapons scholarship manifests in two ways in particular. First, the IR security studies research agenda focuses overwhelmingly on the experiences of states that either have nuclear weapons or are suspected of seeking them, rather than states that have given up nuclear weapons or related programmes, or states that never sought such weapons.\textsuperscript{41} Second, rationalist assumptions have created an empirically questionable ‘proliferation paradigm’ that treats the spread of nuclear weapons as natural and/or inevitable.\textsuperscript{42} This also creates a conceptual ‘straightjacket’ that frames the achievement

\textsuperscript{40} Etel Solingen, \textit{Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 5.
\textsuperscript{41} Rublee, \textit{Nonproliferation Norms}, xiii–xiv.
of national security as a binary choice between acquisition of nuclear weapons or membership in a nuclear alliance.  

In sum, nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states appears quite futile from a rationalist point of view. Such advocacy can most accurately be described in rationalist terms as an attempt by non-powerful countries to convince the most powerful countries in history to voluntarily give up a central source of their power. Since this advocacy might also bring significant diplomatic costs, it also appears quite irrational. For states that are members of a nuclear alliance, nuclear disarmament advocacy is triply puzzling; if such advocacy undermines nuclear deterrence norms, it is assumed to drastically reduce the security of all allies, and to destabilise the international system, thus reducing the security of all states. For states under the nuclear umbrella, nuclear disarmament advocacy thus appears futile, irrational and dangerous to rationalists.

Despite the dominance of this perspective in the security studies literature, a growing body of IR and historical research demonstrates that rationalist assumptions about nuclear weapons-related state behaviour are based on a selective or wholly erroneous reading of the empirical record. There is a large gap, for example, between the number of countries that are

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See, for example, the US reaction to New Zealand’s nuclear free policy in 1985, in Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993), 283.


capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, and the number that have actually done so—in stark contrast to the assumption of an inherent interest in material power maximisation.\textsuperscript{47} And as of 2007, ‘more countries have given up nuclear weapons or weapons programs in the past 15 years than have started them.’\textsuperscript{48} Meanwhile, ‘the number of states that started nuclear weapons activities but reversed course is more than double the number of those who still conduct them.’\textsuperscript{49} South Africa is the preeminent case of nuclear disarmament, as the only country thus far to follow what might be called an ‘indigenous disarmament’ trajectory of decision to acquire—acquisition—decision to disarm—disarmament.\textsuperscript{50} Between November 1989 and July 1990, South Africa dismantled its working arsenal of six nuclear weapons, joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in July 1991.\textsuperscript{51} The so-called ‘born nuclear’ states of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine inherited administrative control of thousands of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles when the Soviet Union dissolved, but chose to return them to Russia.\textsuperscript{52} Granted, these states did not produce their own nuclear weapons,\textsuperscript{53} and it appears most likely that they did not have the ability to target or fire them.\textsuperscript{54} Nevertheless, the decision to surrender control of enormous nuclear arsenals has important symbolic value, affirming that these governments saw their

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Ibid., 87; UNODA, “Treaties Database: NPT.”
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Budjeryn, “NPT and National Identity.”
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national interests as being best served by getting rid of nuclear weapons—a point that NPT members unanimously acknowledged in 2000.\(^5\)

Despite all such evidence, the political dynamics of nuclear disarmament are under-studied in the IR literature,\(^5\) and where they are studied, they are generally under-theorised.\(^7\) Starting in 2007, however, a series of influential articles by former US Cold Warriors ‘stimulated public interest in disarmament as a serious response to nuclear weapons threats’ and triggered ‘a cascade of disarmament proposals.’\(^8\) Responding to this renewed political interest, a few path-finding academic studies have begun to address theoretical challenges associated with nuclear disarmament in recent years.\(^9\) Given the magnitude of the stakes, however, and the overwhelming preponderance of proliferation and nonproliferation research in the nuclear literature, much remains to be done.

Theorising nuclear disarmament (vs. nonproliferation)

An implicit assumption in much of the nuclear weapons literature is that there is no need to separate nuclear disarmament from nuclear nonproliferation analytically. This assumption is exemplified by the insouciance with which scholars interchangeably use terms such as


\(^{57}\) Cooper and Mutimer, “Arms Control for the 21st Century,” 3.


restraint,\textsuperscript{60} forbearance,\textsuperscript{61} rollback,\textsuperscript{62} denuclearisation,\textsuperscript{63} nonproliferation,\textsuperscript{64} and more recently, deproliferation,\textsuperscript{65} often without providing a definition of the terms. This is highly problematic, as the cases examined by these scholars variously involve deliberate decisions not to seek to acquire nuclear weapons; decisions to renounce an established nuclear weapons programme not yet come to fruition; the reduction or complete dismantlement of an indigenously-developed, functional nuclear arsenal; or the surrender of nuclear weapons inherited from other countries.

If academics want to contribute meaningfully to policy debates around nuclear disarmament, it is important to study disarmament, as opposed to nonproliferation, because the two objectives are characterised by different social and psychological dynamics, as Rublee explains,

One cannot assume that motivations for nonproliferation will also explain motivations for disarmament. Acquiring nuclear weapons irreversibly changes a state, from the public prestige (or scorn) that accrues to the domestic bureaucracy that forms to manage and maintain the weapons program. Reversing that type of decision will involve a different set of processes than the processes involved in nuclear restraint.\textsuperscript{66}

In this sense, it is not possible simply to apply the theoretical assumptions developed in the realm of nonproliferation to disarmament, and assume that credible policy prescriptions will result.\textsuperscript{67}

Consider, for example, the policy challenge of ensuring international norm compliance in the two different spheres.

\textsuperscript{60} Sagan, 'Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?': 60-61; \textit{passim}.
\textsuperscript{64} Rost Rublee, \textit{Nonproliferation Norms}, 7.
\textsuperscript{65} Müller and Schmidt, “The Little-Known Story of Deproliferation.”
In contrast to nonproliferation, in which coercive pressure can play a significant role in ensuring norm compliance,\(^{68}\) it is impossible to achieve multilateral nuclear disarmament through coercion or enforcement.\(^{69}\) International attempts to use economic coercion to force the nuclear weapon states to disarm will fall flat at the hurdle of the Security Council veto. Conversely, attempts to use militarily threats or force to coerce these states to disarm are likely to result in war, and potentially, nuclear war—the very outcome the international community is seeking to prevent by moving toward nuclear disarmament. As such, this thesis argues that achieving nuclear disarmament will necessarily require ‘getting to persuasion’—in other words, global ‘internalisation’ of anti-nuclear weapon norms.\(^{70}\) With this in mind, deepening our understanding of the dynamics of normative persuasion—the social-psychological processes through which individuals and states internalise and act on collective belief systems—in the realm of national security policy is essential, and constitutes a significant contribution of this thesis towards a theoretically coherent nuclear disarmament literature.

The role of non-nuclear weapon states

Non-nuclear weapon states are themselves unable to disarm, but have nonetheless used a variety of mechanisms to advance nuclear disarmament. Among other things, non-nuclear weapon states have enacted domestic policies or laws banning nuclear weapons;\(^{71}\) created

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\(^{70}\) Internalisation constitutes a state in which a norm’s prescriptions are so deeply embedded in an identity that they are no longer debated; rather, compliance with those prescriptions is taken for granted as a policy preference. Further discussion of this point follows in chapter two. See, Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 904–905.

\(^{71}\) At the domestic level, Palau and the Philippines, New Zealand, Mongolia and Austria have created laws restricting in various ways or prohibiting nuclear weapons entirely. From 1981–1994, Palau was governed under a nuclear-weapons-free constitution, which was annulled when Palau entered into a Compact of Free Association with the United States. The Compact was the result of extensive political pressure and economic inducements from the nuclear superpower, and was completed only after multiple failed national referenda organised by a powerful and well-funded pro-US lobby that
regional nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs), in which the testing and permanent deployment of nuclear weapons are banned;\textsuperscript{72} helped develop and roll out verification technologies required to create confidence in disarmament-related activities;\textsuperscript{73} and more recently, contributed to research designed to facilitate the participation—as part of any future disarmament treaty—of non-nuclear weapon state representatives in the process of verifying nuclear warhead dismantlement.\textsuperscript{74} In addition to these national and regional, and legal and technical initiatives, a range of non-nuclear weapon states, individually and in groups, have invested significant amounts of energy into advocating nuclear disarmament. The following section examines the existing literature on nuclear disarmament advocacy most relevant to the current thesis, and demonstrates how the thesis contributes to this literature in theoretical and empirical terms.

Existing literature / theoretical contribution

The existing literature on non-nuclear weapon states as nuclear disarmament advocates has largely ignored the question of how unique national identity beliefs relate to policy outcomes.

\textsuperscript{72} At time of writing, 115 countries are located in regions recognised under international law as NWFZ, including Latin America and the Caribbean (1967); the South Pacific (1985); South East Asia (1995); Africa (1996); and Central Asia (2006). Three additional multilateral treaties have created NWFZ cover areas that are largely uninhabited, including Antarctica (1959); Outer Space (1967); and the Seabed (1971). See, Cecile Hellestveit and Daniel Mekonnen, “Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: The Political Context,” in \textit{Nuclear Weapons under International Law}, ed. Gro Nystuen, Stuart Casey-Maslen, and Annie Golden Bersagel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 347–73.

\textsuperscript{73} In the Canadian context, see for example, Michael Pearson, Gregor Mackinnon, and Christoper Sapardanis, “‘The World Is Entitled to Ask Questions’: The Trudeau Peace Initiative Reconsidered,” \textit{International Journal} 41, no. 1 (1985): 130–131.

Johan Bergenäs, for example, details Sweden’s nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation advocacy, but does not engage in any detail with the question of what actually caused this advocacy.\(^{75}\) Marianne Hanson examines Canadian and Australian attempts to advance nuclear disarmament and/or arms control.\(^{76}\) She also looks more broadly at the role of ‘advocacy states’ in nuclear disarmament processes.\(^{77}\) Hanson focuses mainly on the effect of such advocacy on the international normative environment, and does not engage with the notion of identity as a policy driver, nor with the relationship between identities and norms. Naoki Kamimura looks at the nuclear disarmament advocacy of Australia and New Zealand, but limits his explanation of why this advocacy came about to the observation that it was triggered when France began testing in the South Pacific.\(^{78}\)

Erika Simpson looks at the role of elite beliefs in shaping Canadian nuclear weapons policies, but does not engage with the constructivist literature on the subject.\(^{79}\) Gabriel Stern focuses on Canadian identity in the field of conventional arms control, but his work focuses on elite identities only, rules out public influence on arms control dynamics, and highlights the importance of Canadian material contributions, as opposed to the advocacy focus in the current thesis.\(^{80}\) As will be seen in both the Canadian and New Zealand case studies here, however, public sentiment has the capacity to influence nuclear disarmament policy in significant ways.

Douglas Shaw examines Canada’s advocacy of nuclear nonproliferation norms.\(^{81}\) He highlights Canada’s status as a ‘peace-loving nation’ with an ‘apparent satisfaction with “middle power” status,’ as important domestic factors influencing policy. These characteristics clearly relate to national identity, but Shaw makes no attempt to explain how they came to be constructed or

\(^{75}\) Bergenäs, “The Rise of a White Knight.”
\(^{76}\) Hanson, “Advancing Disarmament”; Hanson, “Australia and Nuclear Arms Control.”
\(^{79}\) Simpson, *NATO and the Bomb*.
\(^{80}\) Gabriel M A Stern, “Forging New Identities: Explaining Success and Failure in Canadian Arms Control Initiatives, 1990-2004” (McGill University, 2005), 377, 386.
why Canada in particular should be thought of as peace-loving. Natasha Barnes also explores ‘middle power’ nuclear disarmament advocacy, taking a structural approach to defining this notoriously flexible term; that is, material ‘asymmetry forms the core motivation for these states to actively seek and support the development of international norms that can constrain the great powers and ensure a more constructive and equitable international environment.’ Again, this leaves aside the issue of unique national experiences and histories that are formative aspects of national identity. Carl Ungerer examines the role of the ‘middle power’ New Agenda Coalition (the ‘NAC’—a group of six states that includes New Zealand, whose designation as a middle power demonstrates the extreme flexibility of the term) in helping set the international nuclear agenda. Ungerer makes no mention, however, of national identity and does not attempt to explain why the issue of nuclear disarmament is important to the NAC countries in particular.

The current thesis offers the most detailed examination to date of the precise mechanisms and processes through which nuclear weapons-related national identities inform nuclear disarmament policy in Canada and New Zealand. This constitutes a unique contribution to the small literature on nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states, but also contributes to constructivist studies more broadly, which have almost entirely neglected the relationship between national identity and nuclear disarmament policy.

**Key findings**

Due to the complex, historically-contingent dynamics that characterise nuclear disarmament advocacy, it is not possible for a constructivist analysis to produce iron-clad rules about when non-nuclear weapon states will undertake such advocacy. However, this thesis strongly supports the key causal hypothesis that the activation of an anti-nuclear weapon identity is a

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82 Ibid., 46–47.
83 Natasha Barnes, “Middle Powers as Norm Entrepreneurs: Comparative Diplomatic Strategies for the Promotion of the Norm of Nuclear Disarmament”, MA Thesis (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 2010), 20.
necessary condition, and active driver, for nuclear disarmament advocacy. With that in mind, the case studies do point to several overarching themes regarding when the activation of an anti-nuclear weapon identity will result in nuclear disarmament advocacy.

First, the presence of supportive international norms and especially, international legal norms, makes nuclear disarmament advocacy more likely. The metanorm of sovereignty played an important role in activating opposition to nuclear testing in New Zealand in the 1960s and 1970s, as described in chapters four and five. In its disarmament advocacy, the New Zealand government invoked international legal norms in the form of anti-nuclear testing treaties and provisions, and argued that by causing radioactive fallout in the Pacific, French testing breached New Zealand’s sovereign rights. Likewise, chapters seven and eight show that the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons not only informed the content of Canadian and New Zealand advocacy in the late 1990s, but was actually the catalyst for a reconsideration of Canadian nuclear policy.86

Second, though the number of cases is small, detailed within-case analysis strongly supports the hypotheses that the presence of a nuclear alliance commitment makes broad-scope nuclear disarmament advocacy less likely,87 and that this causal relationship is driven by dynamics at the elite level. In the 1970s, New Zealand’s advocacy was limited to opposition to nuclear testing due to internalised pro-alliance norms that for the most part, ruled out consideration of broader challenges to nuclear weapons or related strategies. Similarly, both Canadian cases show how activation of alliance-related identities significantly constrains the scope of nuclear disarmament advocacy, even if governmental elites hold strongly pro-disarmament identities. Due to the transnational nature of alliance institutions, the constraining, pro-alliance identities may be activated by domestic or external actors. Meanwhile, chapter seven reinforces this conclusion by demonstrating how the opposite situation leads to the opposite outcome; that is, the absence of alliance commitments, combined with an internalised public anti-nuclear weapon identity, can cause universalistic nuclear disarmament advocacy, despite a lack of genuine persuasion

87 This is consistent with the Nic Maclellan’s finding, based on primary archival sources, that Australian leadership of the development of a South Pacific nuclear free zone in the 1980s was caused in part by the government’s desire to ensure that the zone did not ban port visits of nuclear armed warships in the region, out of fear that this would disturb Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States. Nic Maclellan, “Delaying the Nuclear-Free Zone in the Pacific,” Inside Story, August 27, 2013, http://goo.gl/OMePSS.
about such advocacy, or even opposition to it, from senior officials and politicians. Overall, the conflictual dynamics between alliance membership and disarmament advocacy are emblematic of what is called here the disarmament/deterrence conundrum. That is, the conceptual logics behind the two approaches to security are mutually exclusive, and given the existential stakes involved, the conflict between the two conceptual frameworks creates significant policy conundrums for individuals with personal anti-nuclear weapon beliefs operating in pro-nuclear weapon institutions.

Third, the methodology developed here allows the thesis to isolate the important role that bureaucratic, and particularly, legal institutionalisation of domestic anti-nuclear weapon norms plays in increasing the likelihood of consistent nuclear disarmament advocacy in the long-term. This is of theoretical significance in several ways. Kees van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek suggest that since actors may comply with norms for instrumental reasons or out of genuine normative persuasion, specifying ‘the conditions under which these various factors are likely to carry more weight’ in policymaking is an important task.88 All four case studies speak to this issue by isolating the various domestic and external policy pressures in the causal chain to gauge whether and how they affect nuclear disarmament policy. Chapter seven, however, is of particular interest in this regard; it demonstrates that legal institutionalisation of anti-nuclear weapon norms affects long-term policy trajectories in two ways. First, it helps to delegitimise arguments in favour of supporting, or acquiescing to nuclear deterrence, thus removing a primary normative competitor for nuclear disarmament. And second, officials and politicians that undertake disarmament advocacy for instrumental reasons (due to social conformity) may become genuinely persuaded about the national security value of those norms in the long term—that is, across several years. This reflects the social-psychological view of collective learning leading to changed state preferences and thus, policies, as the iterative implementation of new norms leads to a self-perception change in individuals, who come to identify themselves with their regular practices.89

Checkel writes that analysts often present such arguments as heuristic claims that are ‘are intuitively or empirically plausible but elaborated insufficiently to allow for empirical testing and


89 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 46; Robert B Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice, 4th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), 84.
generalizing to other contexts. Thus, they avoid the tough issues of operationalization (how would I know persuasion when I saw it?)\textsuperscript{90} More recent works have similarly called for great specification of constructivist causal chains; Rublee, for example, highlights the need for an evolution in constructivist theory that would have great policymaking value—clarifying precisely ‘through what processes and under what conditions’ ideational factors affect policy.\textsuperscript{91} The methodology developed in this thesis addresses this challenge, and is one example of how analysts can identify normative persuasion and its effects on policy: first, segment the population to isolate domestic policy pressures; and second, identify correlations between active identities and policy outcomes, and trace hypothesised causal pathways from the former to the latter, while eliminating alternative explanations relating to external contextual policy pressures. By doing this, chapter seven provides empirical support for Rublee’s suggestion that one pathway to state internalisation of a norm is through its institutionalisation in bureaucratic structures.\textsuperscript{92}

Fourth, the thesis finds that the persuasion dynamic described above does not function with the same efficacy at the political level as it does at the bureaucratic level. Thus, if politicians are unconvinced about the value of a dominant policy norm, but comply with it for instrumental reasons related to, for example, electoral pressure, those politicians are less likely to become normatively persuaded than are officials. It is hypothesised that this is because politicians tend to focus on specific policy areas less intensively than officials, and due to electoral cycles, for shorter periods of time. Conversely, however, where a specific politician is publicly associated with promotion of a norm on multiple occasions, the persuasion dynamic is more likely to hold true due to psychological consistency effects, discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

Finally, three out of the four cases highlighted the importance of individual norm entrepreneurs in generating nuclear disarmament advocacy. This finding reflects broader trends in the constructivist literature—including in relation to nuclear weapons—regarding the central role of human agency in creating normative change.\textsuperscript{93} In the fourth case, that of New Zealand in the 1990s, individual political norm entrepreneurship was less apparent, though not totally absent. In that case, internalised anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the New Zealand public combined with the rhetorical entrapment of unpersuaded political leaders to produce strong nuclear

\textsuperscript{91} Rublee, \textit{Nonproliferation Norms}, 3.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 46, note 46.
\textsuperscript{93} Müller, “Agency Is Central.”
disarmament advocacy. Later, increasing persuasion among officials and the prime minister, along with positive reinforcement from international peer groups, drove consistently strong advocacy.

**Thesis outline**

This introductory chapter has outlined the basis for the current research and its relevance in policy and theoretical terms. Three further chapters establish the conceptual foundations of the thesis, on which the individual case studies are built. First, chapter two provides more detail about the constructivist principles and concepts that underpin the research. This includes the nature of national identity and its close relationship with norms; the functional mechanisms through which identities and their related norms affect policy; the social and psychological mechanisms through which norms and identities evolve; and the role of human agency in all of these processes. The theory chapter also looks more closely at the contextual factors that may intervene in the policy process and thus, affect actors' willingness or ability to express anti-nuclear weapon sentiment as nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Chapter three describes the methodological choices guiding the research design and the operationalisation of key concepts. In sum, the methodology revolves around two choices: first, to conduct comparative case studies in order to maximise external validity of findings; and second, to apply a process tracing method to within-case analysis in order to increase the internal validity of findings. The methodology chapter also looks at the case selection criteria and process, and outlines the sources and analytical treatment of case study data.

Given the hypothesised role of anti-nuclear weapon identities as the active driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy, it is necessary to establish a baseline of national identity content on which the case studies can draw. Chapter four does this, and thus provides a bridge between the theoretical and methodological frameworks, and the analysis in the case study chapters. Chapter four surveys the history of Canadian and New Zealand experiences regarding nuclear weapons, and demonstrates how these experiences have shaped the prevailing national identities in different segments of the population.
Chapters five to eight present the four case studies. Each of these chapters begins by identifying the dominant national identity tropes in the three societal segments during the period in question, then traces the process through which these identities interacted or competed with each other and with contextual factors to produce the scope, intensity and longevity of nuclear disarmament advocacy observed. Finally, chapter nine reviews the findings of the case study chapters, offers more detailed observations about the patterns that characterise the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy, and suggests areas in which future research could usefully build on the research presented here.

**Conclusion**

This thesis contributes to the security studies literature by presenting a rare look at the causal relationship between national identity and nuclear disarmament advocacy. True to constructivist principles, the thesis highlights the mutually constitutive relationship between identities and social structures such as norms and institutions, and also accounts for material reality constraints and intervening contextual factors in the causal chain. In theoretical terms, the thesis contributes to the nuclear weapons literature by identifying the precise social and psychological mechanisms through which policymakers attempt to resolve the disarmament/deterrence conundrum. An unique empirical contribution comes from mapping in detail how an internalised anti-nuclear weapon norm in the New Zealand public in the 1990s had both instrumentally-driven policy effects, and also downstream normative/persuasion effects on policymakers.
2. Theory: the power of ideas, not the idea of power

Peace cannot be kept by force, it can only be achieved by understanding.

~ Albert Einstein

Constructivism and nuclear weapons

IR constructivism is not a specific theory, but rather, an approach to thinking about how non-material or ‘ideational’ factors influence relations among nations.¹ Constructivists ‘elevate socially constructed variables—commonly held philosophic principles, identities, norms of behavior, or shared terms of discourse—to the status of basic causal variables that shape preferences, actors, and outcomes.’² Two key concepts do much of the explanatory work in constructivist literature: first, national identity as a determinant of national interest and thus, of policy preferences; and second, norms as international social structures that both guide behaviour, and help constitute actors and actor identities over time. Constructivists see the relationship between (ideational) structures and agents as mutually constitutive; that is, state behaviour affects international normative structures, and those structures in turn affect the actions and identities of states.³ Over several decades, constructivist scholars have demonstrated the significant influence of ideational factors on foreign policy choices, even in so-called ‘hard cases’ where traditional IR theories see little prospect for such influence, such as in

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¹ For a formative article that laid the conceptual groundwork for much of the constructivist literature that followed, see, Ruggie, “International Regimes.”


national and international security issues. As Jeffrey Checkel notes, ‘the once controversial statement that norms matter is accepted by all except the most diehard neorealists.’

Constructivists do not dispute the rationalist definition of international anarchy—the absence of a global sovereign capable of ensuring international peace and security—but they take an entirely different view of its nature and implications. For constructivists, the mutual constitution of agents and structures suggests that both anarchy itself, and the interests assumed to arise from it, are social constructs, not static or inevitable ‘realities.’ In this sense, constructivists hold that anarchy does not define national interests in any automatic way; rather, a state’s interests are historically contingent and dependent on its self-conception, or identity.

Despite their ideational focus, constructivists do not deny the important influence of material factors on international affairs. They argue, however, that the influence of material factors is historically contingent, not arbitrary or predetermined. Jutta Weldes, for example, describes material facts as ‘reality constraints’—a set of objective realities, such as geography, or the existence of large stockpiles of nuclear weapons, that states must account for in determining

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their interests in a given situation. The influence on policy of such reality constraints is determined by the interpretations and meanings that actors give to them. These meanings are necessarily subjective, based on culturally and historically contingent national experiences and identities, as opposed to being derived from any inherent quality of physical objects themselves: ‘People act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that objects have for them.’

A good example of how identities affect responses to material objects comes from US perceptions of Russian versus British nuclear weapons. In material terms, the design, range and material effect of many Russian and British nuclear missiles are very similar. Yet British nuclear weapons have never been seen as a threat to US security, while Soviet (and later, Russian) nuclear weapons are seen as a very significant threat. The difference lies not in the weapons, but in the national identities of Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, which are historically contingent, ideational, and interpreted by human agents.

In sum, constructivists see international life as made up of ‘intersubjective understandings, subjective knowledge, and material objects.’ The strength of a constructivist approach lies in its ability to account for the influence of both material and non-material factors, such as identities, norms and social structures, on policy outcomes. Given the constructivist view of the world as a complex social structure characterised by the mutual constitution of agents and structures, feedback loops, and cyclical norm change, this thesis is careful to account for the possible feedback effects created by the events in each case study. In other words, the identities and norms discussed as policy influences in the first case study may not be the same

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10 Ibid., 396–397.


as those discussed in later cases. The following section offers more detail about the specific constructivist principles and concepts most relevant to the current study.

National identity

The previous chapter introduced the argument that national identity plays a central, though not exclusive, explanatory role for policy outcomes in this thesis. To say that identity is an important driver for policy does not mean that national interests do not matter. It is a false dichotomy to contrast rationalist and constructivist explanations of policy outcomes along the lines of interests versus identities. Constructivists agree that interests drive policy, but believe that identity will strongly determine how an actor interprets its interests in any situation. In other words, for constructivists, national identity is a key determinant of national interest.

In an important sense, there is a close, interdependent link between national identity and norms. The common constructivist definition of a norm adopted here—‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’—implies that one’s national identity determines which norms are seen as applying to any given situation. On this basis, national identity is defined here as a national population’s beliefs about its nature as a social unit, in terms of its appropriate relationship to other international actors and social structures, such as allies or international law respectively. Thus, norms are embedded in and help to define national identities, with the latter being in part a collection of beliefs about which foreign policy behaviours are appropriate in

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particular situations. When constructivists talk of norms being ‘internalised’, for example—a concept discussed in more detail below—implicit in this assertion is that the norm is internalised in an identity.  

A second key factor which, along with norms, helps to define national identity is the practice of telling stories—in the media, in schools, or in the speeches of public figures, among other places—related to heroes and events that invoke national pride. It is for this reason, for example, that the name of David Lange, New Zealand’s prime minister from 1984-89, is invoked so often when New Zealanders discuss nuclear issues. Lange is revered by many of New Zealanders as an anti-nuclear hero. Similarly, Lester Pearson’s name invokes for many Canadians their country’s pursuit of peace, due to his role as a formative champion of the concept of international peacekeeping during the 1956 Suez Crisis, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize the following year. A monument to Canadian peacekeepers stands prominently in the centre of Ottawa, with an inscription from Pearson: ‘We need action not only to end the fighting, but to make the peace...My own Government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international force for peace.’ An image of the memorial was stamped on the Canadian $1 coins produced in 1995. These national heroes and stories that they embody help to refine and reinforce dominant notions of national identity across time, embedding them in the popular imagination.

Three clarifications are necessary regarding the treatment of identity in this thesis. First, national identity is a multifaceted concept. Citizens’ beliefs about national characteristics are informed

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24 A point of clarification is necessary here in terms of the treatment of Canada and New Zealand as ‘nations.’ Both countries actually have national communities other than the dominant Anglo-Saxon ones, such as the various First Nations and French Canadian settler communities in Canada, and Māori and Moriori peoples in New Zealand. In the cases examined here, however, identities relating to these communities do not arise in any significant way as competing narratives striving to influence foreign policy decision-making. As such, this thesis does not distinguish between ‘national’ and ‘state’ identities. In contrast, the distinction between nation and state is highly relevant in the Middle East, for example, where a myriad of ethnic, national and religious sub-state and transnational identity markers compete with the Western conception of the sovereign state as a primary point of allegiance. See, Telhami and Barnett, “Introduction,” 8–10.
by a diverse range of cultural, economic and security issues, among other things.\textsuperscript{25} In some foreign policy debates, all three of these aspects of national identity may be highlighted or ‘activated’ by different actors, while at other times, only one might be activated.\textsuperscript{26} Human agency determines which identity tropes are activated in a given situation. This makes agency an important consideration in assessing ideational influences on foreign policy, a point discussed in more detail below. Since nuclear weapons are widely regarded as relating to defence and security, the term ‘national identity’ is used as shorthand here to refer specifically to actors’ security-related beliefs about national identity, rather than to the broader set of beliefs and norms that citizens associate with their country. Nuclear weapons-related questions that inform beliefs about national identity include, are nuclear weapons seen as enhancing or degrading the security of a particular country? Are the weapons seen as morally abhorrent, or simply as a weapon needed to fulfil a national defence requirement? Or perhaps both? Identifying how different actors answer such questions enables the researcher to point to the dominant security-related beliefs about national identity in different portions of the population.

Secondly, different beliefs about national identity may compete for prominence in policy processes, as various actors invoke their preferred vision of identity in order to advance the likelihood of their preferred policy outcome. That vision may be a purely personal one, or it may be representative of an institutional or organisational position. To respond to these observations, this thesis separates each country’s population into three analytical segments: first, senior government ministers; second, key foreign affairs and potentially, defence officials;\textsuperscript{27} and third, the public.\textsuperscript{28} This allows for consideration of how the dominant national identities held by these portions of the population either compete or complement each other in the democratic policy process of deciding nuclear policy. In this regard, it is worth considering the dynamics

\textsuperscript{25} Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 398.
\textsuperscript{26} Telhami and Barnett, “Introduction,” 15.
\textsuperscript{27} In terms of bureaucratic division of policy tasks, nuclear disarmament is largely the domain of foreign affairs, as opposed to defence, bureaucrats. The institutional leaning of defence establishments is generally in favour of closer defence ties with great powers, and hence, tends to act as an inhibitor of proactive nuclear disarmament advocacy. Since this thesis focuses on the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities, discussion here mainly addresses the work of foreign affairs bureaucracies.
\textsuperscript{28} This segmentation distinguishes the thesis from other related constructivist work on nuclear policymaking. Due to her focus on psychology, for example, Rublee focuses specifically on ‘state elites and policymakers’, defining elites as ‘those with decision making authority or substantial influence over decision making.’ Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 2.
typical of policymaking processes in representative democracies such as Canada and New Zealand.

In Westminster–style democracies, the cabinet, led by the prime minister, has collective responsibility for deciding foreign and defence policy. All cabinet ministers are elected representatives and constitutionally speaking, govern in the name of the people, but they nevertheless come into office with their own beliefs about national identity and nuclear weapons, and consequent policy preference. The central role of senior ministers in the foreign policy process means that their views can affect the options available for consideration by cabinet. When the policy preferences of key ministers do not match those of the public on a particular issue, public opinion may influence outcomes if there is enough active public interest to create electoral pressure. If this is the case, and politicians’ public behaviour thus conflicts with their genuinely-held preferences, individual actors may experience a form of cognitive dissonance—defined in the psychological literature as a ‘psychological discomfort.’ The natural human response is to take measures to reduce this discomfort, namely through a reconsideration of policy, or alternatively, by reframing the relevant norms in relation to national identity. As explained in more detail below, the potential for cognitive dissonance to influence policy outcomes is arguably strongest in terms of politicians, as they are required to represent and defend their policy decisions in public.

The constitutional role of officials is to advise cabinet. The bureaucracy holds institutional memory about policy across time and as such, foreign policy officials will often have more detailed policy knowledge and experience than their ministers. Officials are not directly responsible to the public in the way that politicians are, but since they are required to implement

29 On the Westminster system and its governing institutions, see, Raymond Miller, Democracy in New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2015), 26–36. Although New Zealand was once considered a ‘near perfect example of the Westminster model’, Miller (pp. 26-27) questions whether the label is appropriate in modern times, given the abolition of the upper house of parliament in 1950, the shift to proportional representation in 1996, and more recently, the introduction of citizen-initiated referenda. Nevertheless, the primary responsibility of cabinet for policymaking, described above, remains consistent across both Canada and New Zealand.

30 In the nuclear weapons field particularly, see, Jacques E C Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Simpson, NATO and the Bomb.


32 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 48.
political directives, their policy behaviours may be influenced indirectly by public opinion. On a psychological level, a significant influence on officials comes from the personal relationships they form and norms of behaviour that they learn over long periods through regular, potentially daily, cooperation with representatives of friendly or allied countries. In his foundational constructivist essay, for example, Alexander Wendt writes, ‘institutionalization is a process of internalizing new identities and interests, not something occurring outside them and affecting only behavior; socialization is a cognitive process, not just a behavioral one.’ In this view, iterative processes of security policy collaboration necessarily influence officials’ personal beliefs about national identity. Again, although these identities are held by individuals, they are national to the extent that the officials concerned identify their actions with serving a broader, national interest, and participate in collective practices on that basis.

If alliance norms include nuclear deterrence, the beliefs underpinning nuclear deterrence theory are likely to become embedded in the national identities of officials, acting as a constraint on nuclear disarmament advocacy. Norms that are indirectly related to nuclear deterrence may also constrain such advocacy. NATO’s strategic concept, for example, argues that both military strength and alliance solidarity are necessary to ensure a ‘credible’ deterrent. Expressing a dissenting opinion about the value of nuclear weapons may be seen as undermining alliance solidarity, and thus, as increasing the likelihood of external, potentially nuclear, aggression. In this sense, certain types of nuclear disarmament advocacy constitute a psychologically-destabilising, potentially existential threat to nuclear deterrence adherents. The constraining role that this dynamic plays on nuclear disarmament advocacy is revisited at various throughout the thesis.

For the general public, who for the most part do not actually practice foreign policy norms, national identity is made up mainly of beliefs about principles the country stands for, generally represented in stories of past foreign policy ‘successes’ that feature national icons, heroes and foster national pride. As will be seen below, the role of sovereignty as an international ‘metanorm’—the norm at the zenith of the international normative hierarchy, from which most other norms governing international relations derive—means that public beliefs about national identity also revolve around stories that affirm a country’s sovereign independence. If particular

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33 Weldes, Constructing National Interests.
stories or heroes dominate the public discourse for a prolonged period, or play a significant role in affirming ideas about national sovereignty, the related norms are likely to become deeply entrenched in the dominant public view about national identity. Where those stories relate to anti-nuclear weapons norms, this increases the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy as a policy outcome.

In addition to the influence on nuclear disarmament policy of the psychological and institutional dynamics described above, it is important to note that actors may invoke a particular national identity on the basis of genuine, personally-held beliefs, or for instrumental or strategic reasons.\textsuperscript{36} However, instrumental use of identity does not negate the relevance of the concept as a source of political influence:

...if language is used strategically it will only be effective if at least some important portion of the population has internalized the identity cues and responds to their use. That is, the instrumentality and authenticity of identity are two sides of the same coin.\textsuperscript{37}

In other words, an identity must exist in at least one politically-relevant constituency in order for its invocation to be of strategic value. Whether an identity is invoked out of genuine commitment or for instrumental reasons, the act of invoking an identity increases the likelihood that the related norms will inform policy outcomes.

Treaty-based international legal norms have important practical implications in terms of helping embed norms in national identities. Treaties codify norms and for countries that join the treaty, establish their explicit sovereign consent to be bound by the relevant norms. Parties are often obliged take specific measures at the domestic level to ratify and implement treaties, requiring the creation of domestic institutions and constituencies responsible for related tasks. Since their jobs derive from defending treaty-based norms, these constituents have a personal, utilitarian interest in the maintenance and strengthening of those norms, though that interest may also correspond to genuinely-held normative commitments. If the commitment is utilitarian at first, over time, it may come to be internalised in personal identity structures due to the iterative, daily practice of the norms and as a result of the psychological consistency effect—a concept outlined in the following section.

\textsuperscript{36} On the strategic use of national identity by government for economic purposes, for example, see, Peter Skilling, “The Construction and Use of National Identity in Contemporary New Zealand Political Discourse,” \textit{Australian Journal of Political Science} 45, no. 2 (May 17, 2010): 175–89.

\textsuperscript{37} Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 700. See also, Telhami and Barnett, “Introduction,” 16.
Thirdly, in relation to how national identity is defined here, identity is not static; it can change in significant ways over time, and challenges to dominant identities are common. While acknowledging the dynamic nature of identity, this thesis treats identity as a social object that can be defined as a discrete causal factor, in order to assess its influence on an observed policy outcome. Thus, the thesis defines national identity as it existed at the time of the events examined in each case study, offering an assessment of the dominant identities held by the three constituencies discussed: senior ministers, officials and the public. The process and data sources used to define national identities in each case are outlined in the methodology chapter which follows.

As the various dynamics described above suggest, national identities tend to evolve slowly and incrementally. This is because dramatic shifts in belief systems can be psychologically destabilising, and because institutional structures accumulate over time at the national level which reflect and reinforce dominant identity traits, habituating officials to the defence of those traits. Wendt, for example, describes an institution as 'a relatively stable set or “structure” of identities and interests...often codified in formal rules and norms.' As will be seen in chapter four, however, rapid transformations in national identity are possible when an external trigger event challenges existing identities; this is similar, for example, to the way that sudden, unexpected events may shift international norms. Such events create a window of opportunity for norm entrepreneurs—actors who advocate new norms, or who seek to activate and link existing norms to new policy objectives, as discussed further below—to promote a new vision of what a country stands for.

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38 Legro, “The Plasticity of Identity under Anarchy.”
40 Leading international scholars have advocated such an approach. See, Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 700.
41 Discussion of the ‘consistency’ effect that results from this dynamic follows further below.
43 Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 20.
44 Ibid., 24.
45 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 45, n.42.
**Norm internalisation**

The constructivist notion of ‘norm internalisation’ plays an important role when analysing how national identities influence nuclear disarmament policy.\(^{46}\) Internalisation constitutes a situation in which a norm’s prescriptions are taken for granted, and thus, the appropriateness of compliance with them becomes unquestioned.\(^{47}\) A state that internalises a particular norm comes to see the prescribed practices as ‘natural’ for the state.\(^{48}\) Conversely, by describing what is assumed to be natural behaviour, internalised identities tell us what not likely to be possible in policy terms by telling us what is unnatural, or unthinkable:

> Much of the scholarly literature on socialization is also implicitly about the normative content of identities. What is at stake in socialization is ultimately the internalization of constitutive norms—the process by which the collective expectations of the members of an identity group come to feel taken for granted by new members.\(^ {49}\)

Accordingly, in order to answer the core research question of this thesis, it is important also to consider the question, what nuclear weapons-related norms have been internalised in Canadian and New Zealand national identity? The analysis returns to this question at various points throughout the thesis, as and when appropriate.

When norms are embedded in a national identity but not internalised, the democratic policymaking process may include explicit reflection and debate over the related policy prescriptions. In contrast, when a norm is internalised, debate over the relevant policy issues ceases, because actors do not need to consider what the policy preferences should be in a given situation, they are obvious.\(^ {50}\) Internalised norms thus have the potential to constrain policy

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\(^{47}\) Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 904.

\(^{48}\) Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus* closely resembles norm internalisation. Among others, Vincent Pouliot and Frédéric Mérand apply Bordieu’s concept in their IR ‘practice’ theory, but focus on implicit learning among elites as opposed to the effect of explicit norm advocacy. Since the core focus here is on explicit advocacy of nuclear disarmament, the internalization/habitus link is not pursued further. Vincent Pouliot and Frédéric Mérand, “Bourdieu’s Concepts: Political Sociology in International Relations,” in *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, ed. Rebecca Adler-Nissen (New York: Routledge, 2012), 29–32.

\(^{49}\) Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 697.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 697–698.
before any explicit policy debate begins, by defining certain options as ‘natural’ or inevitable, and making other appear unthinkable.

To be clear, the discussion of various internalised identities in this thesis is not intended to imply total unanimity on a particular identity trait. Rather, it implies that the overwhelming portion of a societal segment is committed to a particular vision of national identity. Such widespread internalisation of a norm within a portion of the population may attenuate not just debate, but even attention to an issue. In this situation, the absence of debate or public attention does not reflect a lack of genuine commitment to the relevant norm. On the contrary, the lack of debate means that the norm and its prescriptions are so deeply embedded in an identity that, unless an external trigger forces a reconsideration of beliefs, actors see no need to consciously examine policy alternatives. If this dynamic develops within state institutions responsible for managing policy, the resulting policy practices may become very difficult to shift.

In international affairs, the most obvious example of the internalisation dynamic is what is defined here as the ‘metanorm’ of national sovereignty. Another way of saying this is that sovereignty sits at the zenith of the normative hierarchy governing international relations, and thus provides the rationale and legitimacy for many subsidiary norms that govern daily inter- and intra-state relations. The core norms that constitute the modern concept of sovereignty—self-determination and non-interference within territorially-defined national boundaries, and the right to self-defence—have been practiced relatively consistently since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. These norms are therefore deeply entrenched, and arguably, internalised, in the national identities of people all over the world. They are, for the most part, an unquestioned feature of international life.

The relevance of this observation to the discussion of how internalised norms affect nuclear disarmament policy is that foreign policy claims that can credibly be linked to core sovereignty norms are likely to be compelling and politically influential. Chapter four demonstrates, for example, that in New Zealand, one aspect of the political dynamic that helped shift public

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52 In certain situations, the notion of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) presents serious conceptual and political challenges to dominant notions of sovereignty. However, R2P has never been invoked in nuclear disarmament debates, so is not considered here. On R2P, see, Gareth Evans, “The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)* 98 (2004): 78–89.
opinion towards internalisation of an anti-nuclear weapon norm was the belief—fostered by nuclear disarmament advocates and assisted by external events—that opposing nuclear weapons was central to defending New Zealand’s sovereign independence.

**Socialisation mechanisms**

Political psychology proposes three socialisation mechanisms through which norms, when highlighted or activated, may influence social outcomes—social conformity, persuasion and identification. Social conformity means complying with norm’s prescriptions for instrumental reasons, in contrast to personal preferences. When a person is persuaded, they pursue norm-consistent behaviour out of a genuine belief in the appropriateness of that behaviour. Identification describes a situation in which a person complies with a norm in order to emulate or develop affect with an important other. This section outlines some of ways in which these socialisation mechanisms either affect policy or come to be embedded in dominant national identities. The impact of these socialisation mechanisms may vary across in the three segments of society.

In a democracy, widespread public internalisation of a norm produces strong incentives for politicians to comply with that norm or express pro-norm attitudes in public, even if they are not genuinely convinced about the norm’s prescriptions. Such electorally-motivated statements can lead to rhetorical entrapment; that is, if public sentiment on the issue is strong, leaders will feel compelled to pursue behaviours that are consistent with previous pro-norm commitments made in public, increasing the likelihood of future policy that is consistent with past rhetoric. In terms of genuine preference changes, chapter seven will demonstrate that particular politicians who for instrumental reasons become closely identified with defence of anti-nuclear weapon norms may experience persuasion effects over time; or alternatively, generational change or natural attrition among MPs may alter the balance of identities within a party across time.

A concept related to social conformity and persuasion dynamics, and one which also informs the analysis here of the drivers for nuclear disarmament advocacy, is the notion of psychological

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consistency. This refers to an individual’s need to appear consistent, either for the stability of their own identity and thus, their psychological wellbeing, or for electoral or political purposes.\textsuperscript{55} Consistency effects in policymaking have been explored in the realm of nuclear nonproliferation,\textsuperscript{56} but not previously in regard to nuclear disarmament, though Rublee calls for such an undertaking.\textsuperscript{57}

For officials, the institutionalisation of norms in bureaucratic structures and practice is an important mechanism of socialisation. Officials may have particular strong view on the policies they are instructed to implement, and simply do so for utilitarian reasons in that their livelihood depends on it. Alternatively, they may oppose the policies government policy, and seek to undermine it. Either way, the iterative daily practice of norms habituates officials to those norms, and over time, can lead to norm persuasion. In personal psychological terms, the consistency effect suggests that ‘performance of the initially requested action causes a self-perception change; that is, individuals come to see themselves as possessing certain behaviour-related traits.’\textsuperscript{58} Cialdini describes this process as commitments ‘growing their own legs.’\textsuperscript{59}

In this sense, consistency effects may drive future norm-consistent behaviour not just producing by rhetorical entrapment in political leaders, but due to the psychological desire to avoid cognitive dissonance in both politicians and officials. This persuasion dynamic is more likely to affect beliefs if the individuals in question are undecided to start with, but a key finding discussed in chapter seven is that even in the realm of nuclear weapons, persuasion can shift officials’ perspective from total opposition to the expression of anti-nuclear weapon norms to strong support. If the persuasion dynamic continues for a long enough period, it may result in the internalisation of anti-nuclear weapon norms.

The persuasion/internalisation process may be augmented or diminished depending on whether officials receive external recognition—for example, from international peers—whose figurative ‘back patting’ or shaming may produce a sense of pride or shame regarding the policies enacted.


\textsuperscript{56} Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 46.

\textsuperscript{57} Rublee, “Scholarly Research on Nuclear Exits,” s44.

\textsuperscript{58} Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 46.

\textsuperscript{59} Cialdini, Influence, 84.
The degree to which such external feedback affects individuals’ beliefs depends on the perceived legitimacy of the actor providing the feedback:

...the strength of backpatting and opprobrium depends on two related factors: the nature of the actor’s self-categorization, and which other actors, by virtue of this self-identification, become important, legitimate observers of behavior. Changes in identities mean that different audiences matter differently.⁶⁰

As with the political leadership, natural attrition may help to introduce alter the balance of national identity beliefs within the bureaucracy, though if the beliefs of incoming officials conflict with established norms, they will still have to compete for recognition.

**Norm dynamics**

In very simplified terms, there are two related, but distinct dynamics that might interest norm scholars: how norms affect actors’ behaviour, and how actors’ behaviour affects norms.⁶¹ The main contribution of norm dynamics to this thesis comes from the former. That is, the thesis examines how existing norms—either congruent with, or embedded in anti-nuclear weapon identities, and activated by human agency—affect the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy.

The interplay between agents and structures means that norms are constantly evolving over time in a cyclical manner, with actors ‘linking rules to actions to arguments, which in turn reshape the rules.’⁶² It is the ‘intersubjective’ or shared nature of beliefs about appropriate behaviour that gives norms validity and contributes to their influence on policy.⁶³ In this sense, the legitimacy of state actions at the international level is derived in part from adherence to relevant norms in a given situation, and states may invoke particular norms to justify and validate their behaviour.⁶⁴ As will be seen in chapters six and eight, for example, the inability of Canadian

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⁶¹ On the question of how state behaviour affects international nuclear weapons-related norms, see Shaw, “Lessons of Restraint.”
⁶² Sandholtz, “Dynamics of International Norm Change,” 104.
leaders to link their nuclear disarmament advocacy to specific international norms contributed to a diminution of that advocacy.

Norms are generally seen as existing on a continuum, rather than as being dichotomous. The constructivist literature tends to focus on a few common assumptions about norm functioning. First, norms have a value-laden prescriptive character that distinguishes them from other kinds of rules. For example, James Fearon distinguishes between a rule and a norm as follows: rules stipulate ‘do X to get Y’, whereas norms stipulate ‘good people do X’. In the context of nuclear deterrence, however, this distinction is somewhat blurred.

Few people affirm the moral value of making annihilation threats of the type inherent in nuclear deterrence postures. The theoretical structures around which the practice of nuclear deterrence is built, however, suggest that weakening nuclear deterrence practices—for example, by undermining alliance solidarity, as discussed above—increases the likelihood of war and potentially, nuclear war. As such, the normative value of making credible nuclear annihilation threats comes, somewhat perversely, from the belief that the alternative is worse. For this reason, the use of the terms pro-nuclear/pro-nuclear weapon in this thesis is not intended to impute to the relevant actors a moral commitment to the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Rather, these terms refer to practices and beliefs that favour the retention of nuclear weapons.

A second defining feature of norms is that they can be both constitutive and regulative; they ‘establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave.’ A key example of this in the nuclear field comes from the NPT. Ten years after the Treaty entered into force, 73 percent of UN members (112 of 154) had joined; at time of writing in 2015, the figure is 97 percent, as noted above. In other words, the

66 Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 22.
NPT is a central normative structure that determines multilateral discourse around nuclear weapons. The NPT explicitly creates the identity categories of ‘non-nuclear weapon state’ and ‘nuclear weapon state’—the latter being those that exploded a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967. Though these categories officially apply only to NPT members, the near-universal nature of NPT membership means that the Treaty’s norms and identity categories often structure relations between NPT members and non-members. Many NPT members, for example, show great reluctance to acknowledge the four non-members as being nuclear armed, for fear of undermining the NPT. Similarly, opposition to the US-India nuclear deal in the mid-2000s was based on concerns that the deal would undermine the existing international nuclear regime, which centres on the NPT.

In terms of defining member-states’ behaviours, the NPT affirms that non-nuclear weapon states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons by any means. In exchange, the nuclear weapon states—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—agree not to assist any non-nuclear armed state to acquire nuclear weapons, and agree to disarm under Article VI. Given this ‘grand bargain’ in which all Treaty members agree to work to eliminate nuclear weapons, this thesis argues that although the NPT does not outlaw nuclear weapons, it codifies an ‘anti-nuclear weapon norm.’ In other words, the grand bargain codifies ‘the mutually agreed-upon assumption that the world is better off without nuclear weapons than with them.’ This anti-nuclear weapon norm is defined here as a metanorm that incorporates both nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation norms.

A third common assumption about norms is that they help to shape identities incrementally, through the iterative repetition of norm-compliant behaviour. For example, nuclear weapons acquisition was previously seen as increasing international status and marking a state as a modern or great power. However, as countries have consistently pursued policies, and

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70 UNODA, “Treaties Database: NPT”, article IX(3).
71 See, for example, SCFAIT, “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century” (Ottawa, December 1998), recommendation 14.
73 China and France did not join the NPT until the early 1990s, but were defined as nuclear weapon states in the Treaty text, due to their having tested nuclear weapons prior to signature of the NPT. See, UNODA, “Treaties Database: NPT”, Article IX(3).
74 This might equally be termed an emergent ‘nuclear disarmament norm.’ Barnes, “Middle Powers as Norm Entrepreneurs,” 4–5. The term anti-nuclear weapon norm is used here for compatibility with the notion of anti-nuclear weapon identities.
75 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 39.
established bureaucracies that reflect and institutionalise the anti-nuclear weapon norm of the NPT, these processes have helped to invert the normative value of—that is, the shared beliefs about what constitutes appropriate behaviour in relation to—the weapons over time. Acquiring nuclear weapons is now widely viewed as the illegitimate action of a renegade state. Quantitative analysis shows that this transformation of international norms corresponds to an increased likelihood over time that states will renounce nuclear weapons activities.

Finally, in terms of how norm-related dynamics affect the core arguments in this thesis about the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy, the case studies will show that the activation of domestic or international anti-nuclear weapon norms increases the likelihood of disarmament advocacy. Conversely, in the context of alliance relations, the highlighting of nuclear deterrence or solidarity norms may constrain expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities, depending on the degree to which the actors involved identify with the source of the external messaging, as discussed previously.

The role of agency

The construction, activation and interpretation of ideational structures such as norms and identities are inherently social processes. Human agency is therefore an essential aspect of any explanation for how identities and their related norms affect policy, and vice versa. This section outlines how agency is incorporated into the core arguments made in this thesis about the role of anti-nuclear weapon identities as drivers for nuclear disarmament policy.

Much of the constructivist literature adopts the frame of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ to describe actors that advocate novel policies or normative positions. Norm entrepreneurs are actors that

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76 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 76; Rublee, “Taking Stock,” 430. Even some realist scholars have acknowledged the normative basis for this trend: see, Gavin, “Nuclear Proliferation and Non-Proliferation during the Cold War,” 415.


try to convince a critical mass of states to adopt norms. They ‘seize windows of opportunity’ to ‘alter the prevalent normative structure.’ A common understanding of norm entrepreneurs as purveyors of new ideas led to the assumption in early constructivist literature that such entrepreneurs are most active during the emergence phase of new norms. However, this model needs refinement. Normative contestation is constant and evolutionary, so norm entrepreneurs should not be understood merely as actors who encourage the adoption of new ideas. Norm entrepreneurs also seek to activate and link existing identities and related norms to new policy objectives, and use consistency effects to ensure that policy outcomes reflect prior normative commitments.

Early constructivist works largely examine the role of individuals as norm entrepreneurs, though a small but growing body of literature has begun to focus on states and international organisations in this role. The outcome of interest in this thesis is state-based nuclear disarmament norm entrepreneurship, with the theoretical focus is on why states pursue such activity. In contrast to scholars’ earlier focus on the altruistic, principled motivations of norm advocates, Wunderlich notes that state-based norm entrepreneurship may be driven by a complex mix of self-interest and normative commitment—a finding also reflected in the case studies presented here.

82 Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 20.
84 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 45, n.42.
87 Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 32.
The precise influence of norms on nuclear policymaking depends on how key actors responsible for making decisions process the norms they are either confronted with externally, or with which they already identify. From a social psychological perspective, three mechanisms affect such norm processing: linking, activation and consistency. Linking a proposed policy to well-established norms or values strengthens the perceived legitimacy of the policy. Activation of a norm means emphasising and promoting one particular norm over others. A third norm processing mechanism, consistency, has already been discussed. The empirical chapters return to these three concepts—linking, activation and consistency—to build the causal arguments about the relationship between national identities and nuclear disarmament policy.

To the extent that norm entrepreneurs can credibly frame new policy objectives as congruent with existing norms with which the target audience identifies—that is, to ‘link’ the two, normative precedence may be influential as a policy driver. In the NPT context, for example, it is common to use consensus language from the final documents of previous review conferences as the basis for future negotiations. This practice means that the specific language in such documents often represents consensus developed across a decade or more of negotiations between dozens of countries.88 Invoking previous consensus NPT agreements allows countries to claim greater legitimacy for current disarmament proposals if the two can credibly be linked.89 The relevance of this observation to the question of what causes non-nuclear weapon states’ advocacy of nuclear disarmament is that policymakers who doubt the chances of success for a diplomatic initiative related to disarmament are unlikely to proceed. Normative precedents that legitimate their policy preferences, however, mean that related initiatives more likely to succeed, thus increasing the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy.

In domestic policy-making processes, the existence of codified anti-nuclear weapon norms—whether in domestic law or policy, or international treaties—provides precedents, and thus legitimacy and political leverage, for actors seeking to pursue pro-disarmament policies. Several cases point to this effect. In Ukraine’s decision to get rid of its inherited nuclear weapons, for example, ‘the NPT subtly disciplined nuclear negotiations...by limiting legitimate options available’ due to the identity categories defined in the Treaty.90 South Africa’s decision to disarm

89 The author observed the regular use of this linking technique in negotiations at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, as states sought to have their preferred disarmament language included in the draft outcome document.
90 Budjeryn, “NPT and National Identity,” 34.
seems to have been driven in large part by a desire to rejoin the international community in the post-apartheid era, including for economic reasons.\textsuperscript{91} However, without the NPT’s widely-endorsed anti-nuclear weapon norms, achieving these goals would not have been assisted by getting rid of nuclear weapons, making disarmament a less likely outcome.\textsuperscript{92}

Similarly, while economic and other forms of coercion have played an important role in minimising the spread of nuclear weapons,\textsuperscript{93} such coercion would have no legitimate basis in the eyes of much of the world were it not for the NPT. Political authority is ‘a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose,’\textsuperscript{94} whereas ‘force without legitimacy is tyranny.’\textsuperscript{95} Coercive great power nonproliferation strategies in the absence of collective anti-nuclear weapon norms would be seen as a breach of states’ right to self-defence—a core norm of sovereignty—and would thus be condemned internationally, and arguably, would be less likely to succeed. The case study chapters return to the normative dynamics discussed in this section as they are relevant to each historical episode. Each case offers detailed empirical examination of whether and how the activation of anti-nuclear weapon norms—some embedded in national identities, some derived from international agreements or legal norms—have made nuclear disarmament advocacy more likely.

**Contextual factors**

According to constructivist logic, a significant change in identity should lead—all things staying the same—to a related change in policy. Of course, things never stay exactly the same in the political world. The complexity of social interactions that define international life mean that constructivists cannot make deterministic claims such as, ‘the more X, the more Y.’\textsuperscript{96} The external material, ideational and agentic factors that intervene between identity and policy are classed

\textsuperscript{91} Long and Grillot, “Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies,” 32.
\textsuperscript{92} Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 14.
\textsuperscript{94} Ruggie, “International Regimes,” 382.
\textsuperscript{95} Terence O’Brien, Presence of Mind: New Zealand in the World (Wellington: NZIA, 2009), 177.
\textsuperscript{96} Lupovici, “Constructivist Methods,” 211.
here as *contextual* factors.\textsuperscript{97} To the extent that the analysis can account for or discount contextual policy influences, it is possible to draw credible conclusions about the role of identity as a policy driver.

On the basis of existing scholarship, this thesis examines a range of contextual factors that are of key interest to IR constructivism. These include: a) the military alignment of the country; b) the status of norms relating to nuclear weapons, and the way those norms are processed by decision makers and officials;\textsuperscript{98} c) civil society activity, particularly regarding the activation/highlighting/linking of norms, and d) the state of great power relations, which may affect policy calculations in a variety of ways. Depending on the details of the case, each of these contextual factors may complement or counteract the preference to pursue nuclear disarmament advocacy. The influence of normative context on policy was discussed in detail in the preceding section due to its close relationship with identity structures. The current section therefore only on military alignment, civil society activity and great power relations. It should be noted that these contextual factors do not exist in isolation from the process of identity and preference formation discussed above. Rather, they interact regularly with national identities and thus may exert pressure in a range of ways—for example, by reshaping national identities in the mutually-constitutive manner emphasised by constructivist principles, or by activating particular norms during policy debates.

Finally by way of introduction to the contextual variables, this thesis acknowledges the important role that geography plays as a reality constraint with which all countries must grapple in determining their policy preferences. However, as emphasised above, the impact of such reality constraints on policy is determined by human agency. As such, the influence of geography on the national identities and nuclear disarmament policies of Canada and New Zealand is operationalised in the empirical chapters that follow via the identity-related and contextual factors outlined in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{97} In their definition of process tracing—a methodological tool applied in this thesis, as discussed in the following chapter—Bennett and Checkel discuss ‘complementary’ variables as those that display additive/subtractive qualities in relation to the key causal variable. This thesis takes a similar approach, but does not employ the positivist language of ‘variables’. Bennett and Checkel, “Process Tracing,” 7–8.

\textsuperscript{98} In the context of nuclear nonproliferation, for example, see, Rublee, “Scholarly Research on Nuclear Exits,” s39–s40.
Military alignment

Defence planning is an important, long-term policy issue for governments in logistical, political and legal terms. Military alliances complicate defence planning by requiring its coordination with foreign as well as domestic constituencies. Membership in military alliances with nuclear weapon states can generate countervailing pressures to the expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities through a variety mechanisms. Such alliances create domestic and transnational constituencies that have personal and institutional interests in affirming the value of nuclear weapons, including from a financial perspective. Over time, the socialisation dynamics outlined above may create or strengthen pro-nuclear weapon identities in these constituencies. In some cases, pro-nuclear norms may even become internalised.

Both Canada and New Zealand have participated in alliances in which nuclear weapons play a significant role. Canada is still a member of two such alliances: the 28-member (at time of writing) North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), formed in 1949, and the Canada-US North American Air Defence agreement (NORAD), which began operations in 1957 and was formalised in 1958. For more than 35 years, from 1951–1986, New Zealand was an official ally of the United States under the trilateral Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty (ANZUS). The empirical chapters examine how the publics, bureaucracies and senior ministers in each case study understood and acted on their alliance commitments. This includes consideration of the degree to which alliance commitments and the practice of their associated norms informed national identities and decision-making processes.

In this regard, it is important to note that from a constructivist perspective, the Canadian commitment to NATO cannot be understood merely in terms of security or state ‘survival’ in the

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100 It is worth noting that rationalist theories regarding alliance dynamics, such as those in Glenn Snyder’s early work on alliance dilemmas, do not apply here for several reasons. Snyder’s rationalist starting point leads him to exclude domestic politics from consideration, as well as alliance relations outside Europe. He also fails to consider that nuclear disarmament—as opposed to arms control—might be a policy objective for alliance members. Glenn H Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 466, 484, 485.

rationalist sense. Post World War II, the territorial threat to North America was distant, while the United States—and to a lesser, but still significant degree, Canada—had overwhelming military and economic superiority to those countries whose territories had been devastated by the war.\textsuperscript{102} From a rationalist perspective, Canadian and US commitments to NATO—with their potential for entrapment in messy European conflicts\textsuperscript{103}—is therefore anomalous.\textsuperscript{104}

From an ideational perspective, the establishment of NATO resulted from the affinity between Western, liberal democracies who saw the ‘Sovietisation’ of Europe as a threat to ‘the liberal collective identity and its views of what constituted a “just” domestic and international order.’\textsuperscript{105} The Alliance was established to address that threat. This point is explicitly reflected in NATO documents. For example, the 1991 NATO strategic concept states, ‘the security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all.’\textsuperscript{106} In material terms, this is a very difficult proposition to defend, considering the Atlantic Ocean that divides Canada and the United States from Europe. In this regard, Canada’s commitment to NATO, and the tensions between alliance solidarity and opposition to nuclear weapons—one of the central themes explored in this thesis—must be understood not just in terms of material security concerns, but as a broader normative imperative.

**Civil society activity**

Civil society actors can apply a range of tactics in attempting to influence policy processes. In the nuclear realm specifically, civil society individuals and organisations have engaged actively on nuclear weapons policy issues since the start of the nuclear age, and have become an increasingly prominent aspect of international nuclear policy debates.\textsuperscript{107} In this vein, Lawrence

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  \item \textsuperscript{102} Buckley notes, for example, that Canada ‘emerged from World War II as a major military power in its own right’ with an economy ‘richer, stronger, and more sophisticated than it had been in 1939.’ Brian Buckley, *Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy: Fate, Chance, and Character* (Montreal; Ithaca, N.Y: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 7–8.
  \item \textsuperscript{103} Snyder, “The Security Dilemma,” 467.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 378.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, para. 36.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} For examples of civil society influence on various countries’ nuclear weapons policies, see, Alyn Ware, “NGO and Government Cooperation in Setting the Disarmament Agenda: The Impact of the 1996
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Wittner writes, ‘omitting this [civil society] nuclear disarmament campaign from explanations of nuclear restraint makes about as much sense as omitting the U.S. civil rights movement from explanations for the collapse of racial segregation and discrimination.’\textsuperscript{108}

Through political lobbying or public awareness campaigns, they may help to activate particular norms at important turning points in policy processes, thus affecting political calculations for decision-makers. This activity can be domestic or transnational, and may focus on either domestic or international norms. In the modern, globalised and digitally connected world, civil society actors have their own transnational networks, which may include foreign civil society or governmental actors. Domestic civil society actors may thus be able to use these networks to put pressure on their ministers and/or officials may both ‘from above’ (at the international level) and ‘from below’ (at the domestic level).\textsuperscript{109}

Alternatively, civil society activity at the domestic level may help to shape national identity over time, potentially helping to shape the range of policy options deemed legitimate by all sectors of society. In addition to potentially influencing the population’s views through public campaigning, for example, civil society influence at the government level is made possible by the fact that official government consultations with civil society have been taking place since the late 1970s in both Canada and New Zealand. These consultations were established in the lead up to the First UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 in order to elicit public input into

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 Risse and Sikkink, “Socialization of International Human Rights Norms.”
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disarmament policy; though their frequency has waxed and waned since that time, they have remained a feature of the policy landscape.\textsuperscript{110}

By examining the content, timing and intensity of civil society interventions in policy debates, this thesis assesses how these interventions influenced government decisions about whether and how to pursue nuclear disarmament advocacy. This might include, for example, activating or influencing anti-nuclear weapons identities across the different segments of society, or influencing factors used by policymakers in their cost-benefit analyses of policy options.

**Great power relations**

The most prominent focus of nuclear weapons scholarship has traditionally been the relationships between great powers, and during the Cold War, between the two superpowers. Given their significantly larger access to material resources over other states, the great powers have an increased breadth and depth of capacity to engage in international relations. The tone and content of great power relations are therefore often major influences on international outcomes, including the policies that other states choose to pursue. In the disarmament realm, the nuclear weapon states have often emphasised the view that disarmament is facilitated by reduced international tensions, not the other way around,\textsuperscript{111} though experts are divided on the point.\textsuperscript{112} Similarly, commentators have suggested the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014 greatly reduced the prospects for further Russia-US disarmament progress.\textsuperscript{113} This perspective sees deteriorating relations as a causal factor that blocks disarmament progress. The influence of such a dynamic on nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states, however, cannot be taken for granted. In some cases, retrenchment into antagonistic ‘bloc’ mentalities may lead great powers to put pressure on others not to break solidarity with their bloc; arguably,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} Ernie Regehr, “Private Interview” (Ottawa, May 29, 2012).
\item \textsuperscript{111} See, for example, the French statement to the CD, in which it states that ‘progress on nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved independently of the overall strategic context.’ CD, “CD/PV.1267” (Geneva, 2012), 11–12. For detailed analysis of the point, see, Bull, “Disarmament and the International System.”
\item \textsuperscript{112} For example, see the contrasting positions of Hedley Bull and Philip Noel-Baker, as summarised in Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{113} See, for example, Mark Fitzpatrick, “The Ukraine Crisis and Nuclear Order,” *Survival* 56, no. 4 (July 4, 2014): 81, 86–87. For a partial chronology of the negative spiral of events leading to this annexation, see, Anders Åslund and Andrew Kuchins, “Pressing the ‘Reset Button’ on US-Russia Relations” (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2009), 2–3.
\end{itemize}
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this would lessen the likelihood of disarmament advocacy. Alternatively, total retrenchment into bloc mentalities can increase the perceived risk of nuclear war, creating a powerful motivator for anti-nuclear advocacy. Chapters six and eight demonstrate these two dynamics respectively, albeit with specific nuances.

While extreme antagonism between great powers may spur nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states, disarmament cooperation between great powers can also increase the likelihood of such advocacy. Immediately following the signing of the Russia-US New START agreement on nuclear reductions, for example, the 2010 NPT Review Conference negotiated a comprehensive ‘action plan’ on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, including ‘concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.’ This plan included an explicit reference to humanitarian concerns, which has spurred a new wave of disarmament advocacy, commonly known as the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’.

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Summary of causal chain

This section briefly summarises the core causal arguments presented in this thesis, as represented visually in Figure 1, below.

Figure 1: Core causal chain

In line with foundational constructivist principles, this thesis argues that the active driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states is the activation of anti-nuclear weapon identities. Such identities determine pro-disarmament national interests, and thus, foreign policy preferences. In drastically simplified terms, if the production of foreign policy were a closed system (which it is not, even in the realm of nuclear weapons policies), a pro-disarmament preference would then be expressed as nuclear disarmament advocacy. Due to the mutually-constitutive relationship between agents and structures, this disarmament
advocacy would create a self-reinforcing feedback loop, via which advocacy would reaffirm domestic policymaking norms, institutionalising them in bureaucratic structures and simultaneously, reinforcing a dominant, pro-disarmament identity.

Several factors complicate this simplified model. For a start, national identity is often contested, so any pro-disarmament impulse arising from an anti-nuclear weapon identity will likely have to compete with conflicting visions of the national interest, which may seek to constrain disarmament advocacy. This identity-based competition may come from domestic actors; this is accounted for by identifying the dominant security-related beliefs about national identity among the public, foreign affairs officials and senior government MPs, and assessing how these compete or complement each other. Alternatively, identity competition may be invoked by external actors, such as allies highlighting nuclear deterrence or solidarity norms. A further alternative is that external actors may intervene to create pro-disarmament pressure in the policy chain—for example, by civil society actors highlighting disarmament norms that resonate with domestic anti-nuclear weapon identities. Furthermore, even if a pro-disarmament impulse prevails in domestic policy debates, intervening factors may affect the expression of that impulse at later stages of the policy cycle. Each of the micro-processes described above is animated by human agency—at least at present\(^{117}\)—so accounting for the activation or highlighting of different norms or identities requires the analysis to pay close attention to the policy process leading to the final outcome, a point discussed in more detail in the methodology chapter that follows. Finally, whatever the policy outcome, it creates a precedent that may be invoked as a legitimising precedent in future iterations of disarmament policymaking.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined a constructivist view of politics that sees outcomes as being driven by a mix of mutually-constitutive interactions between human and (ideational) structural factors. In this view of the world, national identity determines interests and thus, policy preferences. Identities themselves are dynamic social constructions, evolving gradually over time in a cyclical

\(^{117}\) IR scholarship will inevitably have to grapple with the impact of artificial intelligence on policy processes as non-human actors are created with ever greater levels of autonomy—including in the military sphere, if the present trend continues.
process of informing, and being informed by, policy choices and other factors such as material ‘reality constraints’; domestic and international norms; and the role of human agency in activating and linking these ideational factors, or assessing them for consistency. The following chapter outlines the methodology applied in each of the case studies to produce the policy analysis described above.
3. Methodology: tracing the policy process

Introduction

Responding to the dearth of theoretical literature on nuclear disarmament in general, and on the disarmament-related experiences of non-nuclear weapon states in particular, this thesis adopts an exploratory, hypothesis-generating approach. A key methodological choice here is the use of process tracing to create detailed, within-case studies. The strong contextual analysis inherent in this approach allows for the exclusion of alternative explanations, increasing the ‘internal validity’ of causal arguments.¹ By comparing cases across time and national boundaries, it becomes possible to arrive at contingent generalisations about the causes of nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states more broadly.² This allows the research to produce credible conclusions about the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy. This chapter begins by outlining the overall research design. This includes the choice to conduct case studies and to apply a process tracing method to within-case analysis. The chapter then discusses the criteria for case selection and introduces the four case studies selected. Finally, the chapter closes with discussion of the data generation and analysis methods used here.

Research design

The overall structure of this research revolves around two factors: a comparative case study method, and the use of process tracing within each case study chapter. The use of detailed case studies is a common methodological option for qualitative researchers. Such studies allow the researcher to generate contingent hypotheses about the causal mechanisms that produce

¹ Lupovici, “Constructivist Methods,” 203–204.
outcomes of interest.\textsuperscript{3} The aim is to present detailed, theoretically-informed analysis of each instance of Canadian or New Zealand nuclear disarmament advocacy, and thus, to identify the drivers for such advocacy.\textsuperscript{4}

While the thesis argues, in line with constructivist expectations, that the primary driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy is the activation of anti-nuclear weapon national identities, the aim of the case studies is not to determine the precise\textit{ amount} of influence that national identity has on a given outcome. That task is better suited to large-\textit{n} statistical analyses, which infer ‘causation through constant conjunction and correlation.’\textsuperscript{5} Rather, based on comparisons across detailed, context-rich historical episodes, the case study method allows for the development of contingent generalisations about the circumstances in which the activation of anti-nuclear weapon identities is likely to produce nuclear disarmament advocacy. As scholars investigate further cases of such advocacy, the theoretical conclusions offered here can be refined—a process known as mid-range or ‘typological’ theorising.\textsuperscript{6} For qualitative scholars, typological theorising offers a means of examining complex empirical phenomena that are not amenable to quantitative methods.\textsuperscript{7}

The second key methodological choice relates to the use of process tracing, which can be defined as ‘the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case.’\textsuperscript{8} Process tracing requires detailed analysis of the temporal and spatial relationships that link actors, structures and events within a case.\textsuperscript{9} This analysis can be conducted using sources common to qualitative studies, such as ‘histories, archival documents, [and] interview transcripts.’\textsuperscript{10} By offering detailed analysis of chains of actions and events within

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Ibid., 457–458.
\item Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), ch. 11.
\item Ibid., 7–8.
\item Bennett and Checkel, “Process Tracing,” 7.
\item George and Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development}, 6.
\end{thebibliography}
each case, process tracing strengthens the credibility or ‘internal validity’ of causal claims.\textsuperscript{11} Process tracing is particularly useful when dealing with complex scenarios characterised by multiple interaction effects, as in the field of international nuclear diplomacy.\textsuperscript{12} Process tracing is distinguished from historical explanation in various aspects, including by its attention to micro-processes, and its commitment to making explicit the theoretical assumptions that underpin causal claims.\textsuperscript{13}

In order to apply the process tracing method, each case study chapter begins by identifying the dominant, security-related national identities in the different populations segments: government leaders, officials and the public. This includes detailing the location, nature and strength of any anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. Having thus identified where there is an active preference for nuclear disarmament, each case study traces the processes and mechanisms through which the relevant actors seek to have this identity expressed in policy. This analysis includes detailed consideration of how and when contextual factors intervene to either augment or attenuate the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy as a policy outcome. Finally, each empirical chapter concludes with a summary of the theoretical implications arising from the case.

**Case selection method**

Three types of logic may apply in the case selection process: 	extit{purposive}, 	extit{pragmatic} and 	extit{random}.\textsuperscript{14} Often, a combination of the three is present. Purposive logic describes situations where research objectives drive case selection. Pragmatic case selection factors, such as the availability of resources or data, always affect research to a degree and must therefore be acknowledged, but they cannot provide methodological justification for the cases chosen.\textsuperscript{15} Finally, random case

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} On internal and external validity in constructivist scholarship, see, Lupovici, “Constructivist Methods,” 210. See also, Schunz, “How to Assess the European Union’s Influence,” 28; Bennett and Elman, “Qualitative Research,” 459–460; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 220–222.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Hall, quoted in Ibid., 206.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Bennett and Checkel, “Process Tracing,” 9–10.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 294.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 295.
\end{itemize}
selection is often used to create representative samples of large populations, generating data that automatically demonstrate useful variation on the variables of interest. Given the small number of cases examined here, random sampling is likely to cause serious bias in the data so this is not a suitable case selection method; a mix of pragmatic and purposive case selection strategies have thus been applied.

In purposive terms, a key consideration is the hypothesis-generating objective of this research. The relative novelty of the research in both theoretical and empirical terms means it is necessary to focus primarily on cases where proactive nuclear disarmament advocacy did occur. This represents selecting on the outcome or ‘dependent variable’, which from a positivist perspective is methodologically problematic. Checkel warns, for example, that small-n studies may overstate the influence of a presumed cause if they ignore the case of the ‘dog that didn’t bark’. That is, if all cases display both the presumed cause and the expected outcome, the researcher may be ignoring cases where the presumed cause failed to produce the expected result.

For several reasons, this criticism is not valid in the current context. First, this study draws causal conclusions from close contextual analysis, rather than from correlational patterns among variables, which mitigates Checkel’s concern. Secondly, the study does not assume a direct X—Y causal relationship that characterises most positivist studies. The question here is the degree to which anti-nuclear weapon identities cause nuclear disarmament advocacy, but when and why they do. And thirdly, the cases selected necessarily demonstrate variation on the outcome, since disarmament advocacy is always unique in the combination of its strength, scope and duration. The cases examined here, for example, include nuclear disarmament advocacy that is limited to opposing nuclear testing (chapter five); high profile, intensive, but short lived nuclear

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17 Ibid., 125–126; Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques,” 295.
18 The ‘hypothesis generating’ approach is one of four purposive case selection techniques in Jack Levy’s typology. Levy, “Case Studies,” 3. For an alternative typology of purposive case selection strategies, see, Seawright and Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques,” 296–306. Under Seawright and Gerring’s typology, the current study represents a ‘typical’ case, in which the aim is to deepen core constructivist understandings by applying them to new empirical material, and to articulate the causal mechanism operating within each case (pp. 303-304).
21 Bennett and Elman, 'Qualitative Research': 458.
22 On this point, see, Lupovici, “Constructivist Methods,” 211.
disarmament advocacy which included challenging nuclear deterrence theory (chapter six); prolonged, consistent and universalistic nuclear disarmament advocacy rejecting any legitimacy for nuclear weapons (chapter seven); and advocacy of a revision of NATO nuclear strategy but which stopped short of calling for specific policy changes (chapter eight).

In pragmatic terms, the scope and nature of research activities required to produce detailed, within-case analysis means that the research has had to focus on a maximum of two countries, whose official languages are either French or English—those in which the author is proficient. Foreign languages create problems of cost and credibility for the current study; hiring interpreters and translators is not feasible financially due to the potential need for many context-specific, expert translations of nuclear weapons-related texts.23

In purposive case selection terms, it has been necessary to choose from countries that have engaged in multiple historical instances of nuclear disarmament advocacy, to allow for variation in outcomes of the type described above. Among non-nuclear weapon states whose official languages include English and French, a number can be classed as relatively consistent and proactively ‘advocacy states’; among them, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland most prominently.24 Various members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the NAM as a whole at times, have also been strong advocates of nuclear disarmament, though Marianne Hanson suggests such advocacy has been less active over recent years.25 Since 1998, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), which includes English-speaking South Africa as well as New Zealand, has been prominent in nuclear disarmament debates. Other groupings that have been excluded from consideration includes the now-defunct 7 Nation Initiative (7NI), which was established in 2005 and disbanded by 2012 and was led and funded in large part by just one country—Norway; and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which was formed in 2010, too recently to permit sufficient access during the main data generation phase of this research.26 Overall, the

24 Hanson, “The Advocacy States,” 71.
26 The 7NI included Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. See, UK House of Lords, “Nuclear Weapons: Questions: Asked by Lord Browne of Ladyton,” October 8, 2012, https://goo.gl/vEyk7; Hanson, “The Advocacy States,” 73, 83–85. NPDI comprises Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey,
resulting set of possible case study countries includes Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and South Africa.

**Case study countries**

The pair of countries that offer the most potential theoretical interest from the list above are Canada and New Zealand. In terms of similarities, both countries are Western, liberal, Westminster-style democracies with a reputation for constructive international engagement. Each is highly developed, and regularly rates among the world’s least corrupt and most peaceful countries.⁷ Both Canada and New Zealand have strong records of engagement in nuclear disarmament affairs. Additionally, civil society has been an active participant in foreign policy decision making in both Canada and New Zealand at various points.⁸

Conversely, two key points distinguish Canada from New Zealand in the present context. The first is the divergence in the countries’ contemporary alliance memberships and relatedly, their perspectives on nuclear deterrence. Secondly, the role of geography in perceptions of national identity and national interest contrasts strongly between the two countries. New Zealand is uniquely situated, surrounded on all sides by what former Foreign Minister Don McKinnon has called ‘the largest moat in the world’—1500 kilometres of ocean separating it from its nearest neighbours.⁹ Aside from European colonisation in the mid-19th century, no military force has

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⁹Don McKinnon, “New Zealand’s Security: 1990 and Beyond,” in 32nd *Otago Foreign Policy School*, vol. NZ FA&T Re (Otago University, Dunedin: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997).
ever invaded New Zealand territory. This is not to say that the country has never faced external aggression, but in comparison to most countries, such aggression has been rather low profile.\textsuperscript{30} Either way, New Zealand’s isolation has led to a consistently very low, bipartisan national threat perception.\textsuperscript{31} This perception is gradually changing as national security is increasingly understood in terms of terrorist risks, as opposed to traditional military threats.

In contrast to New Zealand, Canada for most of the nuclear age has been surrounded by oceans on three sides and a great power ally on the fourth. Though this led to a low threat perception in the pre-nuclear age,\textsuperscript{32} the country’s unique geography produced a very different threat perception during the Cold War, since Canadian airspace represents the fastest flight path between Russia and the United States. Canadian elites thus had to contend with the knowledge that if the Cold War turned hot, nuclear war would most likely begin over Canadian territory.\textsuperscript{33} This meant a significantly higher threat perception than has been the case in geostrategically-isolated New Zealand. Finally, it must be acknowledged that there is a long tradition of practitioners and scholars framing Canadian foreign policy through a ‘middle power’


\textsuperscript{33} Shaw, “Lessons of Restraint,” 50.
lens,\textsuperscript{34} and nuclear policy is no exception in this regard.\textsuperscript{35} Occasionally, the frame has also been applied to New Zealand.\textsuperscript{36} Nevertheless, the inherent ambiguities in the term render it highly problematic when discussing national identity.\textsuperscript{37} As a result, the frame of middle powers is not adopted here.

In conclusion, studying the combination of Canada and New Zealand effectively meets both purposive and practical case selection criteria outlined above. The similarities and differences between the two countries provide credible bases on which to conduct cross-national comparisons of the roles of ideational structures, domestic processes, and material and/or systemic reality constraints as drivers for nuclear disarmament advocacy.

The following section briefly introduces the specific historical cases examined. As will be seen, the utility of cross country comparisons is maximised by selecting one New Zealand case that predates, and one case that post-dates, the splintering of ANZUS. These cases can usefully be compared and contrasted to the Canadian cases, in which the NATO and NORAD alliance

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commitments remained constant. These considerations provide a sound basis for developing contingent generalisations about the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states.

**Historical cases**

The first Canadian case examines long-serving Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s ‘peace initiative’ of 1983-1984. Prime Minister Trudeau (1968-79, 1980-84) took several important nuclear disarmament initiatives. He led the decision to progressively remove US nuclear weapons from Canadian military service and promoted a ‘suffocation’ strategy to end the nuclear arms race. His high-profile, international ‘peace initiative’ promoted East-West dialogue and specific nuclear disarmament proposals to facilitate a reduction in severe Cold War tensions.

The second case examines Canadian attempts in the late 1990s to have NATO review is strategic concept, seeking to move the Alliance towards a reduced emphasis on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine. This diplomacy was driven strongly by Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy (1996-2000), a prominent advocate of nuclear disarmament. Axworthy instigated a comprehensive review of Canadian nuclear weapons policies, resulting in the most explicit description ever of Canada’s interests and objectives regarding nuclear disarmament.

The first case of New Zealand nuclear disarmament advocacy examined is the promotion of an end to nuclear testing in the South Pacific. The period of focus in this case is from 1971–1974. Bipartisan protest activity was constant in this period, but the norm entrepreneurship of Prime

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38 As there were no significant cases of Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy prior to its joining NATO in 1949, it is not possible to select for such variance in Canadian cases.
42 SCFAIT, “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge.”
Minister Norman Kirk (1972-74) was especially prominent, with his Government significantly expanding the range and visibility of New Zealand’s efforts to oppose nuclear testing.\(^4\)

The second New Zealand case relates to the country’s anti-nuclear weapon diplomacy from 1994 to early 2000, including through its membership in the NAC. In this period, New Zealand moved progressively towards denying any legitimacy for nuclear weapons or defence, and sought to entrench global commitments to the elimination of nuclear weapons.\(^4\) This case involves a unique look at the down-stream effects that result from the widespread internalisation of anti-nuclear weapon norms in the public national identity.

**Data generation and analysis**

Two methods of data generation are employed in this thesis. The first is analysis of primary and secondary documents, collected from libraries and archives in both New Zealand and Canada. This is complemented by the second method—interviews with governmental, civil society and academic issue experts in both countries. Documentary analysis and the interview process were undertaken concurrently. As such, the two processes were mutually informing as the research proceeded.

In the Canadian context, the majority of sources were collected during three months of field research from April to June 2012. Most primary material was gathered in Ottawa at Library and Archives Canada and the archives of the Department of National Defence. Most secondary material was accessed through libraries at the University of British Colombia (Vancouver) and McGill University (Montreal). Interviews were conducted in both cities. In the New Zealand context, the author was able to spread interviews with New Zealand experts across several years. Similarly, New Zealand primary documents were gathered through multiple trips to the national archives and national library in Wellington.

The thesis takes an approach to written documents common to qualitative researchers: ‘By reading and rereading their empirical materials, they try to pin down their key themes and and,

thereby, to draw a picture of the presuppositions and meanings that constitute the cultural world of which the textual material is a specimen.\textsuperscript{45} Textual analysis here is thus characterised by an informal, rather than a highly-structured analytical protocol. In this sense, primary source texts are treated as markers that point to social objects, such as norms and identities, rather than as objects to be examined themselves.\textsuperscript{46} This is appropriate when such texts are not themselves the core of the research design, but play a subsidiary or complementary role, as is the case here.\textsuperscript{47}

The research remains sensitive, however, to the ‘historicality’ of documents. In other words, no document represents a complete or impartial account of an event or situation. Texts are indicative of the subjective positions of their authors, and furthermore, may have been generated after the fact, introducing the potential for conscious or unconscious omission or ‘spin’ of issues. Additionally, national security-related documents are likely to be vetted by a range of actors prior to being archived, introducing further avenues for possible bias. The thesis therefore approaches historical texts from a critical perspective: who wrote the document? When did they write it? Who did they write it for? Such questions help the researcher maintain a critical distance from source material.\textsuperscript{48} A further corrective for bias in written texts is to triangulate among sources and data types, thus adding to the credibility of conclusions. This includes, for example, large-\textit{n} public opinion polls; personal biographies; primary documents; secondary analyses; and private interviews.\textsuperscript{49}

Interviewees were selected based on the researcher’s pre-existing networks in the government, civil society and academic sectors, and through direct, written approaches to relevant governmental officials and elected representatives. Permission was granted for the participant interviews by the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee (consent number 7118). Participants included current and ex-politicians from Canada and New Zealand; officials from the Canadian and New Zealand foreign and defence ministries; and academic and civil society disarmament experts. Interviewees were offered the opportunity to participate on a


\textsuperscript{46} In this sense, the research diverges from a more sociological approach, which would treat the texts as inseparable from the \textit{practice} of agents \textit{Ibid.}, 872.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, 870.

\textsuperscript{48} This discussion draws on expert presentations at the Tenth Annual \textit{Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research} hosted by the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, Washington DC, 21–25 June 2012, which the author attended.

\textsuperscript{49} Fontana and Frey, “The Interview,” 722.
non-attributable basis, an option chosen by two Canadian interviewees, one governmental and one from civil society. One particular challenge was access to key interviewees in Canada. Former Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy, for example, and a key former staff member of his, did not respond to repeated interview requests.

Expert interviews present researchers with both advantages and challenges. On a positive note, interviews are ‘particularly apt at reconstructing the practitioners’ point of view’ and ‘provide researchers with an efficient means to penetrate more or less alien life-worlds.’ Both quantitative and qualitative researchers have implicitly endorsed the notion that ‘the results [of interviews] are trustworthy and accurate and that the relation of the interviewer to the respondent that evolves during the interview process has not unduly biased the account.’

However, interviews remove the interviewee from their ‘natural’ surroundings; interviews with diplomats, for example, are not a true representation of how they actually ‘practice’ international relations. From a sociological point of view, ‘Interviews are not pickaxes to mine the truth, but social relations in which a world is performed into being. Diplomats, for instance, know very well the “script” of an academic interview and they practice it accordingly.’ Additionally, ‘response effects’ resulting from the actions of the interviewer or the respondent may bias results. For example, an interviewee may deliberately try to please the researcher by embellishing or giving ‘socially desirable’ responses; or, they may hide information for personal or institutional reasons, or recall events incorrectly. For these reasons, trends in qualitative research have increasingly moved towards an ethnographic perspective on interviewing that recognises the interviewer as a participant in the construction of the data created in interviews.

While acknowledging this point, there is value in gathering personal reflections from interviewees as one tool among many, in seeking to reconstruct shared ideational constructs.

The interview method adopted in this research can be described as semi-structured. It replicates several of the protocols of ‘rational’ interview methods; for example, the interviewer seeks to establish a ‘balanced rapport’ that is casual and friendly, yet directive and impersonal; presents

51 Fontana and Frey, “The Interview,” 698.
52 Pouliot, “Methodology,” 51.
53 Ibid., 49.
54 Fontana and Frey, “The Interview,” 702.
55 Ibid., 696, 698, 716.
an attitude of ‘interested listening’ to encourage participant cooperation; and projects a neutral attitude, refraining from offering opinions on answers provided.56 Each interview began with a set of common, open ended questions. Taking into account the expertise or experience of interviewees, questions then became progressively more specific and focused. The interviews closed with an open invitation for the respondent to reflect on aspects of the research they felt relevant.

Overall, the objective of data analysis is to contribute to a ‘qualitative contextualization’ of data generated by the various means outlined above, in order to ‘reconstruct the intersubjective context of some social phenomenon—in our case, a collective identity—in order to account for an empirical outcome.’57 In the present study, this task of reconstructing ideational phenomena in their social context is accomplished through close, critical reading of written texts and interview transcripts, and through data triangulation.

Conclusion

This thesis is an exploratory, hypothesis-generating study into the causes of nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states. Two key methodological choices inform the process used to generate determine the drivers of such nuclear disarmament advocacy. First, a comparative case study method is adopted, with the thesis presenting four case studies of nuclear disarmament advocacy, two each from Canada and New Zealand, spread between the early 1970s and the early 2000s. These cases demonstrate a range of outcomes in terms of the nature, duration and visibility of advocacy undertaken, allowing for comparison of the different causal dynamics that lead to these different outcomes. By conducting comparisons across national boundaries and across time, the thesis develops contingent generalisations about the drivers for nuclear disarmament advocacy by democratic, non-nuclear weapon states. The second key methodological choice is to use a process tracing method to produce detailed, within-case analyses. Process tracing allows for identification of the precise chain of events and

56 Ibid., 702.
57 Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 702.
interactions that led to the policy outcome in each case, increasing the internal validity of findings.

The case study chapters each follow a standardised structure. They begin by reviewing the dominant security-related national identities across the three segments of society—including the nature, strength and location of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. The chapters then trace the process through which different actors seek to have their preferences expressed in policy, taking into account the potential for competing pro- and anti-nuclear weapon identities to produce conflicting policy claims. In parallel, the analysis examines contextual factors that may intervene to affect whether and how anti-nuclear weapon identities are reflected in policy.

Since anti-nuclear weapon identities are the hypothesised driver of nuclear disarmament advocacy here, it is necessary to establish a baseline for the identity claims made in the various case study chapters. The following chapter therefore provides a broad survey of the role that nuclear weapons have played historically in the Canadian and New Zealand security imaginations.
4. Nuclear Weapons in Canadian and New Zealand History

Living next to [the United States] is like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly or even-tempered is the beast, if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.

~Former Canadian prime minister, Pierre Trudeau

It makes no sense for a country to surround its waters or to invite into its ports or country nuclear weapons, when there is no balance to be achieved. The balance is there now, there are none. And we don’t propose to deter enemies which do not yet exist.

~Former New Zealand prime minister, David Lange

Introduction

This chapter surveys key historical developments relevant to nuclear weapons policy in Canada and New Zealand. The chapter explores the two countries’ perceptions of reality constraints such as geography and the physical presence of nuclear weapons in their respective regions, as well as the influence of the contextual factors defined previously—alliance dynamics, normative context, civil society activity, and great power relations. These historical surveys of the two countries’ national security-related experiences provide the context necessary to make credible claims about the role of national identity as a policy driver in the case studies that follow in chapters five to eight.


Canada in the world

Canada is a Western liberal democracy. In foreign policy terms, this identifier provides ‘the baseline discourse on contemporary Canadian identity.’ The liberal world view is traditionally associated with the rule of law as a means of protecting norms of individual and civil liberties and human rights. In international affairs, Canadians have often projected these values outward through promotion of multilateralism and ‘good international citizenship’, working for international peace and security by advancing the rule of law and human rights. Writing in the Canadian Military Journal, for example, Lane Anker argues, ‘Peacekeeping’ represents a defining aspect of Canadian identity, reflecting fundamental values, beliefs and interests...Public support for a strong Canadian role internationally is largely rooted in our proud history of peacekeeping. Conversely, Canada’s tradition of respect for international law is touted as a symbol of the country’s position as a principled member of the international community. Proponents of this law-abiding/peace-making vision of Canada also commonly cite the country’s active and effective record in disarmament and arms control, both nuclear and conventional. However, Canada’s relationship to nuclear weapons has often been ambivalent, if not contradictory. The conundrum at the heart of this conflicted dynamic is the challenging, often countervailing, pressures deriving from Canada’s alliance commitments on one hand, and its multilateralist, good international citizenship on the other.

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5 See, for example, Lloyd Axworthy, Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future (Toronto: Random House, 2004), 1.
Geography and alliance dynamics

Geography is an important reality constraint for Canada. In particular, it is hard to overstate the influence on Canadian decision making of the immediate proximity of the United States; militarily, economically and culturally, the Western superpower looms large as Canadians look out on the world. Sharing the world’s longest contiguous land border with a global superpower inescapably impacts on Canadian decision-makers’ approach to foreign and security policy issues. At times, the dominance of US influence on Canada—which can be seen as a challenge to established notions of sovereign independence—can lead to a nationalist, almost anti-US sentiment in the Canadian public. Regardless, as former Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau stated, ‘the ponderous presence of the United States’ has been ‘the single most important consideration in the design of successive Canadian foreign policies.’ This point is particularly important in the current context, given that the United States was the first country to build nuclear weapons; has so far been the only country to use them in war; and has played a central role in shaping global politics in the nuclear age. In particular, Canadian governments have had to contend with the powerful, pro-nuclear pressures emanating from membership in US-led nuclear alliances since 1949.

In the period between World Wars I and II, isolationist tendencies were the result of Canada’s low external threat perception; a Canadian representative told the League of Nations, for example, that Canada was a ‘fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.’ By the time World War II broke out, however, this perception was in sharp decline. Canada participated

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9 See the opening section of chapter 2 for discussion of this term.
strongly in World Wars I and II, in the latter case providing Allied forces with significant human, and vast material and financial support. During the second war, Canada also began intelligence sharing with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States in what would become one of the world’s most comprehensive multilateral intelligence systems, the ‘five eyes’ network.

Canada was a significant, active participant in the development of nuclear weapons. The country has enormous uranium deposits, which provided the fuel for the world’s first nuclear weapons, including those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Canada continued selling fissile material to the US nuclear weapons programme until 1965. A significant number of Canadian researchers participated in the US-led Manhattan project that developed the first bombs, giving the Canadian scientific community advanced knowledge of nuclear physics. In the immediate post-World War II era, Canada thus had both the means and the know-how to develop nuclear weapons. Despite this capability, Canada never developed its own nuclear arsenal. In fact, there is near-unanimous agreement among analysts and government figures that Canada never seriously considered developing nuclear weapons. Former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy writes that in the parliamentary and cabinet records, and in the media, ‘There is no evidence that this was ever the subject of major debate...It just seemed to be an assumption that developing nuclear weapons wasn't something we in Canada would do.’

Some analysts put this down to the personal beliefs and convictions of key politicians and officials. Trudeau and his former senior advisor, Ivan Head, suggest the weight of public support for non-acquisition was important, as does former Canadian ambassador for disarmament,

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16 Buckley, Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy, 7–8.  
20 Buckley, Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy, 8.  
22 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 359.  
23 Trudgen, “Buckets”; Simpson, NATO and the Bomb.  
24 Head and Trudeau, The Canadian Way, 70.
Christopher Westdal. Both explanations have important implications for national identity: whether it was elites’ personal beliefs or their perceptions of public opinion that informed Canadian policy, the absence of any serious consideration of nuclear acquisition implies the presence of a national identity that unquestioningly saw Canadian security interests being served by not acquiring nuclear weapons. Similarly, the numerous subsequent statements in which senior officials and politicians have highlighted Canada’s choice not to acquire its own nuclear weapons suggests Canadians are proud of the decision.

The advent of the nuclear era radically transformed the geo-strategic environment and with it, Canadian defence perspectives. Canada was still largely insulated from external invasion, but far from fireproof. As Canadian grappled with the prospect that a nuclear war might be fought in the first instance over Canada, preventing such a war quickly became a key foreign policy objective. Geography also played an important role in the anti-nuclear weapon identity of the secretary of state for external affairs, Howard Green (1959-1963). Green became a resolute opponent of nuclear weapons after learning of the unique threat nuclear testing posed to Canada due to atmospheric fallout patterns.

Canada was also a founding member of NATO in 1949, a multilateral agreement that tied Canada to the United States and to the defence of Western Europe. Acceptance of a Canadian role in NATO to help ensure European security marked a sharp departure from the inter-war perceptions of Canadian security interests, marked by isolationism. As discussed in chapter two

25 Westdal, “Private Interview.”
26 Buckley, Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy, 131, 134; Westdal, “Private Interview.” Westdal and Clearwater also point out that the enormous cost of building nuclear weapons, combined with the fact that the United States—a Canadian ally—was developing its own arsenal, would have facilitated this lack of consideration of the option. John Clearwater, “Private Interview” (Ottawa, June 29, 2012); Westdal, “Private Interview.”
29 Daniel Heidt, “‘I Think That Would Be the End of Canada’: Howard Green, the Nuclear Test Ban, and Interest-Based Foreign Policy, 1946–1963,” American Review of Canadian Studies 42, no. 3 (2012): 343–69.
'Military alignment'), the decision to join NATO owed much to the notion of defending a ‘just’, liberal world order.\textsuperscript{32}

The intersection between Canadian geography and the country’s alliances commitments has created very strong pro-nuclear policy drivers at the institutional level. The deep cultural, political and military integration between Canada and the United States means that any pro-nuclear sentiment within the US government apparatus is felt keenly in Canada. NATO, for example, has explicitly affirmed a prominent role for nuclear weapons in its defence strategy from the outset.\textsuperscript{33} The institutionalisation of domestic and transnational bureaucracies related to NATO creates powerful pro-nuclear pressures for Canadian policymakers, through the progressive entrenchment of alliance nuclear deterrence norms and related identities. From 1957 onward, Canada also developed extensive bilateral political and military ties with the United States via NORAD, a ‘unified, bi-national air defence system with an integrated command structure’ for the defence of the North American continent, which also has a strong nuclear component.\textsuperscript{34}

In the early 1960s, peace movement organisations such as Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and Voice of Women were very active and prominent on nuclear weapons issues, with participation, for example, from the wives of some of Canada’s most senior politicians.\textsuperscript{35} Spurred on in part by the excesses of US military force in South East Asia, a young generation of academics—among them, future Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy—were also attacking Canada’s involvement in both NATO and NORAD.\textsuperscript{36} Nevertheless, historical data and developments suggest the public and government elites identified more closely with maintaining a solid US alliance than with opposing nuclear weapons. In late 1962, for example, a national poll

conducted by the Canadian Peace Research Institute found 58 percent support for increasing armaments to ensure Western military superiority as the best way to prevent war; this would almost certainly have meant increasing nuclear armaments.\textsuperscript{37} A further development that reflects this public sentiment was the issue of Canadian operation of US nuclear warheads. The decision for Canada to undertake this operational nuclear weapons role is an example of the pro-nuclear dynamics arising from its alliance structures, and reveals important insights about Canadian national identity early in the nuclear age. It is therefore useful to examine the details of the decision that led to this outcome.\textsuperscript{38}

Since the late 1950s, the conservative Canadian government led by John Diefenbaker had spent almost CDN$700 million equipping and training Canadian forces with ‘dual-use’ weapons systems—those capable of delivering either conventional or nuclear warheads—on the understanding that they needed to be nuclear armed to serve as effective deterrents.\textsuperscript{39} In the early 1960s, however, the Canadian government, and Prime Minister Diefenbaker in particular, vacillated on actually receiving the warheads. Secretary of State Green strongly opposed receiving the warheads, and ‘frequently argued that Canadian acquisition of atomic weapons would cripple its influence and prestige at international disarmament negotiations.’\textsuperscript{40}

Meanwhile, different portions of the Canadian public had taken different lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.\textsuperscript{41} Unsurprisingly, peace movement organisations such as CND and Voice of Women, among others, were actively lobbying against receipt of the weapons. In 1963, Prime Minister Diefenbaker reported that his mail ‘was running nine to one against nuclear arms for Canada.’\textsuperscript{42} Numerous analysts have explained the government’s hesitancy on this issue by pointing to Diefenbaker’s nationalistic concerns about subservience to US demands; that is, he did not want the United States to determine, or to be seen to be determining, Canadian defence

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Lennox2009} For a more detailed discussion of these events, see Patrick Lennox, \textit{At Home and Abroad: The Canada-US Relationship and Canada’s Place in the World} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 61–65.
\bibitem{Heidt2015} Heidt, “’I Think That Would Be the End of Canada,’” 361.
\bibitem{Wittner1990} Wittner, \textit{Confronting the Bomb}, 101.
\end{thebibliography}
Outside of the peace movement, however, public anger at Canada’s perceived failure to provide full support for the United States during the Cuban Crisis appears to have increased broader support for Canada accepting US nuclear warheads. The delays in accepting deployment of the nuclear warheads led to significant tension with the US leadership, however, and to criticism at home for failing to fulfil alliance commitments.

The opposition Liberal Party leader at the time was Lester Pearson, whose legacy, as discussed in chapter two, is an important touchstone for national pride. In particular, Pearson’s time as secretary of state for external affairs from 1948-1957 has almost mythical status in the popular memory as a golden age of Canadian diplomacy. The ‘Pearsonian’ tradition is often invoked as shorthand for Canada’s commitment to multilateralism and international peace. In the early 1960s, however, Pearson recognised an electoral opportunity in the growing public support for Canadian receipt of US of nuclear warheads in order to maintain strong alliance relations. Despite earlier ‘leading the fight in Parliament against nuclear weapons in Canada,’ Pearson promised that if elected, a Liberal Government would accept the US warheads.

The Diefenbaker Government fell in a parliamentary vote of no-confidence, largely over the warheads issue, and the Liberal Party, having promised to accept the warheads, was elected to govern in 1963. In sum, a conservative government spent a fortune preparing to accept nuclear weapons, but hesitated to do so due to nationalistic fears around excessive American influence on Canadian foreign policy. Conversely, an iconic ‘peacemaker’ Liberal Party leader was elected after promising to bring nuclear weapons to Canada—specifically to repair US alliance relations.

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44 Lennox, At Home and Abroad, 62.
46 On popular understandings of Canada’s place in the world, see, Steven K Holloway, Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006), 1. On the ‘golden age’ under Pearson, see Dhanapala, “Canada’s Role,” 322.
47 Regehr, “Private Interview.”
48 Brian Bow writes that the Liberals officially opposed receipt of US nuclear weapons prior to this point, but that opinion polls showed the public increasingly inclined to receive the weapons. Bow, The Politics of Linkage: Power, Interdependence, and Ideas in Canada-US Relations, 48, 51–54. In contrast, Lenten states that Liberal Party policy was previously ambiguous on this point, but widely assumed to be opposed to nuclear weapons operation by Canadian troops. Howard H Lentner, “Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Case of Canada and Nuclear Weapons,” World Politics 29, no. 1 (1976): 33–34.
50 Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 18–19. Regarding the importance of Canadian concern for alliance relations more generally, see, Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, ch. 3.
Between 1964 and 1984, US nuclear warheads were deployed for use by Canadian troops on four Canadian-owned delivery platforms.\(^{51}\) In Canada, the Royal Canadian Air Force operated BOMARC surface-to-air guided nuclear missiles from 1964-1972,\(^ {52}\) as well as Genie air-to-air, unguided nuclear rockets on long-range CF-101 Voodoo interceptor jets from 1965-1984.\(^ {53}\) In Germany, the Canadian Army fielded Honest John short-range nuclear artillery rockets from 1964-1970,\(^ {54}\) while the Air Force deployed three different nuclear gravity bombs from 1965-1971, aboard CF-104 Starfighter strike/reconnaissance jets.\(^ {55}\) Under Prime Minister Pearson in the late 1960s, Canadian Starfighters provided 20 percent of NATO’s Europe-based, all-weather nuclear strike force.\(^ {56}\) As per nuclear weapons-sharing arrangements with other NATO allies, Canadian troops operated these weapons in cooperation with their US counterparts under a ‘dual-key’ launch system. That is, US troops were deployed with each nuclear unit and the warheads remained in US custody until released to Canadian operators for potential use in times of crisis.\(^ {57}\)

### Anti-nuclear weapon perspectives

In 1968, the newly-elected Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared that a recently-completed review of Canadian foreign and defence policies was inadequate, and demanded a comprehensive re-examination of the core assumptions underpinning these policies.\(^ {58}\) In doing so, Trudeau specifically called into question both NATO strategy and Canada’s

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\(^{51}\) To be precise, John Clearwater states that Canada first received US nuclear warheads on 31 December 1963. Though some have claimed otherwise, he argues convincingly that the Canadian Navy never operated nuclear weapons. John Clearwater, *Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada’s Cold War Arsenal* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1998), 18–21, 238.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., 21, 88.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 178.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 152.

\(^{55}\) More precisely, the final nuclear warheads were removed in the first few days of 1972. Ibid., 91, 152.

\(^{56}\) Ibid., 108–110.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 17, 35–38, 59–63. From the governmental perspective, see, Brian Donnelly, “The Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Articles I, II and VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” in *Nonproliferation: Perspectives from Latin America and the Caribbean* (Quintana Roo, Cancun, Mexico: OPANAL, 1995), https://goo.gl/Nh5Sq1, Annex, Q.3. See also, McGeorge Bundy, ‘Memorandum for the President,’ regarding Canadian use of US nuclear weapons under the NORAD agreement, 30 July 1965, supplied by William Burr, the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Washington DC.

nuclear weapons policies.\textsuperscript{59} Trudeau was strongly personally opposed to nuclear weapons, as numerous analysts, former officials and historians have noted.\textsuperscript{60} He heavily influenced the terms and outcome of the new review, asserting that foreign policy should determine defence policy, not the other way around as he claimed was currently the case.\textsuperscript{61} The idea of reducing Canada’s NATO deployments in Europe was enormously controversial both at home and abroad. Senior Canadian bureaucrats vehemently opposed the idea, as did several senior government ministers and prominent NATO allies—including the United States—in the wake of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{62} Following a heated internal debate, the Trudeau Cabinet announced in 1969 a ‘planned and phased reduction’ of Canada’s NATO forces in Europe.\textsuperscript{63} This included halving the number of Canadian troops in Europe, and a three year phase-out of Canada’s European nuclear role.\textsuperscript{64} At the first UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, Trudeau made the first public declaration of the intention end to Canada’s remaining nuclear


\textsuperscript{62} Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 24–25; Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 20. Regarding the challenges it posed to existing Canadian and alliance policy, see Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, 143; Halloran, “A Planned and Phased Reduction,” 133.

\textsuperscript{63} Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 25.

\textsuperscript{64} Halloran, “A Planned and Phased Reduction,” 140; Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 60; Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 25, 28–29.
weapons role on home soil. The decision made Canada the first NATO ally to return the nuclear weapons it was operating to the United States.

Canada was unique among non-nuclear armed states in the post-World War II period in that it was present at almost every formal multilateral negotiation on nuclear disarmament and arms control. For example, Canada was the only non-permanent member of the UN Security Council to be appointed to the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946. This participation was due in large part to Canada’s collaboration in the Manhattan project, and prominent role in the development of nuclear technology in its aftermath. Since Canada did not itself have nuclear weapons, its role in multilateral forums was limited to ‘attempting to persuade others to enter meaningful negotiations’ for disarmament. The depth of Canadian nuclear expertise and capacity meant that one way Canada could do this was to help develop verification technologies to support and facilitate disarmament and nonproliferation agreements. Canada made pioneering contributions in this field and by championing such technology, and had significant effects on the negotiation of a range of international agreements, including the CTBT.

Canadian policy and activity related to technical nonproliferation initiatives was fuelled in large part by Canadian policymakers’ chagrin when India tested a nuclear explosive device using materials and training provided by Canada and the United States. In the aftermath of the test,

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65 For the Trudeau announcement, see, UNGA, “A/S-1O/PV.6,” 93, para. 3. See also, Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons, 178; Tucker, “Canada and Arms Control,” 646.

66 Shaw, “Lessons of Restraint,” 46. For methodological reasons, the Canadian decision to phase out its nuclear deployments is not assessed as a case study in this thesis, as it has greater similarities to an actual case of nuclear disarmament than to a case of nuclear disarmament advocacy.


68 For discussion and further examples, see Tucker, “Canada and Arms Control,” 639.

69 Holloway, Canadian Foreign Policy, 87. Trevor Findlay argues that although Canada’s decision to operate US nuclear weapons ‘risked tarnishing [Canada’s] non-nuclear credentials…it is not clear that the outside world much noticed, with the exception of the puzzled Americans who were frustrated [in the early 1960s] by Canadian delay in accepting the nuclear warheads.’ Trevor Findlay, “Canada and the Nuclear Club,” in Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room for Manoeuvre?, ed. Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2007), 204–205.


which India claimed was a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion,’ Canada significantly tightened restrictions on its export of nuclear technologies and materials and went on to become a world leader in the realm of export controls and safeguards. Canada participated actively in the diplomatic effort to conclude the NPT in the late 1960s, as well as in the subsequent effort to extend the Treaty indefinitely. Canada also played a key role in enabling the success of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, chairing controversial negotiations on language relating to the Middle East. In the CD in 1995, Canada drafted a compromise statement still widely cited today—‘the Shannon Mandate’, named for the Canadian Ambassador to the CD at the time—regarding future negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

Canada’s presence in these multilateral disarmament forums, however, is subject to the same conflicting impulses that result from the presence of both anti-nuclear weapon and pro-US alliance identities. A statement on the foreign affairs department’s website epitomises the challenge that Canada faces: ‘Canada has a policy objective of non-proliferation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. We pursue this aim persistently and energetically, consistent with our membership in NATO and NORAD and in a manner sensitive to the broader international security context.’ In other words, since NATO’s defence strategy explicitly treats nuclear deterrence as the ‘supreme guarantee’ of allied security, Canada’s ‘persistent and energetic’ pursuit of nuclear disarmament must always be ‘consistent with’ an alliance strategy that affirms the supreme importance of maintaining a nuclear deterrent.

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76 “Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on Consultations on the Most Appropriate Arrangement to Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices (CD/1299)” (Conference on Disarmament, March 24, 1995).
These alliance dynamics place significant restrictions on the scope for independent Canadian policy initiatives.\textsuperscript{79} This was particularly true during the Cold War, when taking any position that did not maintain strict adherence to alliance unity would be seen by other Western policymakers as supporting the cause of the USSR.\textsuperscript{80} On occasion, this prevented Canadian policymakers from taking a stance against nuclear weapons for fear of upsetting NATO allies—particularly the United States.\textsuperscript{81} Head and Trudeau, for example, bemoan the restrictions that alliance dynamics placed on possible reductions in Canadian NATO nuclear deployments in 1969: ‘Canada's instincts for responsible innovations were suffocated by the professional establishments’ desire for team acceptance.’\textsuperscript{82} The case study chapters return to these dynamics, examining in detail how the differing impulses play out in policy process and the consequences for nuclear disarmament policy.

**New Zealand in the world**

The modern New Zealand state is relatively young; European settlement officially began with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. Like Canada, New Zealand is a Western, liberal democracy. Its people see themselves as progressive and egalitarian, with a strong affinity for the natural environment.\textsuperscript{83} In part, these identity traits derive from domestic histories. In 1893, New Zealand became the first country in the world to grant women the vote. The country was also, along with Canada, among the pioneers of the modern ‘welfare state’ in the mid-1930s. And since 1975, successive governments have supported a national reconciliation programme via the Waitangi Tribunal, to acknowledge, apologise for, and pay reparation for widespread colonial injustices perpetrated on the indigenous Māori peoples.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{79} Paul Meyer, “Private Interview” (Vancouver, April 24, 2012); Dhanapala, “Canada’s Role,” 321, 328; Regehr, “Private Interview.”


\textsuperscript{81} Westdal, “Private Interview.”

\textsuperscript{82} Head and Trudeau, The Canadian Way, 80–81.


Looking out on the world, New Zealanders identify themselves with efforts to create a peaceful, rules-based international order in much the same way as Canadians do. This is reflected in stories of ‘independent’ foreign policies that defend international law, multilateralism and humanitarian missions, and the rights of small states. As with Canada, geography and US alliance issues have dominated debates in New Zealand around national security in the nuclear age, as has—to a greater degree than in Canada—the issue of nuclear testing.

**Geography and alliance dynamics**

New Zealand’s unique geography has impacted strongly on notions of national security. Located in the South West Pacific, New Zealand is among the most physically isolated countries in the world, surrounded on all sides by at least 1500 km of ocean. The country’s colonial settlers viewed their physical isolation as a source of vulnerability due to the separation from the ‘motherland’, though isolation also led to a low fear of direct invasion. Perceived vulnerability and colonial heritage led to a strong tendency to follow the British lead on all international security matters, including disarmament, on which New Zealand was ‘mostly treated as, and mostly acted as, part of the British Empire’.

During World War I, New Zealand strengthened existing colonial ties with Australia through shared military service and sacrifice, forming the Australia-New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) bond that is fundamental to contemporary national identity.

In per-capita terms, New Zealand also contributed significantly to the Allied effort in World War II, and began what has become extensive intelligence collaboration with Australia, Canada, the

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88 Trevor Findlay, “Disarming Cooperation: The Role of Australia and New Zealand in Disarmament and Arms Control” (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, 1992), 5.
United Kingdom and the United States in the ‘five eyes’ intelligence network. US troops were also based in New Zealand as part of the US Pacific campaign during the war. Following the war, colonial ties remained strong, but Britain’s wartime inability to defend the Pacific led to a rethinking of New Zealand security. Whereas New Zealand military support for and reliance on the United Kingdom had previously been automatic and unquestioned—an internalised aspect of national identity—this support was gradually replaced by a more mature consideration of interest based on an evolving national identity.

A handful of New Zealand scientists participated in the Manhattan Project, although making a much more limited contribution than their Canadian colleagues. Also in contrast to Canada, New Zealanders never operated nuclear weapons. In the immediate post-war years, however, New Zealand’s leaders accepted the strategic and nuclear doctrines of the Western Powers almost unquestioningly. In this period, physical isolation contributed to fears in New Zealand of a proverbial ‘domino effect,’ in which Communism would spread rapidly through Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. New Zealand elites thus saw great power alliance—and specifically, nuclear alliance—as vital to New Zealand defence. In practice, this led to an increasing focus on US assistance, military contributions to the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and to participation in

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96 See, for example, the statement of Prime Minister Keith Holyoake in NZHR, “Nuclear Weapons - Society of Friends,” NZPD 314 (October 9, 1957): 2923.
the Colombo Plan, designed to thwart the development of Communist tendencies in South East Asia.\[97\]

In the 1950s, the perceived imperative to maintain great power alliances still outweighed any concern over nuclear risks, though New Zealand showed increasing willingness to define and pursue independent security policy objectives.\[98\] At Australian and New Zealand urging—in large part driven by fears over US plans to rearm Japan—the Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty (ANZUS) was signed in 1951.\[99\] Unlike NATO, ANZUS contains no collective defence guarantee. ANZUS allies agree to consult and respond in accordance with each party's constitutional arrangements when 'the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.'\[100\] Also in contrast to NATO, collective ANZUS documents do not mention nuclear defence. Nevertheless, support for nuclear deterrence norms was an implicit expectation of ANZUS membership and played a significant role in alliance dynamics, as New Zealand's experiences in the 1980s attest.\[101\]

By the late 1950s, despite official support for nuclear defence strategies, domestic and international developments began to generate a significant split in public perceptions of the appropriateness of nuclear defence for New Zealand. Internationally, there were disarmament discussions from 1957 onward in various UN forums, including consideration of a nuclear test ban.\[102\] Domestically, an anti-nuclear protest movement first gained significant traction in the 1950s, and public opposition to nuclear weapons was growing. This anti-nuclear sentiment was


\[98\] Priestley, *Mad on Radium*, 65.


\[102\] Legault and Fortmann, *A Diplomacy of Hope*, 338.
spurred particularly by allied nuclear testing in the South Pacific. In this regard, New Zealand’s unique geography was an important factor that anti-nuclear activists used to frame their advocacy, in terms of the need to maintain the status quo in the region, which was the absence of permanently-stationed nuclear weapons. Years later, for example, Prime Minister Helen Clark suggested, ‘Perhaps as a small nation without enemies, in a benign strategic environment, we have had a greater freedom to raise these issues.’

In August 1957, the possibility of New Zealand hosting UK nuclear weapons emerged during a visit to New Zealand of the UK Defence Minister, Duncan Sandys. On 4 September, however, Deputy Prime Minister Keith Holyoake quashed such thinking by announcing—apparently without consulting the prime minister, who retired two weeks later due to illness—that ‘New Zealand’s own defence planning did not contemplate the acquisition of nuclear weapons nor would she become a storage base for them under her other defence arrangements.’ Templeton argues that this showed Holyoake’s personal opposition to nuclear testing, but also his ‘instinctive understanding of public sentiment in this country,’ which was increasingly fearful that the presence of nuclear weapons would make New Zealand a nuclear target. Regardless, the government saw such concerns as secondary to alliance commitments. The same month that announced New Zealand would not acquire or host nuclear weapons, for example, Holyoake stated that regardless of the health risks from nuclear testing, ‘the greater risk to New Zealand would be for her to part company with her principal allies.’

This sentiment was bi-partisan; in 1957–1958, for example, the Labour Government sent Navy and Air Force equipment and personnel to assist British nuclear testing at Christmas Island (now Kiritimati, a part of Kiribati) in order to fulfil alliance commitments made by its predecessor, and

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104 Clark, “Address to the State of the World Forum.”
105 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 82, n. 80.
108 Clements, Back from the Brink, 40–41.
109 See Holyoake, 9 October, in NZHR, “Nuclear Weapons - Society of Friends,” 2923.. From 20 September to 12 December 1957, Holyoake was caretaker Prime Minister, after Sydney Holland (1949-1957) stepped down. National lost the general election that year.
Despite the personal anti-nuclear convictions of Prime Minister Nash (1957-1960),\textsuperscript{110} Even so, general awareness of growing nuclear risks was raising concern among officials. The 1958 Review of Defence, for example, recognised increasing threats to New Zealand from radioactive fallout and rapid enhancements in nuclear propulsion and missile technology.\textsuperscript{111}

In February 1962, French plans to conduct nuclear tests in the South Pacific became public in New Zealand; actual testing began in 1966. From 1962 onward, public protests against French testing grew consistently.\textsuperscript{112} Similarly, the government protested consistently from 1963 onward against planned, and later, actual French nuclear testing.\textsuperscript{113} Regardless, the New Zealand government viewed membership in a nuclear alliance as vital to the country’s defence interests,\textsuperscript{114} and responded to public anti-nuclear weapon petitions by emphasising the importance of alliance over all other security considerations.\textsuperscript{115}

Public concerns were exacerbated in 1963 by rapidly rising levels of Caesium-137 and Strontium-90. The rises were largely due to delayed fallout from high-altitude US and USSR nuclear testing, but French testing in the South Pacific was closer to home and more immediately in people’s minds.\textsuperscript{116} In 1963, New Zealand CND presented a petition to parliament calling for New Zealand promotion of a Southern Hemisphere nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), using the slogan ‘No Bombs South of the Line.’ The petition was signed by 80,238 New Zealanders—more than any petition in four decades.\textsuperscript{117} Foreign affairs officials privately opposed the idea but would

\textsuperscript{110} Priestley, Mad on Radium, ch. 3; Templeton, Standing Upright Here, ch. 3; Gerry Wright, We Were There: Operation Grapple: The Story of New Zealand’s Involvement in the British Nuclear Weapons Tests at Christmas Island 1957-58 (Auckland: Self-published, 2007). Clements, Back from the Brink, 41–42.

\textsuperscript{111} New Zealand, “Review of Defence”, p. 6, para. 17; p. 10, para. 34; p. 15, paras 58-59.

\textsuperscript{112} Elsie Locke, Peace People: A History of Peace Activities in New Zealand (Christchurch: Hazard Press, 1992), 181. For more detail on the protests, see Locke, Peace People, ch. 29, 30, 42.. See also Clements, Back from the Brink, ch. 2, 3.


\textsuperscript{114} UNDC, “DC/201/Add.2,” 48–49.

\textsuperscript{115} See the statement of John H. George in NZHR, “Nuclear Weapons,” NZPD 331 (September 6, 1962): 1869.

\textsuperscript{116} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Nuclear Testing, 108; Clements, Back from the Brink, 51.

not say so in public. As it had in the past, parliament’s petitions committee recommended the petition be considered secondary to New Zealand’s alliance commitments, implying that disarmament was the domain of global powers. In sum, until at least the early 1970s, New Zealand leaders saw their support for nuclear disarmament as secondary to the maintenance of alliance solidarity and with it, allied nuclear deterrence. Key political parties and bureaucracies generally left the issue of nuclear strategy and disarmament to the great powers.

Internalisation of an anti-nuclear identity

While government support for nuclear alliance remained constant, public support was waning. Over time, a broad-based domestic peace movement had developed, made up of unions, churches, women’s groups, community groups, marae (Māori tribal community centres), professionals, business leaders, local-area peace groups, and sympathetic politicians—particularly from the left in its early days. The Vietnam War was a key focus of the movement from the mid-1960s onward. During the early 1970s, strong protests from the New Zealand government against French nuclear testing in the South Pacific also significantly reinforced public anti-nuclear weapon sentiment and linked it to national identity. These developments are covered in detail in the following chapter and so are not addressed further here.

The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 coincided with the election of a conservative government led by Prime Minister Robert Muldoon (1975-1984). This confluence of events brought the domestic peace movement to focus much more on nuclear issues. Muldoon was strongly pro-

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118 Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb*, 100.
120 Alley, “New Zealand and Disarmament,” 92. On this point, see also Stanley and Burford, “Australia, New Zealand and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” [Forthcoming]
alliance; his government supported allied nuclear ship visits to New Zealand as an important aspect of its commitment to ANZUS.\textsuperscript{124} From 1976—1984, nine nuclear powered ships visited New Zealand.\textsuperscript{125} These ships were potentially also nuclear armed, but it is not possible to confirm this point due to the US neither confirm nor deny policy. Anti-nuclear activists responded to these ship visits with dramatic protest campaigns; a high-profile and very successful example was the ‘Peace Squadron.’ Modelled on Quaker protests against US government arms exports and led by a priest, Rev. George Armstrong, the Peace Squadron involved activists using small, privately-owned vessels to blockade New Zealand harbours, swarming around incoming nuclear warships to try to prevent them entering.\textsuperscript{126} This produced a frenzy of media coverage—much of it sympathetic—and made for iconic, David-vs-Goliath style images and footage of tiny, civil society protest vessels swarming around enormous US nuclear warships. The Peace Squadron was an excellent example of the type of iconic story that evokes notions of sovereignty and pride, and thus, can inform public ideas around national identity. As Clements notes, ‘a good deal of the Peace Squadron's 1976 manifesto was implemented in general terms when the 1984 Labour government [sic] initiated its nuclear-armed ship ban.’\textsuperscript{127}

The peace movement also rolled-out a nationwide NWFZs campaign, which saw individuals, churches, marae, businesses, community centres and sports clubs, among others, declare their properties nuclear weapon free zones.\textsuperscript{128} As the proportion of adherents grew, local authorities declared first suburbs, then boroughs and entire cities NWFZ by democratic mandate; this was a powerful symbol of anti-nuclear sentiment with electoral implications. Over time, the peace movement successfully reversed the dominant public understanding of New Zealand’s physical isolation and its involvement in a nuclear alliance.\textsuperscript{129} These understandings highlighted the

\textsuperscript{124} Graham, \emph{National Security Concepts}, 24.
\textsuperscript{126} Tom Newnham, \emph{Peace Squadron: The Sharp End of Nuclear Protest in New Zealand} (Auckland, NZ: Graphic Publications, 1986).
\textsuperscript{127} Clements, \emph{Back from the Brink}, 111.
\textsuperscript{128} This was launched in the late 1970s by the Home Base Pacific Pilgrimage group. It was quickly picked up by the Christchurch Peace Collective and then developed nationally by the Christchurch-based New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Committee, run by Larry Ross.
dangers of nuclear testing and war, and framed the presence of nuclear weapons in the otherwise peaceful South Pacific region as a target and a threat.  

This fundamental recrafting of the dominant security-related national identity in the public was a remarkable achievement, and happened relatively rapidly in historical terms. It is important to consider, therefore, the contextual factors that made this possible. In the mid-1970s, what it meant to be a New Zealander in the world was very much a live debate. Decolonisation, the civil rights movement in the United States, and a Māori cultural renaissance at home had ‘forced many [white] New Zealanders to confront the racist assumptions in their past.” In 1976, the conservative government sent the New Zealand All Blacks rugby team to tour apartheid South Africa, when the majority of the world was boycotting the country. In response, many African states boycotted the Olympic Games that year in protest at New Zealand’s participation.

In rugby-mad New Zealand, this international condemnation of the country on the basis of its rugby ties with a racist regime had caused an identity crisis, and led to much soul-searching in New Zealand about what the country stood for. When the same conservative government invited the South African rugby team to tour New Zealand in 1981, it created the largest domestic civil unrest in three decades. The mood was ripe for change, and anti-nuclear advocates had a powerful story to tell: opposition to nuclear weapons was framed as brave, principled and independent-minded. Regular media coverage of anti-nuclear protests, such as the Peace Squadron actions and the land-based marches that accompanied them, constantly fuelled this vision. This powerful combination of factors helped bind anti-nuclear sentiment tightly to notions of national independence. As described in chapters one and two, rhetorically or symbolically linking new normative claims to stories that evoke national pride is an important means of socialising populations to new norms. This is precisely what nuclear disarmament advocates did in New Zealand in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

By the mid-1980s many New Zealanders had come to see the country’s physical isolation as a source of increased security in the nuclear age. In 1984, 61% of New Zealanders lived in locally-

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130 Dewes and Ware, “Nuclear Ally to Pacific Peacemaker.”
133 For a detailed account of the events, see, Geoff Chapple, 1981: The Tour (Wellington: Reed, 1984).
134 McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, 279.
declared NWFZs,\textsuperscript{136} and three out of four main parties contested the general election that year with anti-nuclear platforms.\textsuperscript{137} The 1984 general election recorded the highest turnout in New Zealand history at 93.7 percent.\textsuperscript{138} Nuclear concerns were not the central issue of the election, but the Labour Party clearly promised, if elected, ‘a more independent stance within the ANZUS alliance’; to ‘actively work for nuclear disarmament’; to pass a law banning nuclear armed and propelled vessels; and to actively promote a South Pacific NWFZ.\textsuperscript{139} Labour won the 1984 election comfortably and implemented the promised nuclear free policy.

Despite its strict anti-nuclear policy, the Labour Party leadership favoured maintaining the ANZUS alliance.\textsuperscript{140} Equally, opinion polling showed strong public support for both maintaining a US alliance and for maintaining New Zealand’s nuclear freedom.\textsuperscript{141} In early 1985, following months of private negotiations by officials—about which Lange did not inform cabinet—the United States formally requested New Zealand port access for a visit of the conventionally-powered \textit{USS Buchanan}. The request was rejected on the basis that the \textit{Buchanan} was nuclear-capable, greatly angering US officials who felt the New Zealand government had misled them.\textsuperscript{142} From this point on, New Zealand-US relations deteriorated consistently. Lange and other senior government politicians argued New Zealand’s isolation was a boon in the nuclear age, and framed the nuclear free policy in terms of the sovereign right to self-determination.\textsuperscript{143} Lange highlighted sovereignty norms, for example, in the famous, televised Oxford Union debate in 1985, where he successfully defended the moot that ‘nuclear weapons are morally indefensible’:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{139}New Zealand Labour Party, “1984 Policy Document,” 1984, 10, 50. There was also considerable support within the Labour Party membership for withdrawal from ANZUS, though this was not shared by the leadership. Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 117.
\item \textsuperscript{140}Geoffrey Palmer, \textit{Reform: A Memoir} (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2013), 474.
\item \textsuperscript{141}Gerald Hensley, \textit{Friendly Fire: Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS, 1984-1987 (Kindle Edition)} (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013), ch. 4, loc. 1157.
\item \textsuperscript{142}Palmer, \textit{Reform: A Memoir}, 469–472; Hensley, \textit{Friendly Fire}, ch. 4, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{143}Catalinac, “Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS,” 332–33.
\end{itemize}
...to compel an ally to accept nuclear weapons against the wishes of that ally is to take the moral position of totalitarianism, which allows for no self-determination, and which is exactly the evil that we are supposed to be fighting against.\textsuperscript{144}

Lange returned to New Zealand a hero of the anti-nuclear movement.\textsuperscript{145} External events led many New Zealanders who were initially ambivalent about the nuclear free policy to support it. The public reacted angrily to the perceived ‘megaphone diplomacy’ of the United States, for example, which Lange likened to a great power bullying a small, allied state.\textsuperscript{146} In July 1985, this sentiment was radically exacerbated when the French government bombed the Greenpeace flagship \textit{Rainbow Warrior} in Auckland harbour; a crew member died in the attack.\textsuperscript{147} The ship was preparing to take non-violent civil society protesters to French Polynesia, to protest French nuclear testing. The French attack fits both US and UNGA definitions of terrorism,\textsuperscript{148} and Lange and Palmer, both lawyers by trade, publicly denounced the bombing as state-sponsored terrorism.\textsuperscript{149} The outraged New Zealand public was further incensed that there was virtually no condemnation of the incident from allies.\textsuperscript{150}

Finally, the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine, USSR occurred in April 1986. Though this related to nuclear energy, it came in the midst of a heated debate about sovereignty, national security, and the safety of nuclear-powered ships, and was easily linked by anti-nuclear advocates to anti-nuclear weapon sentiment.\textsuperscript{151} A few months later, the United States declared the US-New Zealand leg of the ANZUS alliance ‘inoperative,’ citing the incompatibility between New

\textsuperscript{144} Lange, “Nuclear Weapons Are Morally Indefensible.”

\textsuperscript{145} Newnham, \textit{Peace Squadron: The Sharp End of Nuclear Protest in New Zealand}, 57.

\textsuperscript{146} Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 138–139; Clements, “New Zealand’s Role,” 400.


\textsuperscript{148} US law, for example, defines terrorism as act ‘violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law’ and ‘Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; [or] (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.’ Meanwhile, a UNGA resolution implies that terrorism includes acts of violence ‘including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, which endanger or take innocent lives.’ UNGA, “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (A/RES/49/60)” (New York, December 9, 1994), 2, Annex, preamb. para. 3; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code,” August 15, 2015, https://goo.gl/rjVw8.


\textsuperscript{151} Many New Zealanders, for example, mistakenly believe that the 1987 law bans land-based nuclear power; it does not.
Zealand’s nuclear free policy and the US neither confirm nor deny policy.\textsuperscript{152} The United States suspended high-level political ties, cut New Zealand’s access to processed intelligence (the provision of raw data was maintained, though largely in secret), and threatened to spy on its former ally.\textsuperscript{153} New Zealand was also excluded from US military procurement processes and exercises, though it continued to deploy personnel in UN-mandated missions with US troops, such as the first Iraq war in 1990-1991.\textsuperscript{154} The Reagan Administration made clear, however, that it would not pursue economic or trade retaliation;\textsuperscript{155} in fact, New Zealand exports to the United States almost doubled between 1984 and 1991.\textsuperscript{156} Despite the suspension of New Zealand-US alliance ties, Australia and New Zealand maintained all high-level political and military links.\textsuperscript{157} For its part, New Zealand placed increased emphasis on the Australian defence relationship.\textsuperscript{158}

The loss of New Zealand’s major ally necessitated a comprehensive rethinking of security policy. A major, government-commissioned opinion poll published in July 1986 showed overwhelming anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the public. 92-95 percent of those polled opposed the stationing of the various types of WMD in New Zealand; 92 percent favoured New Zealand promoting nuclear disarmament at the United Nations; and 88 percent supported New Zealand promotion of NWFZs.\textsuperscript{159} In effect, anti-nuclear weapon sentiment had become mainstream.\textsuperscript{160} Nevertheless, the same government poll also showed a strong public preference for US alliance,


\textsuperscript{154} McCraw, “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy,” 9–10.


\textsuperscript{157} McKinnon, \textit{Independence and Foreign Policy}, 283–284.

\textsuperscript{158} Peter Greener, \textit{Timing Is Everything: The Politics and Processes of New Zealand Defence Acquisition Decision Making} (Canberra: ANU, 2009), 26, 42–43.


\textsuperscript{160} Norrish, “Merwyn Norrish,” 141; Palmer, \textit{Reform: A Memoir}, 475.
and a population divided on the relative importance of US alliance versus nuclear freedom—with a small majority in favour of retaining the alliance if both options were not possible.\textsuperscript{161} The norm that was most consistently highlighted in public at the time, however—by both the Labour Party and civil society activists, was nuclear freedom. The peace movement, for example, was at its zenith in the mid-1980s, with 350 active, local peace groups around the country.\textsuperscript{162}

On 8 June 1987, the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act became law.\textsuperscript{163} The Act is arguably the most stringent anti-nuclear weapon legislation in the world. Still in force in 2015, it bans nuclear weapons and propulsion from New Zealand’s land, airspace and sea out to the country’s 12-mile sovereign territorial limits.\textsuperscript{164} Moreover, the law creates extraterritorially anti-nuclear weapon legal norms for agents of the New Zealand government. In other words, the law stipulates that any government agents—including the armed forces—who provide material support anywhere in the world for nuclear weapons development, maintenance or operation may be imprisoned for up to 10 years upon return or extradition to New Zealand (assuming the necessary extradition protocols).\textsuperscript{165}

The 1987 Nuclear Free Zone law also institutionalised disarmament norms in New Zealand policy processes, by establishing a cabinet-level minister for disarmament and arms control. This created a dedicated, senior political and bureaucratic constituency with a mandate to promote disarmament norms at home and abroad. The nuclear free law also created a Public Advisory Committee for Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC) with an explicit mandate ‘to advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs on such aspects of disarmament and arms control matters as it thinks fit,’ and ‘to advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of Act.’\textsuperscript{166}

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\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{161} Defence Committee of Enquiry, “What New Zealanders Want,” 43–44. This aspect of the poll had a large margin of error, as one of the poll’s authors subsequently noted. Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 161.


\textsuperscript{163} NZHR, \textit{New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act} (Wellington, 1987). Some sources incorrectly state that this happened on 4 June. See, for example, Andreas Reitzig, “New Zealand’s Ban on Nuclear-Propelled Ships Revisited” (University of Auckland, 2005), 21; McGibbon, “New Zealand Defence Policy,” 125.

\textsuperscript{164} NZHR, \textit{New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act}, Sections 5-7, 9-11.

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., section 14(2).

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., Section 17(1)(a,b).
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At the New Zealand general election in August 1987, five out of six key political parties campaigned on nuclear free policies and the Labour Party was re-elected comfortably. By October 1987, 72 percent of the New Zealand population was living in self-declared NWFZs. In March 1990—seven months before a general election and facing overwhelming public support for the nuclear free law—National announced a complete policy reversal; it would now maintain the law as written. Wellington’s daily morning paper, the Dominion, reported that only 12 of National’s 40 MPs opposed the reversal, but it was nonetheless very controversial within the party. The party’s deputy leader and defence spokesperson, Don McKinnon, resigned his defence portfolio in protest, but acknowledged the democratic basis of the decision. Party leader Jim Bolger defended the policy shift by stating that the changing international environment required a fundamental policy rethink, though the party’s attempts to undermine the nuclear free policy and law after being elected in 1990—discussed in chapter seven—call this point into question. Regardless, by the early 1990s, the New Zealand Nuclear Free Act had become ‘virtually sacrosanct,’ among the public, with experts commonly referring to nuclear freedom as a core national identity trait and/or national interest. This identity can be thought of as a ‘New Zealand nuclear taboo.’

171 The figure of 12 assumes that the Dominion did not include Muldoon in its count of 11 MPs opposed, since for health reasons, Muldoon was absent from the Caucus meeting where the policy reversal was decided. See, Richard Long, “National Copies No-Nukes Policy,” The Dominion, March 9, 1990; NZPA, “Muldoon ‘Ashamed’ to Be in the Caucus,” The Dominion, March 9, 1990. For reactions from senior National Party members, see, “What the Nats Said...,” Peacelink 80, no. April (April 1990): 3.
172 McKinnon, ABC Radio, as cited in Ibid.
176 The term ‘nuclear taboo’ comes from Tannenwald. As discussed in chapter seven, however, the New Zealand nuclear taboo differs hers in that the New Zealand taboo delegitimises nuclear weapons entirely, whereas the taboo Tannenwald describes delegitimises the use of nuclear weapons. Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo.
Conclusion

This chapter has surveyed the dominant, nuclear-weapons-related national identities in Canada and New Zealand, and the actors and stories that have constituted them. In the case study chapters that follow, the analysis demonstrates how the various identities identified in this chapter influence the two countries’ nuclear disarmament-related policies.

Canada has a strong tradition of US alliance, including participation in the development and operation of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence policies. Conversely, the country chooses not to develop its own nuclear weapons despite having the capacity to do so—a point of pride for many Canadians—and has used political, financial and technical means to promote nuclear disarmament in a variety of international contexts. These observations reveal competing anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear weapon norms which are embedded to different degrees in different parts of the Canadian population. Across all three segments of society, a dominant, pro-US alliance norm trumps all others. For officials, the daily practice of alliance-based nuclear deterrence norms has established a strong, arguably internalised pro-nuclear identity in addition to the pro-alliance one. The public has been ambivalent historically about the role of nuclear weapons in Canadian defence. The presence of widespread, but generally dormant, anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the public has enabled pro-disarmament politicians to legitimate their proposals for Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy by activating that public sentiment, and on occasion, have been driven by civil society activation of that identity.

New Zealand supported the early development of allied nuclear weapons, and the related nuclear defence strategies explicitly or implicitly for almost four decades. Official protests from the 1960s onward were limited in scope to opposing nuclear testing. From the 1950s onward, several decades of anti-nuclear norm entrepreneurship from civil society and sympathetic politicians succeeded in crafting a new dominant national identity in the New Zealand public. This new identity was informed by geography, and framed nuclear weapons as antithetical to national security and values, as well as to sovereign independence. During a period of political upheaval in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this view became mainstream, and ongoing norm
entrepreneurship led to public internalisation of an anti-nuclear weapon identity by the early 1990s—a New Zealand nuclear taboo.
5. Opposing Pacific nuclear testing

We are opposed to the development, refinement, and stock-piling of nuclear weapons. We want to see an international agreement to bring about the abandonment of these weapons and to see the world freed from the tensions and risks of nuclear war which they engender...You cannot build a wall without picking up the bricks. And I believe that a Government policy must not only declare what it wants to achieve but it has to be activist in its character.

~ Former New Zealand prime minister, Norman Kirk

Introduction

Between 1971 and 1974, the New Zealand government took several high-profile anti-nuclear weapon initiatives. These focused mainly on opposing French atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific, though New Zealand also condemned nuclear testing in all environments, including that of allies. This advocacy was explicitly based on the premise that nuclear testing was a barrier to nuclear disarmament more broadly, including the achievement of a CTBT. The

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1 Norman Kirk, “Prime Minister’s Address to the Returned Services Association,” *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 23, no. 6 (June 12, 1973): 10.
key New Zealand initiatives examined here include urging international opposition to nuclear testing in multilateral forums; using the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to challenge the legality of French atmospheric nuclear testing; the prime minister personally writing to the heads of state of all UN members to urge their condemnation of French testing; and sending two New Zealand Navy frigates to protest at Mururoa Atoll, the French nuclear test site in Polynesia. This chapter demonstrates that as per the expectations outlined in chapters one and two, the nature and strength of New Zealand's nuclear disarmament advocacy in this period can credibly be accounted for in reference to the activation of anti-nuclear weapon national identities. While these identities constituted the active drivers of disarmament advocacy, New Zealand policy was also partially shaped by intervening contextual factors—in particular, the international normative environment and civil society activity.

From the mid-1960s onward, French nuclear testing in the South Pacific, to which New Zealand has close historical, cultural and ethnic connections, activated anti-nuclear weapon sentiment to varying degrees among New Zealanders from all three societal segments. The widespread, internalised preference for maintenance of US alliance ties, however, meant that support for—or at least acquiescence to—nuclear deterrence strategies set the implicit boundaries for nuclear disarmament advocacy. Within this framework, the variations in the strength of disarmament advocacy can be understood particularly in terms of the different national identities of key political leaders. The strong, moralistic anti-nuclear weapon beliefs of Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk drove New Zealand’s most strident nuclear disarmament advocacy. Although Kirk’s predecessors, and most officials, saw nuclear testing as a threat to national and international security, they prioritised protection of New Zealand’s economic interests over the expression of moral concerns and thus, pursued more restrained forms of protest. Civil society activity played an important role in shaping government protests, by establishing precedents that strongly informed Labour Party policy. Meanwhile, international normative precedents, and pressure from the Australian government, helped shift preferences among officials and Labour ministers for pursuing the ICJ case.
National identities

Political elite

By the early 1970s, there was bi-partisan consensus in New Zealand that nuclear testing in general, and atmospheric testing in particular, posed a threat to national and international security. This consensus was driven by concerns about health and environmental risks, and concerns that testing undermined the prospects for a CTBT and nuclear disarmament more broadly. At the same time, the dominant, bipartisan preference was for maintaining great power alliances, which necessarily meant accepting the nuclear defence strategies of great power allies. In effect, the dominant national identity across all three segments of society was more strongly defined by alliance as a security provider than by nuclear weapons as a security detractor.

Despite bipartisan consensus on the priority of alliance membership, significant divergences existed between the leadership of the two main parties with regard to nuclear weapons policy. The National Party is a conservative party, the traditional constituency of which is found in the agricultural and business sectors, and is ‘interested in promoting free enterprise and individual freedom.’ National has therefore generally focused on ‘traditional’ foreign policy concerns such as military security defined in terms of armaments and economic security defined in terms of trade. In contrast, the Labour Party was established by trade unions to fight for economic and social justice. These roots have led successive generations of Labour Party members to focus on liberal ideals such as international justice and humanitarianism. In the long term, New Zealand’s

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5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Nuclear Testing, 28; Clements, Back from the Brink, 55, n.24; Kirk, “New Zealand: A New Foreign Policy,” 4.


7 McCraw, “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy,” 8.
international promotion of moral and legal norms has been ‘associated much more with Labour governments than with National ones.’

Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk (1972–1974) is the person most commonly associated with the expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in New Zealand in the early 1970s. Kirk fits the traditional model of a norm entrepreneur, in that his disarmament advocacy was driven largely by normative convictions. He believed strongly in the importance of morality in foreign policy, and placed much greater emphasis on national independence than his conservative counterparts. Significantly, Kirk also questioned the security value of US extended nuclear deterrence, as demonstrated by his comments both in private and in public. Frank Corner, New Zealand’s secretary for foreign affairs and head of the prime minister’s department from 1973 to 1980, told Australian officials that Kirk ‘would prefer New Zealand not to be defended at all than to be defended by nuclear weapons.’

Officials

Two aspects of national identity that were prominent in New Zealand’s foreign affairs bureaucracy predisposed officials to oppose nuclear testing: a desire for greater foreign policy independence—within the boundaries of great power alliance—and personal anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. In the early 1970s, senior officials believed it was necessary to reassess New Zealand’s place in the world, including the management of alliance commitments. These dynamics were strengthened by external events such as US conduct in South East Asia and the emergence of the ‘Nixon Doctrine,’ which declared that allies would now be expected to play a greater role in ensuring their own security. George Laking, Corner’s predecessor as secretary

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8 Ibid., 20.
9 Kirk died in August 1974, with 15 months remaining of his three-year term.
10 For example, regarding the ICJ case, see Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 206.
11 Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 31–32.
14 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 190.
15 Hugh Templeton, “‘New Era’ for ‘the Happy Isles’: The First Six Months of Labour Government Foreign Policy in New Zealand,” Australian Outlook 27, no. 2 (1973): 155; Kirk, “Prime Minister’s Address to the Returned Services Association,” 20; Keith Jackson, “New Zealand’s International Interests and the
for foreign affairs and head of the prime minister’s department from 1967–1972, told a Wellington audience in 1970,

...we need, in the context of our future relationship with the United States, to disenthrall ourselves from the dogmas of the recent unquiet past. We shall be dealing shortly with a generation to which Vietnam is no more than an incident in history. They will be infinitely more concerned with racism and the pollution of the environment.16

Corner also held progressive views about the need for greater foreign policy independence. This was evident, for example, in his ‘pathbreaking work on the decolonisation of small states’ during his time as New Zealand’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1962–1967.17 Ian McGibbon, who edited a volume of correspondence between senior officials, describes Corner as ‘idealistic in nature,’ but a ‘visionary and strategic thinker.’18 Corner was strongly personally opposed to nuclear testing. In 1963, he had suggested to Laking the idea of sending New Zealand frigates to protest French testing: ‘No gentle thing through diplomatic channels—let’s do it in a big way: the way the General would do it himself. Let’s get the most mileage out of it.’19

Public

Assessing the New Zealand public’s views in the early 1970s is a challenging task, as national polling did not begin until 1971, and even then, foreign affairs-related data was sparse.20 The majority of polls prior to that time were based on samples of only one or two electorates in a

18 McGibbon, Unofficial Channels, 39.
19 Ibid., 297–298. ‘The General’ is a reference to then-French President, General de Gaulle.
region, and generally focused on domestic political issues.\(^{21}\) It is possible, however, to credibly gauge public perspectives on nuclear issues from the actions and experiences of civil society protesters, and the beliefs and responses of both politicians and officials about public sentiment. From 1956 onward, there were repeated public petitions to Parliament from groups such as CND, calling for the New Zealand government to take strong action to oppose nuclear weapons and nuclear testing.\(^{22}\) Between 1957 and 1972,

An increasingly robust public platform emerged, one that later supported diplomatic protests and legal moves against French nuclear testing...A solid core of opposition to nuclear weaponry, if at times muted, was maintained. And deepening local opposition to nuclear weaponry began to penetrate other agendas.\(^{23}\)

Malcolm Templeton, a senior official who worked closely on nuclear policy in the early 1970s, writes that Holyoake’s 1957 announcement that New Zealand would not acquire or host nuclear weapons showed his ‘instinctive understanding of [New Zealand] public sentiment.’\(^{24}\) Other researchers agree with this assessment.\(^{25}\) Corner’s 1963 reflections on whether to speak in the opening session of the UNGA that year demonstrated the strength of public opposition to nuclear testing at even that early stage; Corner notes, ‘with the election coming up I guess that the occasion to say something about nuclear tests—and French tests—cannot be neglected...the Govt. [sic] would be vulnerable if it were accused of passing up the opportunity of the General Debate.’\(^{26}\) In the context of consistent civil society protest against French testing in particular, public anti-nuclear sentiment continued to grow. By the early 1970s, ‘the government felt under pressure to raise the issue in every available international forum.’\(^{27}\)

Prime Minister Kirk wrote to the French government in late 1972, stating that New Zealand public opposition to nuclear testing was so widespread that his government was bound by

\(^{21}\) For a survey of such polls, see, CLIVE BEAN, “AN INVENTORY OF NEW ZEALAND VOTING SURVEYS, 1949-84,” POLITICAL SCIENCE<\/i> 38, NO. 2 (1986): 172–84.


\(^{23}\) Alley, “New Zealand and Disarmament,” 65.

\(^{24}\) Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 511.


\(^{27}\) Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 160.
democratic principle to pursue the issue vigorously. Similarly, the New Zealand government told the ICJ in 1973 that over the preceding two years, domestic opposition to nuclear testing had become,

...a dominating political issue, requiring constant and extensive coverage in the daily press and in other news media. There has been intense activity by private individuals and groups to impress upon the New Zealand government their anxiety about the tests.

The government noted that this sentiment was being expressed by churches, local bodies, community organisations, trade unions, student and youth organisations, and ‘virtually every other grouping of public opinion.’ In 1972, for example, Greenpeace and CND raised NZ $1300—the 2015 equivalent of NZ $16,400—in ten days to outfit the vessel Greenpeace III for a protest voyage to the test site at Mururoa Atoll, French Polynesia. For a pre-internet, pre-cell phone age in which crowd-funded public activism was largely unheard of, this was a striking achievement, indicative of strong public support.

Having demonstrated the various strands of anti-nuclear weapon identity across the three segments of New Zealand society, the following section traces the processes and mechanisms through which these identities found expression in policy, and the role of contextual factors stimulate or stifling nuclear disarmament advocacy.

**Nuclear disarmament advocacy**

The New Zealand government's first high-profile nuclear disarmament advocacy began in 1971. In fact, New Zealand had protested French plans to test nuclear weapons in the South Pacific from March 1963 onward, as had many civil society activists. But in this early period, the conservative government of Prime Minister Keith Holyoake (1957, 1960-1972) generally pursued low-profile protests in the form of private diplomatic notes to France, even after testing began

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29 Ibid., 57.  
30 Ibid.  
33 Locke, *Peace People*, ch. 29, 30.
The government deliberately excluded actions that might jeopardise New Zealand’s trading interests, giving the protests a somewhat ‘collusive and constructive’ tone. In this context, the conservative government resisted high-profile direct protest actions or multilateral initiatives that civil society and the opposition Labour Party were advocating, such as promoting a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ or calling a regional foreign ministers’ meeting to address the issue of Pacific nuclear testing. Despite active civil society engagement in this early period, political pressure on the government to strongly oppose nuclear testing was somewhat attenuated by the predominant focus of the public and most peace activists on the Vietnam War.

International normative developments in the 1960s and early 1970s supported the pursuit of nuclear disarmament advocacy. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) entered into force in 1963, codifying a legal norm against nuclear testing in the earth’s atmosphere, underwater and in outer space, and affirming the broader aim of stopping all nuclear testing and proceeding to disarmament. The three nuclear armed states at the time—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—ratified the PTBT in 1963, as did New Zealand, which strongly supported the Treaty. The entry into force of the NPT in 1970—again, ratified by the three nuclear powers—was another major normative advancement. New Zealand signed the NPT the day it was opened for signature in 1968 and ratified the Treaty the following year. France never signed the PTBT, and did not accede to the NPT until 1992, so in legal terms, the treaties’ obligations did not officially apply to it in the early 1970s. Regardless, the treaties created international legal precedents to which anti-nuclear weapon policy objectives could be linked.

34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Nuclear Testing, 19–46. An exception was New Zealand speaking out at the United Nations against planned French tests in 1965; compared with later activity, however, this was still relatively low-key protest. See, Clements, Back from the Brink, 55, n. 25.
35 Ibid., 54. New Zealand also opposed Chinese nuclear testing from its inception in 1964. Ibid., 24, 55, including n. 24; Dalby, “The ‘Kiwi Disease,’” 443.
36 See, for example, the debate on the conference idea in NZHR, “French Nuclear Tests - Proposed Conference,” NZPD 379 (July 7, 1972): 834–836. For analysis, see, Clements, Back from the Brink, 54–63; Locke, Peace People, 181.
37 Clements, Back from the Brink, 55, 57, 61. This reflects similar dynamics in the United States; Tannenwald notes, for example, that the increased focus on the peace movement on Vietnam in the 1960s attenuated anti-nuclear activity. Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 31.
39 Clements, Back from the Brink, 48.
increasing the perceived legitimacy of those objectives. As will be seen below, this made it easier for New Zealand actors who were predisposed to pursue nuclear disarmament advocacy to express those preferences in policy.

In June 1971, key negotiations over the conditions of UK entry to the European Economic Community (EEC—the forerunner to the European Union) were completed. Leveraging New Zealand’s colonial heritage, British and New Zealand negotiators secured import quotas for key New Zealand products to the EEC during a transitional period. This was a significant economic consideration for the geographically-isolated, export-dependent New Zealand.42 A French threat earlier in the year to veto New Zealand imports was thus nullified, though the threat would later resurface in response to civil society anti-nuclear protests in New Zealand.43

This EEC deal marked a turning point in the intensity of New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy under the Holyoake Government. Latent anti-nuclear weapon sentiment that the government had previously set aside due to economic concerns now found stronger expression.

On 7 August 1971, New Zealand hosted the inaugural South Pacific Forum (now the Pacific Islands Forum), a group whose membership was deliberately restricted to independent countries located in the South Pacific, thus excluding France. Unlike the Forum’s predecessor, the South Pacific Commission, which was dominated by colonial powers and had a remit that excluded sensitive ‘political’ issues, the South Pacific Forum explicitly sought to address nuclear testing and decolonization.44 The inaugural Forum issued a communiqué expressing ‘deep regret’ at France’s nuclear tests and concern over related health, safety and environmental risks; calling for the current test series to be the last; and asking New Zealand to convey South Pacific protests to France.45

New Zealand took further multilateral action later the same year. At the 1971 UNGA, New Zealand inserted into a resolution amendments calling for all states to cease nuclear testing in

environments banned by the PTBT; although neither China nor France had signed the Treaty, this was an implicit rebuke of their atmospheric testing programmes, which contravened PTBT norms.\(^{46}\) On the domestic front, the Opposition Labour Party also highlighted the PTBT's norms in calling for more robust protest from the government.\(^{47}\) Once elected to govern, Labour continued to highlight the PTBT, NPT and other international legal norms in its opposition to French testing.\(^{48}\) This demonstrates how the existence of codified, anti-nuclear weapon norms generates legitimacy for concordant policy options in the eyes of policymakers, thus making the further expression of related anti-nuclear identities more likely.

1972 was an election year in New Zealand. In February, Keith Holyoake resigned his leadership of the National Party and his deputy, Jack Marshall, became New Zealand prime minister. In the lead up to the election, the National and Labour Parties sought to differentiate themselves from each other. Labour campaigned on the slogan *Time for Change*. Hugh Templeton, a National Member of Parliament (MP) who lost his parliamentary seat in the election, writes that the slogan ‘struck a deeply responsive chord in the electorate.’\(^{49}\) Domestically, National had been in power for 12 years, while internationally, major structural changes such the recognition of Communist China, the Nixon doctrine and superpower détente were disrupting traditional New Zealand perceptions of the world.\(^{50}\) In this context, Labour’s foreign policies ‘cut furrows in ground more than ready for change.’\(^{51}\)

France had announced a new set of tests to be conducted from 1 July to 7 August 1972; this, combined with widespread public opposition to nuclear testing, ensured that nuclear issues were a significant theme in election-year policy debates. Labour highlighted its strong anti-nuclear policy and accused National of being too cautious and ‘more interested in a few francs than the future of New Zealanders.’\(^{52}\) The National-led Government countered by highlighting its advocacy of a CTBT, and accusing Labour of pursuing nuclear disarmament advocacy that was

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\(^{49}\) Templeton, “New Era,” 155.

\(^{50}\) Kennaway, “Foreign Policy,” 165.


‘irresponsible, confrontational, immature, and provocative,’ and of focusing on nuclear issues to the detriment of broader foreign policy goals.\(^{53}\)

Under pressure from growing anti-nuclear sentiment in the public, and less constrained by concerns over New Zealand exports, the conservative government responded more strongly to the planned French tests than it had previously.\(^{54}\) At the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in June 1972, New Zealand led its largest multilateral protest initiative to date. This action was strongly influenced by civil society protest and opposition political activity at home. The Federation of Labour had called for a union boycott of French ships and aircraft during the test series. At the same time, Kirk was promoting the idea of a meeting of regional foreign ministers dedicated specifically to opposing French testing. The government had opposed the union boycott out of fear of French trade retaliation in Europe, but was now concerned that for electoral purposes, it needed to take an anti-nuclear initiative of its own. According to Templeton, the government saw the Stockholm conference as the chance to do that: ‘the need to be seen to be active [in opposing nuclear testing], the delegation was told, could not be overemphasised.’\(^{55}\)

At the Stockholm meeting, New Zealand convinced eight countries—Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Fiji, Japan, Malaysia, Peru and the Philippines—to co-sponsor a statement condemning nuclear tests that might contaminate the environment. New Zealand and Peru then tabled a resolution on this basis, which the Conference adopted by 109 to four, with nine abstentions.\(^{56}\) The resolution singled out ‘especially those [tests] carried out in the atmosphere,’ and called on ‘those States intending to carry out nuclear weapons tests to abandon their plans to carry out such tests since they may lead to further contamination of the environment.’\(^{57}\) New Zealand’s Minister for the Environment singled out France in his speech—the first time New Zealand had done this in an international forum.\(^{58}\)


\(^{54}\) Marshall had been New Zealand’s lead negotiator with the British on the issue of New Zealand trade access to the EEC, and so knew the issue well. Gustafson, “Marshall, John Ross.”

\(^{55}\) Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 156.


\(^{58}\) Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 63.
Further New Zealand protests in multilateral forums followed throughout 1972. Later in June, the New Zealand and Australian prime ministers sent a joint statement to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD—the predecessor to the CD), jointly protesting plans for further atmospheric tests in the South Pacific. The statement called for the CCD ‘to continue to accord high priority to the question of the urgent need for suspension of such tests and the formulation of a comprehensive test ban treaty.’ At the end of June, the ANZUS Council expressed ‘hope’ for the universal adherence to the PTBT and noted the Australia-New Zealand statement to the CCD. At the same time, the New Zealand foreign minister sought to have SEATO issue a declaration protesting the French tests; unsurprisingly given French, British and US membership in SEATO, the attempt was unsuccessful. In August, New Zealand presented a resolution opposing all nuclear tests to a UN Seabed Committee meeting. Then, at the second South Pacific Forum in September 1972, New Zealand inserted a paragraph into the final communiqué noting member countries’ common objective of ending ‘all nuclear weapons tests in all environments by any country.’ The New Zealand prime minister and the Australian foreign minister also briefed the assembled leaders about action they could take to support New Zealand and Australia in advancing that objective at the upcoming session of the UNGA.

Finally, New Zealand took high-profile action at the 1972 UNGA, including condemning nuclear testing on behalf of South Pacific Forum countries. New Zealand also introduced a resolution on behalf of itself and 13 countries, stressing the urgency of stopping all atmospheric nuclear tests ‘in the Pacific or anywhere else in the world’; calling on all states that had not yet done so to adhere to the PTBT; calling upon ‘all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments’; and highlighting the urgency of pursuing a CTBT to consolidate and advance

60 Ibid., 94.
disarmament achievements.\textsuperscript{66} The UNGA resolution passed with 106 votes in favour to four against, with eight abstentions.\textsuperscript{67}

**Divergent identities**

An important point of divergence between the two main New Zealand political parties was their views on the legitimacy of direct, civil society anti-nuclear protest. This divergence had significant implications for the parties’ respective nuclear weapons policies in this case study. The conservative government in office from 1960–1972 was largely suspicious of public anti-nuclear protesters, who were ‘often seen as a source of subversion.’\textsuperscript{68} The conservative government generally opposed civil society initiatives, including, for example, the idea of sending a protest fleet to Mururoa. When CND and Greenpeace were preparing in April 1972 to send the *Greenpeace III* to protest at Mururoa, they experienced ‘every possible kind of harassment from several government agencies—police, customs, marine department, and broadcasting.’\textsuperscript{69} Regardless, with strong financial support from the public as noted previously, the *Greenpeace III* sailed as planned.

The voyage of the *Greenpeace III* received significant international attention, especially after the vessel was rammed by the French Navy.\textsuperscript{70} The voyage reinvigorated CND NZ; with the support of Radio Hauraki, CND collected 81,475 signatures for a new petition urging stronger protest action from the New Zealand government, including taking a case against France to the ICJ.\textsuperscript{71} The conservative government, however, continued to resist such efforts.\textsuperscript{72} This dynamic was also partly influenced by the legal-normative context, however; in 1966, following protests against its nuclear testing in the Algerian Sahara, France had issued a reservation to its acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in ‘disputes concerning activities relating to national


\textsuperscript{67} Locke, *Peace People*, 297.

\textsuperscript{68} Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 59.

\textsuperscript{69} Locke, *Peace People*, 291.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 292.

\textsuperscript{71} NZHR, “French Nuclear Tests,” September 14, 1972, 2552.

\textsuperscript{72} See, Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 159–160.
defense. Thus, in addition to being unconvinced as to whether France’s actions constituted a breach of international law, lawyers in the New Zealand foreign ministry were not confident that the ICJ would agree to proceed with a case, and advised against the government pursuing the matter. For its part, the government refused public or media access to the petition hearing, and the September, 1972 report of the petitions committee recommended simply that the government ‘consider’ the petition. Under parliamentary protocol, the fact of having received a recommendation from the committee allowed the government to avoid parliamentary debate of the issue.

In contrast to the suspicion and resistance of the conservative National Party, civil society directly influenced Labour Party nuclear policies as a result of the close, personal links between the two groups. Richard Northey, for example, was chair of Auckland CND in 1972 and helped coordinate the protest voyage of the Greenpeace III that year; he later become a three-term Labour MP (1984-1990, 1993-1996). Similarly, Peace Media was established in May 1971 by prominent anti-nuclear activists and rank-and-file Labour Party members. The group sought to activate anti-nuclear sentiment internationally, including in France, by sending a flotilla of protest vessels into the French-declared exclusion zone at Mururoa, forcing the French either to postpone the tests or risk poisoning the protesters. When Labour MP Matiu Rata joined the crew of a Peace Media vessel, Labour leader Kirk told parliament that he was ‘immensely proud’ of Rata. Kirk went further, promising, ‘if we were the Government we would not send a yacht. The country has four expensive frigates. Let them run up the New Zealand flag. Let us be proud of them. Let us take a frigate up there.’

The high-profile actions of groups such as Peace Media, Greenpeace and CND, including the petition supported by tens of thousands of New Zealanders, were reinforced by calls from

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74 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 150–151.
77 Clements, Back from the Brink, 64. See also Locke, Peace People, 290–91.
78 Ibid., 291.
79 Clements, Back from the Brink, 64; Locke, Peace People, 300.
80 The Magic Isle set sail on 18 July 1972. Clements, Back from the Brink, 64. See also, Locke, Peace People, 300.
82 Ibid.
mainstream unions for more active anti-nuclear weapon advocacy from the government.\textsuperscript{83} All this activity complemented and emboldened Labour’s calls for protest.\textsuperscript{84} In the end, the National Government did a poor job of promoting awareness at home of the international protest activities that it had taken. This left the impression that the government was doing little, and gave Labour a lot of material with which it could challenge the conservative government’s anti-nuclear credentials.\textsuperscript{85}

A new government

Labour’s strong anti-nuclear stance and assertion of the need for a more independent foreign policy did not decide the November 1972 election, but they assisted in Labour’s victory.\textsuperscript{86} The significant degree to which morality and anti-nuclear sentiment were linked to national identity for the incoming Labour Government created a strong preference for nuclear disarmament advocacy.\textsuperscript{87} The result was that over roughly the following 18 months, New Zealand took a range of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions seeking to end French nuclear testing which were of a significantly higher profile than previous advocacy.

Immediately on taking office, Prime Minister Kirk wrote to the French government regarding nuclear issues.\textsuperscript{88} He stated that he was obliged by democratic mandate to represent strong New Zealand public opposition to nuclear testing, and that stopping nuclear testing was now a central New Zealand foreign policy objective. He advised that his government was ‘committed to working through all possible means to bring the tests to an end, and we shall not hesitate to use the channels available to us in concert as appropriate with like-minded countries.’\textsuperscript{89}

The Labour Government’s predisposition was reinforced by a contextual factor: strong, consistent and often, transnationally-coordinated civil society protest, which served to further activate New Zealand public anti-nuclear sentiment. As the Kirk Government took office in

\textsuperscript{83} Templeton, \textit{Standing Upright Here}, 155–156.
\textsuperscript{84} Locke, \textit{Peace People}, 293.
\textsuperscript{85} Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 61, 63–64; Templeton, \textit{Standing Upright Here}, 159, 164–165.
\textsuperscript{86} Clements, \textit{Back from the Brink}, 63–64, 66–67; Priestley, \textit{Mad on Radium}, 217.
\textsuperscript{87} Kirk, “New Zealand: A New Foreign Policy,” 3, 7. This dynamic was also evident in later debates around New Zealand nuclear weapons policy. See, Catalinac, “Why New Zealand Took Itsself out of ANZUS.”
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 40. Emphasis added.
December 1972, for example, the UN Association of New Zealand, together with the Federations of Labour in both Australia and New Zealand, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Soroptimists, and CND all urged strong protest action from the Australasian governments. The following month, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions—with 52 million members worldwide—announced a boycott of Air France; the Australian Council of Trade Unions boycotted all French goods and services; and the New Zealand Federation of Labour announced it would coordinate domestic trade union action against France.

In 1973, Peace Media sent two more protest vessels to Mururoa, and the Greenpeace III made the voyage again. French military personnel beat the male crew of the Greenpeace III with truncheons, as photographs smuggled out by a female crew member later revealed to the world. The Peace Media vessel the Fri was joined by four French campaigners, including a former French Army general who, on returning to France, returned his Legion of Honour medal to the French government in protest. In France in the early 1970s, the liberal media had also started to report widely on international anti-nuclear protest activity. French MPs highlighted the protests in French Polynesia and abroad, including Australia and New Zealand.

**Legal and martial protests**

The idea of challenging French nuclear testing at the ICJ had strong public support, as demonstrated by the 81,000 people that signed the 1972 CND petition calling for such action. At

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90 Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 70.
91 Ibid., 70, 76.
the time, however, foreign ministry legal experts in New Zealand advised against taking a case on technical legal grounds, and the conservative government took that advice. Evolving government and bureaucratic perspectives about the chances of successfully instituting legal proceedings in late 1972 and early 1973, however, demonstrate how the complex, interdependent relationship between contextual factors (here, alliance dynamics and international legal norms) and human agency affects policy outcomes.

In late 1972, Australian officials alerted colleagues in New Zealand to a legal analysis from D. P. O’Connell, an expatriate New Zealander and Professor of International Law at Oxford. O’Connell highlighted the possibility of applying for an interim injunction from the ICJ, calling on France to halt nuclear testing while the issue of the Court’s jurisdiction was decided. The application would be based primarily on Article 17 of the 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (the ‘General Act of Arbitration’), which Australia, France and New Zealand had all signed. It was not until 13 October that officials briefed Prime Minister Marshall (and his predecessor, Holyoake) on this point, stating that the analysis seemed ‘well-based’; it is unclear how the politicians responded.

Two points are noteworthy in theoretical terms. First, after his November 1972 election victory, Prime Minister Kirk was himself hesitant about taking an ICJ case. Kirk was an intelligent man but one with no formal education. He saw the world in moral, not legal terms and his preference was for sending a frigate to Mururoa, a dramatic protest action that would ‘stir public opinion...a bit like the mouse that roared.’ Secondly, Kirk’s personal uncertainty was initially mirrored among officials, who were still considering jurisdiction and substantive issues related to an ICJ case. Over the coming months, however, officials and key politicians became increasingly convinced of the merits of taking a case against France.

96 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 150–151.
97 Ibid., 165, n. 245.
98 For detailed analysis of the New Zealand government’s case, based on primary sources and including the advice given to government by officials, see, Templeton, Standing Upright Here, ch. 6.
100 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 165, n. 245.
102 Ibid., 200.
The newly-elected Australian Labor Government—led by a lawyer, Gough Whitlam—decided in January 1973 that it would take a case against France to the ICJ. Australian officials and politicians began to put pressure on New Zealand to do the same, arguing that their legal case would be weakened if New Zealand—which was closer to the French test sites and legally responsible for territories that were closer still—did not also participate. Templeton, who worked closely on the ICJ case, writes that during a trip to Canberra to discuss the idea in February 1973, New Zealand’s Attorney General, Martyn Finlay, became convinced of the merits of taking a case.

Meanwhile, Kirk had made clear at his first post-election press conference that he still intended to send a frigate to protest at Mururoa if necessary, but the reality was that this would require logistical support to be possible at all. The frigate would require refuelling for the return journey, and New Zealand had no such at-sea capacity. Historical ties and convergent interests made Australia the obvious place to turn to for help, but Whitlam and his officials initially opposed the idea; Lance Barnard, Whitlam’s deputy prime minister and defence minister, called it a ‘ridiculous waste of time.’ However, 51 Australian Labor MPs, including twelve cabinet ministers, called on the prime minister to support New Zealand’s initiative. Kirk ‘brought moral pressure to bear and cornered [Barnard] into promising [to send] the tanker HMAS Supply.’ Thus, there was trans-Tasman pressure in both directions to support each other’s preferred protest actions.

By late February 1973, Whitlam believed a bargain had been struck: New Zealand would support Australia by agreeing to take a case to the ICJ, and Australia would provide logistical support for New Zealand’s frigate initiative. In early March 1973, Kirk advised France that the New Zealand government saw French testing in the South Pacific as ‘unacceptable and in violation of New Zealand’s rights under international law, including its rights in respect of areas over which

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106 Ibid., 169, 205.
107 Ibid., 203.
108 Ibid., 168.
109 Ibid.
111 See, Ibid., 69, 73–74.
112 Kirk’s nationalism and personally competitive relationship with Whitlam led him to favour an individual New Zealand case, rather than joining the Australian one. Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 200; Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 69, 74.
it has sovereignty.' On 1 May, New Zealand gave notice that it would take the issue to the ICJ, also acting for the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau.115 Both New Zealand and Australia lodged their respective cases on 9 May.116 New Zealand argued that French atmospheric testing breached New Zealand’s sovereign rights and that further, the case was being brought to protect ‘the rights of all members of the international community, including New Zealand, that no nuclear tests that give rise to radio-active fall-out be conducted.’

The following week, New Zealand presented a request for the Court to support ‘interim measures of protection’ on the basis of the General Act of Arbitration, including mandating a halt to French testing while the case was heard.118 As on many previous occasions, New Zealand highlighted ‘worldwide opposition to nuclear weapons development and especially to atmospheric testing’; in effect, New Zealand asserted that the development of international anti-nuclear weapon norms was evidence that France must cease testing that might cause radioactive fallout.119 In this regard, New Zealand cited the PTBT, the NPT and the Latin American NWFZ Treaty; numerous UNGA resolutions calling for an end to nuclear testing that were overwhelmingly-supported by UN members; and protests from countries in the South Pacific, both individually and collectively, through the South Pacific Forum.120

On 16 May 1973, France gave notice that it considered the ICJ ‘manifestly incompetent’ to hear the case and would not participate.121 Regardless, on 22 June, the ICJ granted New Zealand’s interim request, and a parallel one in the Australian case. The Court stated that ‘in particular, the French government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radioactive fall-out on the territory of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue or the Tokelau Islands.’122 Given France’s rejection of the Court’s jurisdiction, New Zealand immediately took two further high-profile actions.

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115 See, Letter from New Zealand Prime Minister to the French President, 1 May 1973, in Ibid., 45–46.
116 According to Roberts, Marshall, now leader of the opposition, ‘indicated that a National Government would probably have gone to the International Court of Justice in 1973 as well.’ Roberts, “New Zealand Review,” 86. Whether or not this is accurate cannot be proven, of course, as Templeton points out. Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 165.
118 Ibid., 53–64.
119 Ibid., 14, 55–61, quotation at 55.
120 Ibid., 56–57.
122 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Nuclear Testing, 7.
First, from 23–25 June, the prime minister personally wrote to the heads of government of every UN member and observer state, seeking support for the ICJ interim injunction. These messages affirmed the need to support international law, especially to protect the rights of small states. Kirk received a range of supportive national responses to this letter, which he reported publicly, and other countries took international action to pressure France as a result. Secondly, fulfilling its election promise, the government sent a New Zealand Navy frigate, HNZS Otago, to protest at the testing zone at Mururoa. Speaking at the farewell for the departing Otago on 28 June 1973, Kirk linked New Zealand’s opposition to nuclear testing to the country’s support for international justice and morality:

We are a small nation but we will not abjectly surrender to injustice...Today the Otago leaves on an honourable mission. She leaves not in anger but as a silent accusing witness with the power to bring alive the conscience of the world.

The photograph of Kirk waving farewell to the Otago is an iconic national image for many New Zealanders; combined with the often-cited statement about, the image clearly evokes notions of national sovereignty and pride in pursuing principled foreign policies. In other words, this is precisely the type of image that, as described in chapters one and two, helps define popular notions of national identity.

To emphasise the priority it attached to the frigate protest, the Labour Government sent a cabinet minister with the Otago. Since all 20 cabinet members wanted the job, the candidate was chosen by lottery, with the Minister of Immigration and Mines, Fraser Coleman, winning the draw. The Government sought to maximise media attention for the frigate’s voyage, to

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126 Clements, Back from the Brink, 69, 73–74.
mobilise international public opinion to pressure France into complying with the ICJ order. Colman spent 46 days on the Otago and on a second frigate sent to relieve her, HMNZS Canterbury, talking with reporters from around the world.

The National Party strongly opposed the frigate deployment. Marshall contrasted the ‘responsible’ protest actions his government had pursued with the ‘flamboyant publicity stunts’ of Labour, saying, ‘this new Government is going to extremes in its protests, which could well turn out to be more harmful to New Zealand and less effective in their objective.’ Marshall warned that the protests would ‘irritate and annoy’ the French, thus endangering trade negotiations, and stressed that ‘renegotiation of the EEC agreement in 1975 should always be regarded as a significant New Zealand interest in our relations with France.’ This again demonstrates how competing national identities within political elites affected what was perceived as being in the national interest. For Marshall, anti-nuclear protest was appropriate, but should be pursued as a secondary priority to trade interests.

At the 1973 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Ottawa from 2-10 August, Kirk sought to elicit a collective condemnation of French testing. British Prime Minister Edward Heath fiercely opposed this initiative. Heath had presided over the United Kingdom’s third and ultimately, successful application to join the EEC (France had vetoed the first two attempts during the 1960s). Heath was concerned not to embitter the French, with whom the United Kingdom would have to negotiate in future—including renegotiation of New Zealand’s EEC import quotas after their initial five-year term. French trade threats against New Zealand had resurfaced in mid-1972, and the New Zealand Press Association reported later that year that faced with further high-profile New Zealand protest, France ‘would almost certainly pursue retaliatory action.’

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133 Gustafson, “Marshall, John Ross.”


135 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 155–156, 168; Clements, Back from the Brink, 69, n. 78.
Kirk and his officials persisted despite these economic threats and the concerns of the British prime minister; they convinced the CHOGM to make an unprecedented, mid-conference declaration condemning nuclear testing in generic terms, though not France specifically. New Zealand was supported especially by African leaders, whom Kirk supported in debates about African independence struggles. The CHOGM anti-nuclear declaration was deliberately issued on 5 August to mark the 10th anniversary of the signing of the PTBT. This timing was admittedly a minor concern compared to the goal of securing the collective statement. Nevertheless, it again demonstrates how actors link their policy objectives back to exiting normative structures as a means of increasing the political pressure on norm violators to change their behaviour—in this case, by highlighting France’s non-compliance with a widely-endorsed international legal norm. An Ottawa newspaper ran the headline, ‘Tiny New Zealand speaks for mankind.’

On 10 January 1974, six months after the ICJ issued its injunction calling for a temporary halt to French testing, the French government withdrew its recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. By this stage, however, France ‘was being widely condemned, both within and outside France.’ As the year rolled on and international public opposition to the atmospheric tests continued to grow, France became ‘increasingly desperate for a way out of a situation that had become diplomatically awkward and politically costly.’ The head of the French air force stated in early May 1974 that ‘long and delicate works are necessary’ before France could move to underground testing. Just one month later, the new French government of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing announced that the current series of tests would be the last. The point was repeated in several statements by French officials in subsequent months, including in bilateral

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138 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 195; McIntyre, “From Singapore to Harare,” 91.
142 Ibid., 735–36.
144 ICJ, “Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France),” 469, para. 35.
communications with New Zealand. Thus, before the ICJ delivered a final judgment in the Australian or New Zealand cases, France had publicly undertaken to stop the disputed behaviour. The Court ruled that this rendered the cases moot, and chose not to deliver a final decision—though New Zealand and Australia could revisit the issue if France resumed atmospheric testing.

Theoretical implications

The defence strategies of nuclear allies set the boundaries of New Zealand's nuclear disarmament advocacy in the early 1970s, under both conservative and liberal governments. In this sense, this case shows immediately the influence of contextual factors on national identity. Alliance ties constrained New Zealand policy in this period precisely because the dominant, arguably internalised, national identity in all three societal segments saw maintenance of great power alliance as a primary security guarantor. As will be seen in chapter seven, the 1970s consensus on alliance as a core national security interest was a historical fact, but not an inevitability.

Setting aside the pro-alliance consensus, different strands of national identity competed for primacy among political elites, and this competition was reflected in nuclear disarmament policy. In particular, these differences related to the priority given to independence, and the relative importance attached to morality and economic concerns as key national interests. For conservative politicians (and officials, for that matter), economic interests were prioritised over the pursuit of anti-nuclear principles. Kirk, on the other hand, openly questioned the credibility of nuclear deterrence, saw foreign policy in strongly moral terms, and ignored economic threats as he railed against what he saw as the injustice of French nuclear policies.

The Australian influence on New Zealand nuclear disarmament advocacy did not relate to the activation of alliance norms, since the main alliance tie for both countries was ANZUS, with its implicit support for nuclear deterrence. Rather, it was historical and geographical links that led Australian and New Zealand interests to converge, facilitating further nuclear disarmament.

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145 Ibid., 471, para. 39.
advocacy from the New Zealand government. Both countries’ increasingly regional security outlook supported a desire for greater foreign policy independence, and favoured anti-nuclear weapon advocacy focused particularly on the South Pacific. Australian groundwork and advocacy on the ICJ idea led to New Zealand’s participation in that forum, while the trade-off was Australian cooperation on the frigate protest.

In terms of the normative environment, New Zealand’s ICJ case against France exemplifies the dynamics described in chapter two regarding the relationship between norms, agency and foreign policy. The decision to take the ICJ case was triggered by a legal expert highlighting a specific legal norm in the 1928 General Act of Arbitration. Over time, activation of this precedent changed the cost-benefit calculations among officials and politicians in both Australia and New Zealand.

Meanwhile, the content of New Zealand’s argument to the ICJ demonstrates the relationship between constructivist notions of normative development and influence and international legal theory regarding customary international law; this is a theoretical convergence that deserves much greater attention. Under the legal principle of free consent, treaty-based legal norms only bind states if they give their sovereign consent to be bound by the treaty.147 In some circumstances, however, a treaty provision may attain customary international law status, in which case it becomes binding on all states, including non-treaty members. For this to happen, two factors must be present: uniform state practice; and opinio juris sive necessitatis.148 Opinio juris denotes an actor’s belief that a particular behaviour is legally required. Thus, customary international law exists where states enact a practice broadly and consistently, and do so because they believe this is required by law. From a constructivist perspective, this is of great interest, since ‘customary international law exists only where there is a norm.’149

New Zealand’s case to the ICJ exists at the fuzzy edge of the distinction between these two concepts. New Zealand explicitly linked its protest activity to legal anti-nuclear weapon norms in the PTBT, the NPT, and the Latin American NWFZ treaty—even though France was not party to those treaties—as a means of adding credibility and legitimacy to its anti-nuclear advocacy. New Zealand also cited numerous international resolutions and declarations, and argued the Court

147 “VCLT”, Articles 34, 35.
149 Finnemore, National Interests, 139.
should not rule purely on scientific grounds; rather, ‘The Court should be urged to accept as its standard the values of the world community, as reflected in the decisions of United Nations bodies.’

New Zealand was effectively invoking the belief that the international norm against atmospheric nuclear testing had achieved customary international law status. Attorney General Trevor Finlay summarised this point pithily in parliament, saying that in international relations, ‘when enough people say it, it is the law. We say enough people and enough nations have [condemned nuclear testing] to make it the law.’ While this point is debateable—as international law inevitably is—its relevance here is that New Zealand’s most progressive legal advocacy in favour of nuclear disarmament was made possible in part by the existing normative context, and by the protocols of customary international law.

The comments above show how normative structures make certain behaviours appear legitimate and credible, and thus, inform agency. Conversely, a further point arising from the New Zealand and Australian ICJ cases shows how agency informs structure, and how all states can incrementally contribute to the development of international legal structures governing relations between states. In order to conclude that the New Zealand and Australian cases were legally moot, the ICJ argued that French proclamations that it intended to stop atmospheric testing were ‘undertaking[s] possessing legal effect.’ This finding meant that in future, depending on the context, unilateral oral statements by senior government representatives could be deemed to be legally binding. W. Michael Reisman, Professor of International Law at Yale Law School, calls this finding ‘revolutionary.’

The impact of civil society activity on policy in this case differs slightly from the dynamics that constructivist norm scholars have observed in other policy fields. The ‘boomerang’ model, for example, sees civil society putting pressure on governments both ‘from below’ (domestically), and ‘from above’, by activating foreign civil society or governmental networks to pressure the home government to comply with a norm. In this case, New Zealand civil society actors sought to pressure the government to take great action not to comply with anti-nuclear weapon norms,

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150 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 204.
154 Risse and Sikkink, “Socialization of International Human Rights Norms.”
but to actively promote them, as well as to pressure France into compliance. Peace movement activists presented regular petitions to parliament prior to and during the case study period, some supported by tens of thousands of people. Local trade unions, which at the time had significant political and electoral influence, implemented boycotts against France in collaboration with international partners, and called of the government to take stronger protest action. Civil society also strongly influenced Labour Party policy through the direct, personal links between disarmament activists and party members. The frigate protest was an example of Labour policy emulating civil society protest, and struck a strong chord with the public; it ‘stimulated considerable national pride within New Zealand: at last New Zealand was standing up for its rights.’\(^{155}\) Ironically, Clements suggests that the strong anti-nuclear protest of the Labour Government from December 1972 onward may actually have tempered civil society activity, due to the government co-opting most of the peace movement’s concerns.\(^{156}\)

For the public, national identity is built and maintained in large part by invoking stories of national heroes, struggles and triumphs that foster national pride. The New Zealand government framed its ICJ case and frigate protest in terms of justice and sovereignty, and Kirk explicitly linked the frigate’s voyage to a primary marker of national identity—the New Zealand flag.\(^{157}\) When France announced it would move its testing programme underground, many New Zealanders saw the announcement as a diplomatic victory over a powerful state.\(^{158}\) The act of standing up to a nuclear power and taking direct protest action that garnered international attention thus elevated Kirk to the status of a national hero for many New Zealanders.\(^{159}\) The stories of his government’s anti-nuclear protests resonate as markers of national pride, casting New Zealand as an anti-nuclear champion that successfully pursued a principled, independent foreign policy.\(^{160}\) The high-profile nuclear disarmament advocacy of the Labour Government in particular in this period ‘legitimated the objectives of the peace movement and provided it with considerable respectability.’\(^{161}\)

\(^{155}\) Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 81.
\(^{159}\) On the respect that Kirk generated both at home and abroad for his management of New Zealand foreign policy, see, Roberts, “New Zealand Review,” 77.
\(^{160}\) Templeton, *Standing Upright Here*, 513–514.
\(^{161}\) Clements, “New Zealand’s Role,” 398.
As chapter four demonstrated, the downstream effects on New Zealand national identity of the events described here, along with ongoing civil society activism, were significant. Helen Clark, for example, a lead proponent and author of the 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act and New Zealand prime minister from 1999-2008, writes that Kirk’s principled opposition to nuclear weapons, apartheid, and the Vietnam War inspired her decision to join the Labour Party.\textsuperscript{162} It was not just left-leaning New Zealanders who were affected; the government’s protests brought anti-nuclear sentiment and activism much closer to the public mainstream. Over time, such sentiment has become a dominant aspect of national identity in the public, as well as among many officials and politicians.\textsuperscript{163}


6. The Trudeau peace initiative

In view of the madness inherent in the threat to use atomic weapons, to kill the hopes for disarmament would truly be to risk killing life on earth.

~ Former Canadian prime minister, Pierre Trudeau

Introduction

From October 1983 to February 1984, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-84) undertook a high-profile international campaign that became known as the Trudeau peace initiative. Over five months, Trudeau dedicated the majority of his time and energy to the initiative, touring 15 world capitals and meeting 58 world leaders for detailed discussions on the security challenges of the nuclear age. He aimed to reduce East-West tensions and put an end to ‘megaphone diplomacy’; to increase scope for dialogue among the nuclear armed states; to stop the spread of nuclear weapons; and to reinvigorate nuclear disarmament negotiations. In many of his meetings, Trudeau promoted a set of specific nuclear disarmament-related proposals, produced by a dedicated Canadian taskforce established for the purpose. The proposals reflected the Trudeau Government’s approach to international security in the nuclear age—namely, as one commentator put it, that ‘control of the application of new technology to

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1 UNGA, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Eighteenth Meeting (A/S-12/PV.18)” (New York, June 18, 1982), 36.
weapons development must be part and parcel of any process aimed at securing actual nuclear disarmament.⁴ In 1984, Trudeau won the Albert Einstein Peace Prize for his peace initiative.⁵

In terms of identity dynamics, Trudeau was personally committed to a vision of Canada as an international peacemaker. This vision included strong opposition to nuclear weapons, as his actions and statements both before and after entering politics attested. At the same time, the senior government leadership, including Trudeau, had an internalised belief in the centrality of US alliance as a national security interest for Canada. As discussed previously, this meant that key alliance norms of maintaining deterrent credibility and relatedly, solidarity, were also deeply entrenched in Canadian political thinking. Likewise, the majority of officials had internalised pro-alliance and arguably, pro-nuclear national identities, due to the existence of long-standing bureaucratic institutions dedicated to the defence of alliance-related norms.

National identity in the Canadian public in the early 1980s included a strong, latent anti-nuclear weapon strand, but as with the political class, the majority of the public saw this as a secondary concern to maintaining US alliance guarantees. During the superpower crisis in mid-1983, however, this hierarchy of security norms appears to have been inverted. The government’s decision to permit US testing of nuclear-capable cruise missiles in Canada in the name of alliance solidarity thus activated very strong anti-nuclear public sentiment and mobilised civil society. The majority of Canadian opposed the cruise decision, which triggered the largest peace/anti-nuclear protests in the country’s history.

The protesters singled out Trudeau for condemnation, highlighting the contradictions between Canada’s support for cruise missile testing and the anti-nuclear vision for Canada that the prime minister had personally championed previously. Widespread public condemnation triggered cognitive dissonance in the prime minister, stimulating a deep sense of personal responsibility to help mitigate global nuclear risks. Officials were hesitant about the sudden, high-profile peace initiative that was an uncharacteristic departure from traditional Canadian foreign policy practice. Seeking to reduce the psychological discomfort generated by the public’s condemnation, however, Trudeau asserted his prerogative as prime minister and side-lined officials’ concerns by developing and delivering the initiative outside of normal policymaking.


channels. In sum, the activation of public anti-nuclear weapon sentiment, and its resonance with Trudeau, was the catalyst for the peace initiative. This chapter thus shines a spotlight on the inherent contradictions in two core visions of Canadian identity and the conflicting impulses they create—Canada the pro-disarmament peacemaker, and Canada the solid US ally and supporter of nuclear deterrence.

National identities

Political elite

Numerous historians, former officials and analysts have noted Pierre Trudeau’s deep-rooted personal aversion to nuclear weapons.6 Two prominent biographers, for example, write that Trudeau’s ‘horror of nuclear weapons’ was ‘genuine and longstanding.’7 In 1963, Trudeau fiercely attacked the Liberal Party leader, Lester Pearson, for supporting the receipt of US nuclear warheads for operation by Canadian troops; in protest, Trudeau refused to stand as a Liberal Party candidate in the upcoming general election.8 During Trudeau’s premiership, decisions were made to end all of Canada’s nuclear weapons roles, as discussed in chapter four.9

Trudeau’s beliefs were informed by his experiences as an academic and leading public intellectual before entering politics. These experiences produced an inclination to ask difficult questions, to encourage debate and challenge the status quo, and to highlight inconsistencies in Canadian foreign policy.10 The lead historian at Canada’s foreign affairs department, Greg Donaghy, writes that in general, Trudeau ‘was skeptical of Canadian foreign policy since 1945,

6 Axworthy, “Revisiting the Hiroshima Declaration,” 3; Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, 202; Trudgen, “Buckets,” 52; Tucker, “Canada and Arms Control,” 645.
7 Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 7.
which too often seemed defined by a network of US-led military alliances. Always prepared to strike out on his own, he sought policies more closely attuned to Canadian values and interests.\textsuperscript{11} Although Trudeau believed in the concept of nuclear deterrence, he thought that the manner in which the superpower nuclear arsenals were being managed created enormous risks of accidental or miscalculated war.\textsuperscript{12} While Trudeau’s focus on nuclear issues was sporadic,\textsuperscript{13} it is important to note that during his premiership, a powerful Quebecois separatist movement presented ‘the most serious challenge that has ever confronted the Canadian federal system.’\textsuperscript{14} The separatist movement led Trudeau to focus mainly on domestic events, despite his personal views on disarmament.\textsuperscript{15}

In the early 1980s, many senior Liberal MPs were also concerned about the severe security risk created by nuclear weapons, and were willing to push for greater foreign policy independence in strategic affairs. In April 1982, for example, the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) proposed in a report on ‘Security and Disarmament’ that Canada take a ‘Twin Pillars’ approach to improving international security. First, Canada should make a strong call for ‘urgent negotiations on strategic armaments limitation and reduction as soon as possible.’\textsuperscript{16} And second, Canada should pursue ‘rapid progress towards improvement in world political conditions’; establishment of confidence building measures and crisis management systems; and further multilateral disarmament negotiations.\textsuperscript{17} Such initiatives were to be pursued, however, within the bounds of nuclear alliance norms.

\textsuperscript{12} Head and Trudeau, \textit{The Canadian Way}, 293–294.
\textsuperscript{15} von Riekhoff, “The Impact of Prime Minister Trudeau,” 267. Similarly, see the comments of Trudeau’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, in MacGuigan, \textit{An Inside Look at External Affairs During the Trudeau Years: The Memoirs of Mark MacGuigan}, 6–7.
\textsuperscript{16} Cited in Barrett, “Canada’s Arms Control and Disarmament Policy,” 81–82.
\textsuperscript{17} Cited in Ibid.
Officials

A strong narrative in the literature on the peace initiative thus revolves around the significant concern it caused among Canadian officials.\(^{18}\) The daily responsibility of managing alliance relations had entrenched pro-nuclear weapon norms in the national identities of the senior bureaucrats, who were less inclined to question the status quo than their political masters. In addition, Canadian and US officials have deep and wide collaborative relationship, of which nuclear disarmament and arms control is only a very minor part. In general terms, officials are thus concerned not to pursue disarmament policies that would upset relations and potentially have spill-over effects on other aspects of the Canada-US relationship.\(^{19}\) Foreign affairs officials were suspicious of Trudeau from the start of his premiership, due to his cabinet’s rejection of the recommendation to maintain existing troop commitments to NATO in Europe in the late 1960s, and its demand that officials repeat their review from the ground up.\(^{20}\) Trudeau later suggested he could get more useful information by reading the *New York Times* than foreign ministry dispatches.\(^{21}\)

The early 1980s were a time of superpower political crisis, as described further below. In this context, alliance norms of solidarity, internalised in the majority of officials, were of heightened importance. NATO nuclear deterrence strategy is premised on the need to maintain credible nuclear threats, said to derive from military capacity and alliance solidarity.\(^{22}\) Canada questioning the credibility of NATO’s nuclear threats thus constituted a fundamental challenge to the dominant norms practiced by officials at home and abroad. Trudeau’s key foreign affairs advisor warned the prime minister that his peace initiative would ‘run against and across a number of bureaucratic currents.’\(^{23}\) Nevertheless, this scepticism did not turn into open resistance: ‘most [officials] proved “co-optable” and were swayed by the prime minister’s “enthusiasm and sense of mission.”’\(^{24}\)

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18 See, for example, Thompson, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Peace Initiative,” 1125.
24 Ibid., 43.
Public

The late 1970s and early 1980s marked the resurgence in Canada of sustained public concern with nuclear weapons. The previously ‘small and marginalised’ Canadian peace movement rapidly gained momentum as the collapse of détente and the intensifying Cold War stimulated fears of nuclear war.25 Between 1981 and 1983, for example, the annual budget of Project Ploughshares—a key civil society organisation with expertise in disarmament issues—jumped from CDN $11,000 to CDN $273,000.26 Another prominent nuclear disarmament advocacy group, Operation Dismantle, was founded in 1977 and quickly developed an active membership base of 10,000.27

By the early 1980s, Canadian public perceptions of Cold War defence strategies had continued the anti-armament trend noted in chapter four. A 1982 survey within the Canadian Institute of International Affairs—‘a middle-of-the-road segment of the Canadian attentive public’ on foreign policy issues—found 74 percent support for reducing all countries’ armament levels as the best way to increase Canadian security.28 In July the same year, Gallup asked respondents how they would vote ‘as a Canadian’ if there were a global referendum on nuclear disarmament—an objective being promoted by Operation Dismantle. 68 percent supported total nuclear disarmament.29 Between 1962 and 1982, ‘the percentage of Canadians believing that “the West should take all steps to defeat Communism, even if it means risking nuclear war,” plummeted from 42 to 6 percent.’30

Several analysts have noted the overwhelmingly positive response of the Canadian public to the peace initiative, which ‘struck at the heart of Canadian fears about the dangers of continuing the pace of the current arms race.’31 A survey conducted in 1984 registered 85% support for

25 Ibid., 40–41.
26 Ibid., 40.
30 Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, 157.
Trudeau’s efforts. The peace initiative resonated with two particular aspects national identity for the Canadian public: first, the strong anti-nuclear weapon strand, which constituted part of the popular vision of Canada as an active advocate of international peace; and second, a desire to express greater foreign policy independence. Donaghy, for example, writes that the peace initiative ‘delighted most Canadians, reinforcing their scepticism about American claims to exclusive leadership of the western alliance.’

**Nuclear disarmament advocacy**

Two different aspects of the Trudeau peace initiative have theoretical significance, and are therefore examined in detail here: first, the question of what caused the peace initiative, and second, the question of why the initiative took the specific form that it did.

**The impetus to act**

Superpower relations were at an historic low in 1983, with general East-West tensions at a height not seen since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The international atmosphere was marked, as Trudeau put it, by an ‘ominous rhythm of crisis.’ Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it became clear that the US Senate would not ratify the SALT II nuclear arms control agreement. East-West relations continued to deteriorate over the next few years. In January 1981, Ronald Reagan became US president (1981–1989), initially espousing a bellicose, anti-Soviet, good-versus-evil religious rhetoric. Reagan announced that a perceived decline in US power would be addressed via a massive nuclear and conventional military build-up. UK Prime

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32 Sigler and von Riekhoff, “The Trudeau Peace Initiative,” 59. The report that Sigler and Von Reikhoff cite is dated May 1984. Thus, it is not clear whether or not the opinion poll it refers to was conducted prior to the end of the peace initiative in mid-February that year.
34 Ibid., 39.
35 In addition to the Guelph speech, for example, see, Pierre E Trudeau, “A Peace Initiative from Canada,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 40, no. 1 (January 1984): 15.
36 Barrett, “Canada’s Arms Control and Disarmament Policy,” 77. See also, “U.S.-Soviet/Russian Nuclear Arms Control” (Arms Control Association, June 2002).
37 Barrett, “Canada’s Arms Control and Disarmament Policy,” 80.
Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979—1990) took an equally hard line regarding the Soviet Union, and was championing the modernisation of UK and NATO nuclear forces. In March 1983, Reagan condemned the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire,’ and two weeks later, announced plans for a space-based missile defence system—the Strategic Defense Initiative, or ‘Star Wars.’ The latter undermined the decades-old consensus—enshrined in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty—that mutual superpower vulnerability made nuclear war less likely, and that missile defences should therefore not be developed.

The Canadian Parliament unanimously condemned Star Wars as an escalation of the arms race, and Trudeau personal warned Reagan that it increased the risk of nuclear war. In September 1983, a Soviet fighter pilot shot down a South Korean civilian airliner that had strayed into Soviet airspace, killing 269 people. In this context, disarmament negotiations had all but ceased; as Tom Axworthy, a senior Trudeau advisor at the time, puts it, ‘the policy had virtually ended, and rhetoric had taken over.’ Trudeau was concerned that the superpowers were letting ideological battles obscure the vital goal of preventing nuclear war. Recently declassified primary sources reveal that in November 1983—that is, in the middle of the Trudeau peace initiative—NATO nuclear war exercises led the Soviet leadership to believe that the West was preparing for a massive nuclear strike on the Soviet Union.

By 1983, Trudeau had been Canadian prime minister for over 15 years. A senior Western statesman, he had extensive international contacts and a significant degree of personal political capital. He was also highly charismatic and enjoyed close, direct personal engagement with his peers. Given these personal traits, Trudeau’s strong personal aversion to nuclear weapons, and the steadily growing risk of nuclear war, Trudeau felt a personal responsibility to try to

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42 Ibid., 116–117.
ameliorate global tensions. This sense of responsibility was linked in Trudeau’s mind to a belief in Canada’s natural role as an international mediator and advocate for peace. Despite Trudeau leaning early in life toward foreign policy isolationism, this internationalist ‘peacemaker’ view of Canadian national identity was a long-standing theme of his public statements and diplomatic efforts, including in the two years prior to the peace initiative. There was an inherent tension, however, between Trudeau’s view of Canada as a mediating force for peace, and a national identity that was deeply entrenched among political and bureaucratic elites of Canada as a solidarist US ally. The conflicting policy imperatives created by these two visions of national identity came to the fore in mid-1983, just months before the peace initiative, over the issue of cruise missile testing.

In mid-1980, the US government had privately petitioned its Canadian counterpart for permission to test new air-launched, nuclear capable cruise missiles over Canadian territory. Foreign, defence and economic bureaucracies were enthusiastic about the idea, seeing it as serving multiple objectives. First, it would help to rebuild Canada-US military ties, which had been strained since the early 1960s when the Diefenbaker Government refused to receive US nuclear warheads for Canadian operation, and had suffered further in the wake of Canada’s European NATO drawdown at the start of Trudeau’s premiership. Second, cruise testing would support the development of Canadian defence industries. And third, officials saw cruise testing as a means of helping to repair relations with other NATO allies, which had likewise suffered during the European drawdown.

Trudeau was also keen to improve Canada-US relations, and saw cruise missile testing as a possible means of doing that. In contrast to the bureaucracy, however, he was initially hesitant about the cruise testing. Given Trudeau’s previous, high-profile nuclear disarmament...
advocacy, this was unsurprising. At both UN special sessions on disarmament in 1978 and 1982, Trudeau personally championed a ‘suffocation’ strategy to end the arms race.\textsuperscript{55} A central premise of the this strategy was that states could help to facilitate nuclear disarmament by opposing the testing of new delivery systems for nuclear weapons.

The Canadian government also assumed that nuclear missile testing in Canada would be deeply unpopular with the public, and thus tried to keep the cruise missile negotiations secret. In March 1982, however, an unplanned comment from a US military officer responding to a different issue alerted the public to the negotiations.\textsuperscript{56} When critics pointed out that allowing cruise missile testing in Canada appeared to contradict both the spirit and letter of Trudeau’s suffocation strategy,\textsuperscript{57} Trudeau replied that suffocation ‘was never intended to mean that any country could or should unilaterally pursue this strategy.’\textsuperscript{58} In February 1983, a generic agreement was signed for the testing of US weapons systems in Canada,\textsuperscript{59} and formal approval for nuclear-capable cruise missile testing was granted in July the same year.\textsuperscript{60}

Donaghy argues that deteriorating East-West relations, characterised by the collapse of détente and the Soviet deployment of SS-20s to Europe, meant ‘it had become impossible for Trudeau to maintain his steadfast opposition to nuclear weapons.’\textsuperscript{61} However, such conclusions about policy influences immediately invoke identity structures. That is, the events described affect Canadian nuclear weapons policy only if a politically-salient constituency views national security primarily in terms of alliance structures and in this case, in terms of the resulting nuclear deterrence strategies. In terms of the theoretical arguments advanced in this thesis, these norms were indeed internalised in large portions of the Canadian bureaucratic and political elite,\textsuperscript{62} and came to the fore in the cruise decision.

The government’s concern about public anti-nuclear weapon sentiment, however, was well founded. In July and December 1983 respectively, Gallup Canada reported 47.6 and 47.1 percent

\textsuperscript{58} Trudeau, “Commencement Address,” 481.
\textsuperscript{59} Clearwater, Just Dummies, 36–37.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 53–54.
\textsuperscript{62} Clearwater, Just Dummies, 13.
of respondents opposed cruise testing (against 44.5 and 44.3 percent in favour);\(^6\) Regehr and Rosenbaum report 1983 polls showing 52 percent of Canadians opposed.\(^6\) Seeking to appease public opinion, Trudeau tried to link cruise testing in Canada to alliance commitments under the 1979 NATO dual-track decision.\(^6\) This decision had mandated deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe as a response to Soviet deployment in Europe of SS-20 missiles to replace ageing predecessors.\(^6\) NATO’s dual track strategy was to use new Western nuclear deployments as a bargaining chip to push for negotiations on nuclear arms reductions.\(^6\)

In fact, the link between cruise testing in Canada and the dual track decision was highly tenuous, as critics and opposition MPs pointed out.\(^6\) The 1979 dual-track decision related to European deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles. In contrast, the air-launched cruise missiles of the type tested in Canada first entered service with the US Air Force in December 1982 and were deployed on US soil.\(^6\) In other words, the Canadian tests related to different class of weapon deployed on a different continent with no reference disarmament negotiations. They certainly related to the overall US deterrence strategy, but appear to have had a much greater resemblance to the logic of arms racing than to the dual track strategy. Arguably, this accounts for why Trudeau was initially hesitant about cruise testing.\(^7\)

Moreover, it was somewhat incongruous for Trudeau to invoke the dual track decision at this point given that he appeared to criticise the dual-track logic in a major speech in the United States in May 1982, and to imply that both East and West were responsible for the arms race.\(^7\)

Given the latent anti-US sentiment in the Canadian public, however, the multilateral NATO alliance was more popular among than the bilateral, Canada-US NORAD agreement. This was particularly relevant given Reagan’s massive nuclear weapons build-up in the early 1980s and his bellicose attacks on the Soviet Union, perceived as increasing the risk of nuclear war. In

\(^6\) NATO, “Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers” (Brussels, December 12, 1979), https://goo.gl/kQM2qi.
\(^6\) Clearwater, *Just Dummies*, 22.
\(^6\) Ibid., 68.
\(^7\) Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 40.
\(^7\) Trudeau, “Commencement Address,” 481–483.
theoretical terms, then, Trudeau invoking the dual-track precedent can thus be seen as an attempt to link the new policy direction—support for cruise testing in Canada—to established foreign policy norms. This linking attempt was a clear failure.

Anti-nuclear sentiment was already high around the world; as Tannenwald notes, ‘In 1981 and 1982, the largest antinuclear movement in history arose in the United States and Europe to protest the Ronald Reagan administration’s seeming repudiation of arms control and pursuit of war-fighting strategies of deterrence.’ The cruise testing issue ‘galvanised [Canada’s] nascent peace movement,’ which mobilised a large public constituency and formed a nation-wide anti-cruise testing coalition. Moreover, it was not just the peace movement that mobilised; major unions such as the United Auto Workers, the Canadian Union of Postal Workers, the Canadian Union of Public Employees, and the million-member Canadian Labour Congress all condemned the cruise decision and promised to fight it. The result was a mass, public outpouring of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment on a scale never before seen in Canada. The anti-cruise rallies were the largest peace protests in Canadian history, and featured ‘Trudeau’s effigy, perched atop a cardboard cruise missile...hoisted before jeering protesters.’ In April 1983, the Vancouver City Council helped organise a peace and anti-nuclear rally attended by at least 65,000 people. According to Donaghy, 100,000 protesters took to the city’s streets that month.

Other high-profile civil society activities increased pressure on the government. Operation Dismantle, for example, lodged an (ultimately unsuccessful) legal challenge against cruise testing. The national Farmers Union, the United Church of Canada, and the New Democratic Party all endorsed a campaign run by Project Ploughshares and Operation Dismantle to establish Canada as a NWFZ; the local authorities of 75 towns and cities—including Toronto and Vancouver in 1983—declared their municipalities nuclear free zones. In sum, cruise testing was a policy that clashed with a strong anti-nuclear weapon national identity in the general public.

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72 Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb,” 32.
76 Wyler, “Vancouver Loves Peace.”
79 Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, 157; Clearwater, Just Dummies, 32; Wyler, “Vancouver Loves Peace.”
However, civil society norm entrepreneurs played an important role in activating that identity, putting pressure on Trudeau by highlighting the inconsistency between his past public statements and current policies. The result was that six months before Trudeau launched the peace initiative, ‘his reputation as an opponent of nuclear weapons [was] in tatters.’

This chapter argues that as a result of the dynamics described above, Trudeau experienced significant cognitive dissonance and a heightened sense of personal responsibility to help reduce international tensions. The core elements in this mix were Trudeau’s longstanding personal opposition to nuclear weapons; his international championing of a suffocation strategy to end the nuclear arms race and facilitate disarmament; and the Canadian public’s passionate condemnation of cruise testing in general, and Trudeau in particular, for having betrayed that anti-nuclear vision. This cognitive dissonance generated a profound ‘psychological discomfort’ in Trudeau, creating the impetus for action. His main immediate aim, as one of his senior advisors at the time states, was to reduce international tensions and re-establish dialogue between East and West, in the hope that this would reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. In this context, the existence of enormous superpower nuclear arsenals constituted a key reality constraint. Since East-West security relations were structured primarily in relation to nuclear weapons, any attempt to reduce tensions necessarily had to engage with these weapons. Trudeau’s efforts to restore political dialogue therefore had to be framed in terms of movement towards nuclear disarmament. The theoretical discussion at the end of the chapter addresses this point in more detail.

Trudeau’s inclination to act was reinforced by his close personal advisors, such as Thomas Axworthy and Robert Fowler. In 1983, the anti-nuclear film If You Love This Planet won the Oscar for best documentary short. The film, which stars prominent Australian anti-nuclear advocate, Helen Caldicott, highlights the risks and terrible consequences of nuclear war. Trudeau’s girlfriend at the time, Margot Kidder, was a passionate member of the peace movement and urged him to see the film, as did Axworthy and Fowler, who arranged for him to do so. Trudeau was clearly impressed, and Kidder urged him to meet with Caldicott; Trudeau

81 Elliot and Devine, “Motivational Nature of Cognitive Dissonance.”
82 Axworthy, “Private Interview.”
83 Weldes, Constructing National Interests, 102.
invited the latter to Ottawa and discussed Cold War dynamics with her.\textsuperscript{86} In August 1983, Caldicott gave the keynote speech at a Liberal Party conference focused on reviewing Canadian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{87}

In mid-1983, Axworthy and Fowler also arranged for Trudeau to meet ex-US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. Along with several senior ex-US officials, McNamara had begun to question the concept of a ‘limited nuclear war’ as envisaged by NATO strategy, and was advocating for NATO to adopt a ‘no first use’ policy—a commitment not be the first to use nuclear weapons in any conflict.\textsuperscript{88} Trudeau and McNamara discussed possible Canadian contributions to nuclear weapons-related matters. McNamara urged Trudeau to use his station to speak out personally about the risks of nuclear war before he left office, unlike so many other world leaders, who spoke out only after retiring.\textsuperscript{89} Trudeau’s personal interactions with prominent individuals such as McNamara and Caldicott appealed to his sense of style and leadership, and appear to have contributed to his decision to take action.\textsuperscript{90}

By the end of August 1983, Trudeau had decided to take some kind of initiative.\textsuperscript{91} The following section turns to the second key question highlighted above—namely, what caused the nuclear disarmament advocacy that Trudeau pursued to take the particular form that it did. As will be seen, competing identity dynamics informed by alliance and disarmament objectives again feature prominently.

**Developing the initiative**

On 21 September 1983, Trudeau met for the first time on the concept of a Canadian initiative with Alan MacEachen and Jean-Jacques Blais, the secretary of state for external affairs and minister of national defence respectively.\textsuperscript{92} This was just five weeks before the peace initiative was launched; for a major foreign policy initiative, such a timeframe was unprecedented. A dedicated, eight-member task force was established to develop practical ideas, the makeup and

\textsuperscript{86} English, *Just Watch Me*, ch. 17, unpaginated.
\textsuperscript{87} Sigler and von Riekhoff, “The Trudeau Peace Initiative,” 52.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 41–42.
\textsuperscript{90} Sigler and von Riekhoff, “The Trudeau Peace Initiative,” 52.
\textsuperscript{91} Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 42.
\textsuperscript{92} Sigler and von Riekhoff, “The Trudeau Peace Initiative,” 56.
functioning of which deviated significantly from standard bureaucratic practice. The group consisted mainly of mid-level, rather than senior, officials. Moreover, the ad-hoc taskforce was made up predominantly of international security and arms control specialists—an unusual choice for any high-profile Canadian initiative, given that this field constitutes only a small fraction of the overall Canadian foreign policy agenda. In a further break from tradition, the group reported directly to the prime minister’s office. 93

This disregard for traditional foreign policy channels stirred pre-existing concerns among senior Canadian bureaucrats, who worried about the potential impact of the initiative on broader Canada-US and NATO relations. 94 Indeed, the peace initiative turned out to be a unilateral Canadian initiative with almost no prior consultation with allies; in this regard, it marked a ‘sharp and public shift in Canadian security and disarmament policy.’ 95 According to Trudeau biographer, John English, NATO’s Secretary General told MacEachen in June 1984 that ‘Pierre’s peace initiative drove Margaret [Thatcher] crazy.’ 96 Officials in the Reagan administration, while publicly offering support in principle for the peace initiative, in private complained loudly about the lack of consultation, 97 and even insulted Trudeau. 98 The head of the working group, Louis Delvoie, likened his role of coordinating between the foreign ministry and the prime minister as ‘frequently a job of riding roman circus horses.’ 99

Following an intensive burst of 18-hour days, the task force produced a set of disarmament and arms control-related proposals, of which Trudeau eventually agreed to four. 100 These included a call for a five-power nuclear conference within a year; strengthening the NPT to include current non-signatories; developing new initiatives to boost the languishing negotiations on Multilateral Balanced Force Reductions; and introducing new initiatives to suffocate the arms race—for example, by banning the testing and deployment of high-altitude, anti-satellite weapons and restricting the mobility of ICBMs. 101

93 Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 43–44. A parallel steering committee of more senior staff was also established, but had little impact on the content of policy proposals. Sigler and von Riekhoff, “The Trudeau Peace Initiative,” 57.
94 For examples of this discontent, see, Thompson, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Peace Initiative,” 1126–1127.
98 English, Just Watch Me, ch. 17, unpaginated.
100 Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 43.
101 Barrett, “Canada’s Arms Control and Disarmament Policy,” 88–89.
A final issue that Trudeau himself promoted was the idea of reviewing NATO security strategy—which necessarily meant alliance nuclear deterrence doctrines. In this, he was opposed by almost all of his senior officials and colleagues, including Secretary of State MacEachen and Minister of National Defence Blais, who feared it ‘might be seen as a lack of faith or a breaking away from NATO’; the head of the ad-hoc taskforce, Louis Delvoie; and the Canadian ambassador to Washington, Allan Gotlieb, who was concerned Trudeau’s earlier criticisms of Western nuclear strategy may have offended US officials and policymakers, who ‘don’t like the notion that they and the Soviets are equally responsible for world tensions.’ Despite this widespread opposition from senior colleagues and officials, Trudeau returned to the issue of NATO nuclear strategy on several occasions during the peace initiative.

Launching the initiative

Trudeau launched the peace initiative on 27 October 1983, with a speech at a conference on *Strategies for Peace and Security in the Nuclear Age* at the University of Guelph, Ontario. Here, Trudeau returned to his vision of Canada as a positive political force that could mediate East-West tensions, framing this vision in terms of a ‘third rail’ of high-level political activity:

> Canada is not at the [disarmament negotiating] table, and we have no wish to insert ourselves into this vital and delicate process. It is my hope, however, that we might help to influence the atmosphere in which these negotiations are being conducted, and thereby enhance the prospects of early agreement.

Trudeau expressed firm support for NATO’s dual-track, armament–for–disarmament strategy, but also criticised the solidarity norms which tend to suppress political debate within NATO:

> It is almost as though the diversity, pluralism, and freedom of expression which we are determined to preserve through the Alliance, are not seen as appropriate within the Alliance...institutions cannot grow to meet new challenges if their level of debate—their

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103 Granatstein, “Gouzenko to Gorbachev,” 50.
105 Ibid., 101. He returned to this theme at the end of the peace initiative. See, Trudeau, “Speech from the Throne,” 1212.
Roughly two weeks later, Trudeau set off along his metaphorical ‘third rail.’ He travelled across Europe from 8-11 November advocating dialogue, reinvigorated disarmament negotiations, and the need to bridge the East-West divide. He met the British Queen, the pope, and the heads of government of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. He did not initially seek a meeting with Thatcher, with whom he had had ‘a lengthy and acrimonious confrontation’ the G-7 summit in May that year over his attempt to moderate anti-Soviet rhetoric in the summit communiqué. At the end of Trudeau’s European tour, however, Thatcher ‘summoned’ him to London and ‘castigated him for jeopardizing NATO solidarity and placing any trust in the Soviets.’ Thatcher aside, there was broad support in principle for his initiative due to the dire state of East-West relations.

Returning home, Trudeau made a second public speech on the peace initiative, this time at a Liberal Party fundraiser in Montreal—against the advice of officials, who thought the setting added an unhelpful partisan flavour to the initiative. In Montreal, Trudeau laid out more details on his proposals for the five-power nuclear conference, for strengthening the NPT regime, and for the ban on high-altitude anti-satellite weapons. Still in November, Trudeau travelled to New Delhi for the 1983 CHOGM, though perhaps because his audience was less enmeshed in East-West nuclear dynamics, he shied away from pushing disarmament issues strongly in his main speech. The same month, he met with the Japanese prime minister in Tokyo, and with Chinese Premier Zhao Zi-yang and the paramount leader of China, Deng Xiao-ping. In each case, Trudeau raised his concerns about deteriorating East-West relations, and asserted the need to take immediate action to reduce the immense risks related to nuclear conflict.

In early December 1983, MacEachen attended a meeting of NATO foreign ministers. Against MacEachen’s personal wishes, Trudeau instructed him to gauge the willingness of allies to support Canada in urging a fundamental review of NATO strategy. The minister did as Trudeau

108 Ibid., 41. For a further example of this antagonism, see, Thompson, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Peace Initiative,” 1121.
111 Ibid., 45–46.
instructed, but US Secretary of State George Shultz ‘made it clear to MacEachen that the US was not remotely interested in discussing NATO’s doctrine of flexible response.’\textsuperscript{114}

On 15 December, Trudeau met President Reagan in Washington in what was arguably the most important meeting of the initiative. To the great surprise of many observers, including officials from both countries, Trudeau and Reagan got along well.\textsuperscript{115} Ambassador Gotlieb had urged Trudeau to avoid policy specifics and instead encourage the president to further highlight his own recent calls for peace, such as those the president had made the previous month in a speech to the Japanese parliament.\textsuperscript{116} The Japan speech had been a mixture of tough-talking anti-Soviet rhetoric—‘we would never coldbloodedly shoot a defenseless airliner out of the sky’—and conciliatory calls for compromise and negotiation—‘a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought...our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.’\textsuperscript{117} For the most part, Trudeau followed Gotlieb’s advice and the two leaders did not discuss specific disarmament measures. Trudeau instead highlighted Reagan’s more conciliatory recent remarks about disarmament, suggesting that they had not been sufficiently acknowledged internationally, and urging Reagan to take a proactive stance in support of détente. Despite this ‘restrained and non-confrontational’ tone, Trudeau raised the issue of NATO strategy, though it is not clear what precisely was said on this issue.\textsuperscript{118} At the subsequent joint press conference, Reagan wished Trudeau ‘Godspeed in your efforts to help build a durable peace.’\textsuperscript{119} Trudeau then asserted, ‘the President agrees that we shouldn't seek military superiority in NATO, we should seek a balance; that we do not think that a nuclear war can be won; that we think that the ideal would be to see an end to all nuclear arms.’

In theoretical terms, it is instructive to note that Trudeau’s notes from this time demonstrate the way that individuals use consistency effects, such as the practice of naming and shaming inconsistent behaviour, to advance policy objectives.\textsuperscript{120} Shortly after his meeting with Reagan, Trudeau wrote,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[114] Ibid., 48.
\item[119] “Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada Following Their Meeting.”
\item[120] Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 46–47.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
My tactic was essentially to nail Reagan down publicly to the newer and more positive aspects of his [Japanese parliamentary] statement, and—even more important—to commit him publicly & personally to the progressive statement made by NATO in Brussels. If he should flinch in pursuit of this new course, he can be held to account.121

Trudeau had not given up on the issue of NATO nuclear strategy. Frustrated by his failure to initiate any serious discussion of the matter, he publicly questioned the logic of extended nuclear deterrence. He twice challenged the French prime minister, Raymond Barre, on the notion that the United States would risk nuclear war in Europe in order to repel a Soviet conventional attack on the continent. This attracted media criticism at home, in the United States and in Europe, and caused significant concern in the Reagan administration.122 Trudeau also insisted that his ad-hoc taskforce ‘include a critical examination of NATO’s strategy’ in the speech it was drafting to mark the conclusion of the peace initiative, though the Reagan administration urged him not to raise the issue in the speech.123

Trudeau had hoped to meet the Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, prior to Reagan, so as to be able to present the latter with a credible proposal for East-West engagement. However, Andropov’s terminal illness ruled out this possibility. Instead, Trudeau travelled in January 1984 to the capitals of three Eastern bloc countries: Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania. This was against the advice of MacEachen, and ‘brought into the open the rumoured differences between Trudeau and his senior foreign policy officials over the peace mission.’124 In his last speech of the peace initiative given in the Canadian parliament, Trudeau appears to have been influenced by the strong opposition from Canadian and allied bureaucrats and politicians to any discussion of NATO strategy, and refrained from discussing the issue.125

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123 Ibid.
124 Ibid. In the end, Trudeau met the new Soviet premier, Konstantin Chernenko, on 15 February 1984 while in Moscow for Andropov’s funeral—a week after the parliamentary speech that marked the end of the peace initiative—though many Western leaders were also in attendance and met with Chernenko. Ibid., 52.
125 Trudeau, “Speech from the Throne”, especially 1214.
Theoretical implications

As with the empirical discussion above, this theoretical section engages both with the question of what catalysed the Trudeau peace initiative, and the question of why the initiative took the specific form that it did. On the first question, it is important to note that the peace initiative was highly-unusual compared with Canada’s tradition of quiet nuclear weapons diplomacy coordinated in advance with allies. The fact that East-West relations were bleak in the early 1980s and that Trudeau was an elder Western leader who felt a responsibility to help mitigate the risk of nuclear war is insufficient, then, to explain why Canada should suddenly take a high-profile, unilateral nuclear disarmament initiative. A compelling means of explaining this outcome, however, is that Trudeau’s sense of responsibility was dramatically heightened by his profound cognitive dissonance, triggered by the public’s strong activation of an anti-nuclear identity that Trudeau shared, and by their personal condemnation of Trudeau for having betrayed it.

The majority of the Canadian public interpreted the cruise testing decision as strongly conflicting with their vision of Canada as a pro-disarmament peacemaker, as demonstrated by the fact that the cruise decision triggered the largest anti-nuclear protests in Canadian history. The protesters condemned Trudeau personally because he had publicly championed a vision of Canada as a pro-disarmament peacemaker for many years. The need for people to appear consistent in their actions, either for the psychological stability of their own identity, or for electoral or political purposes, is a powerful behavioural driver. If an initial policy commitment is made out of genuine normative preference, a subsequent policy that conflicts with that preference causes cognitive dissonance or ‘psychological discomfort.’ With 100,000 Canadians marching in the street, touting Trudeau’s effigy atop a mock nuclear missile, protesting his betrayal of anti-nuclear principles he claimed to hold dear, Trudeau cannot have escaped a profound sense of cognitive dissonance. Indeed, several commentators note that he was deeply disturbed at the mass protests triggered by the cruise missile decision. The observation that Trudeau appears

127 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 43–47. See also, Rublee, “Taking Stock,” 427–428.
128 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 48; Elliot and Devine, “Motivational Nature of Cognitive Dissonance.”
to have aimed specifically to engage the public on nuclear policy issues during the peace initiative further supports this notion.\textsuperscript{130}

Strong cognitive dissonance leads the sufferer to take action to reduce their discomfort; in political terms, this means either a reconsideration of policy, or a reframing of identity.\textsuperscript{131} Psychologists frame the latter option as ‘attitude change...in the service of reducing the psychological Discomfort [sic] generated by counterattitudinal behavior.’\textsuperscript{132} In the case of cruise missile testing, the idea of reversing course was never seriously considered; senior politicians and officials—including Trudeau—overwhelmingly saw a strong Canada-US alliance as a primary security interest, and reversing the cruise decision would have been immensely damaging to US relations. Trudeau therefore tried to reframe cruise testing in relation to the 1979 NATO dual track decision. As a multilateral alliance, NATO had strong support among the public despite its nuclear component. The public, however, either rejected this link, or rejected the notion that increasing Western nuclear armaments was in the national interest because it would facilitate disarmament. Unwilling to change the cruise testing policy, and unable to reframe it in identity terms that the public would accept, Trudeau’s sense of cognitive dissonance persisted, as did the protests. Keenly aware of the inconsistency between Canadian policy and his personal anti-nuclear beliefs, Trudeau sought to resolve the resulting psychological discomfort by reaffirming his vision of Canada as a supporter of peace through nuclear disarmament. Viewed in such terms, the peace initiative makes sense as a policy outcome.

Turning to the second question of why the peace initiative took the specific form that it did, four theoretical observations are noteworthy, relating to the international structuring effect of nuclear weapons; to the role of identity; to the importance of agency; and to the international normative context. On the first point, the peace initiative demonstrates the fundamental degree to which nuclear weapons structure great power relations. They are a reality constraint or ‘brute observational facts’ that cannot be ignored when trying to engage in issues of great power politics.\textsuperscript{133} As such, the credibility of any effort to reduce international tensions required

\textit{Our Times - Volume 2: The Heroic Delusion} (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1994), 355. This reading of Trudeau’s response to the mass protests is further reinforced by his announcement, two weeks after his trip to the Soviet Union in February 1984, that he would shortly retire from politics, suggesting it is unlikely the peace initiative was undertaken for electoral purposes. Globe and Mail, “Chronology of a Remarkable Political Life” (Ottawa, 2003), \url{http://goo.gl/QOaUHR}.

\textsuperscript{130} Munton, “Public Opinion and the Media,” 171–172.
\textsuperscript{131} Rublee, \textit{Nonproliferation Norms}, 48.
\textsuperscript{132} Elliot and Devine, “Motivational Nature of Cognitive Dissonance,” 390.
engagement with nuclear weapons. In this sense, the nuclear disarmament proposals were ‘a conversation piece, an icebreaker,’ serving as a carte de visite, ‘entitling the bearer to raise the broader political issues of peace and international security.’ Relatedly, the peace initiative was noteworthy for demonstrating that policymakers may pursue nuclear disarmament advocacy as a means of reducing international tension and thus, preventing nuclear war. Though some might think this is self-evident, in fact, the idea that nuclear disarmament—which aims at the elimination of nuclear weapons, as per the definition in chapter one—is a means of addressing nuclear threats clashes with a foundational assumption of nuclear deterrence theory—namely, that nuclear war is best avoided by maintaining a strong, credible nuclear deterrent. These clashing notions, and the purported commitment of Canadian policymakers to both, brings the discussion back to the key identity-based drivers that shaped the content of the peace initiative.

Secondly then, in terms of identity, this case clearly demonstrates the conflicting identity-based policy impulses between Canada the pro-disarmament advocate, and Canada the solidarist ally of the United States, inescapably entrapped by—or alternatively, depending on the identity trope, committed to—the structuring role that nuclear weapons play in US global strategies. The majority of the Canadian public were committed to the former, while in general, officials and political elites were committed to the latter. Trudeau was entrapped in the latter, as opposed to genuinely persuaded, about the value of nuclear weapons. This disarmament/deterrence conundrum is a hallmark of the nuclear age, and led to both the cruise testing decision and to Trudeau’s criticism of nuclear deterrence theory during the peace initiative. Trudeau was well aware of this conundrum and the contradictory policies generated by the mutually exclusive logics of each vision; he highlighted precisely this issue in his UN speech in 1982, for example:

I understand full well the people’s anguish and confusion. The nuclear debate is difficult and seems to pursue an inverse logic. It deals with power that, by common consent, is unusable. It argues for more nuclear weapons in order that, in the end, there may be fewer.136

Trudeau’s comment regarding a ‘power that, by common consent, is unusable’ points to a second contradiction that nuclear allies such as Canada are required to deal with, or more

134 Thompson, “Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Peace Initiative,” 1124.
135 Sigler and Von Riekhoff, p. 56 On this theme, see also, Pearson, Mackinnon, and Sapardanis, “The World Is Entitled to Ask Questions,” 142–43.
commonly, to simply ignore. NATO nuclear deterrence strategy is premised on an explicit willingness to use nuclear weapons first, and NATO claims that this willingness increases allied and international security.\(^{137}\) In this context, a key immediate objective of the peace initiative—preventing nuclear war—ran counter to embedded norms that to which Trudeau’s officials and political colleagues, both at home and abroad, subscribed. Of course, no one actually wanted a nuclear war. As Beatrice Heuser notes, this creates,

...the central paradox underlying all Western plans involving a nuclear defence posture:
NATO was trying to threaten a nuclear war which NATO itself had to fear as much as the Soviet Union; how, then, could NATO credibly threaten to resort to nuclear use?\(^{138}\)

Trudeau’s willingness to address these questions in public was, in the midst of a controversial initiative, the thing that caused the greatest controversy among Canadian and allied officials and leaders.\(^ {139}\) It is argued here that the resistance of NATO allies to discussing the disarmament/deterrence conundrum publicly is based on two factors. The first of these is the institutionalisation of nuclear deterrence norms in bureaucratic and political structures. This institutionalisation has a strong socialising effect on the individuals operating within those structures, potentially leading through iterative practice to the internalisation of nuclear deterrence norms. Secondly, governing elites do not want to address the disarmament/deterrence conundrum because it generates intense psychological discomfort through what is called here the Hotel California effect. In this regard, the Trudeau peace initiative epitomises the human-level psychological challenge confronting policymakers as they grapple with a conundrum that has characterised international politics in the nuclear age.

A line from the famous Eagles song *Hotel California* claims that at the Hotel, ‘you can check out any time you like, but you can never leave.’ This thesis argues that the conceptual logic underpinning nuclear deterrence theory creates a nuclear Hotel California in the minds of its adherents. That is, once an individual commits to the rationale driving the practice of nuclear deterrence, it becomes logically impossible to escape from the practice without risking—or, depending on the flavour of rationalist theory one ascribes to, guaranteeing—global nuclear catastrophe. In effect, once an individual is adopts an identity in which national security based

\(^{137}\) The 1991 Strategic Concept, for example, notes that allied nuclear weapons ‘will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression.’ NATO, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, para. 54.


on nuclear deterrence theory, the internal logic of that theory makes its renunciation appear both logically impossible,\textsuperscript{140} and existentially threatening.\textsuperscript{141} Thus, even if an individual would prefer to pursue nuclear disarmament (that is, to check out of the Hotel California), the psychological barrier to doing that is overwhelming.

A third theoretical point of interest here relates to the notions of human agency, and in particular, its importance in the causal chain.\textsuperscript{142} Canadian politicians have always had to contend with the contradicting policy demands of the disarmament/deterrence conundrum. The number of instances in which this conundrum has openly been addressed, however, are few. The fact that Trudeau was willing to question the logic of nuclear deterrence speaks to his personal status as a former intellectual with a sharp analytical and questioning mind. Arguably, it also speaks to the level of personal psychological stress he was already experiencing, as described above. In theoretical terms, Trudeau was a norm entrepreneur who sought to alter the prevailing norms of practice, but ran into strong opposition due to institutionalised pro-nuclear norms and the related Hotel California effect. In terms of predicting when and why such norm entrepreneurs may arise, these questions would move constructivist theory towards broader sociological questions about the conditions under which individuals come to hold the specific views they do, and come to attain positions of authority. While much theorisation remains to be done in this regard, it lies outside the scope of this thesis.\textsuperscript{143}

Instead, what this thesis does is to point to psychological mechanisms through which institutionalised norms affect views of national identity in the bureaucracy and public in

\textsuperscript{140} Bull, “Disarmament and the International System,” 47; Buzan, \textit{Introduction to Strategic Studies}, 250.
\textsuperscript{142} Müller, “Agency Is Central.”
\textsuperscript{143} Vincent Pouliot’s ‘practice theory’ provides a convincing explanation for policy continuity or incremental change on the basis of elite actors’ implicit ‘know-how’ about how best to advance the national interest. However, it is not clear how this theory would cope with the opposite: embedded knowledge being openly challenged by rival knowledge claims, as is the case with Trudeau and NATO nuclear strategy. As will be seen in chapter seven, practice theory also does not reflect the experience of New Zealand policymakers and officials who were forced to change their behaviour in response to the demands of norm entrepreneurs promoting a different vision for New Zealand national identity and security policy. See, Vincent Pouliot, \textit{International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy} (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), ch. 2.
particular.\textsuperscript{144} For officials, the norms that constitute national identity are practiced daily, and the institutionalised, iterative practice of security-related norms informs officials’ views of national identity over time. Conversely, for the public, stories of national struggles and heroes are important, as the content and practice of these stories, by retelling and reaffirming them, is the social fabric that is woven into the cloth of national identity. The latter dynamic may actually affect all three segments of society, but is arguably most relevant in relation to the public.

In this latter regard, the Trudeau peace initiative has significance in terms of its high-profile reinforcement of a view of national identity that is popular among the Canadian public—that of Canada the independent-minded, pro-disarmament peacemaker. 85 percent of Canadians supported the initiative,\textsuperscript{145} and Donaghy writes, ‘in acting for peace against long odds, Trudeau both reflected and reinforced the highest aspirations of Canadians for their foreign policy.’\textsuperscript{146} National pride in the effort would arguably have been increased by the awarding of the Einstein Peace Prize to Trudeau in 1984 for his effort. While this public view of national identity does not tend to dominate nuclear policymaking, its reinforcement in this case has down-stream effects. As will be seen in chapter eight, the existence of this identity can be used by norm entrepreneurs to legitimate further pro-disarmament policies.

Finally in terms of the key analytical concepts that inform the causal arguments in this thesis, the international normative environment had a very limited influence on the peace initiative. Trudeau writes that he grew concerned as the 1970s progressed that the international community was failing to build on the precedents set by the PTBT and NPT.\textsuperscript{147} In this regard, it is noteworthy that the international normative context provided no legal precedent to which Trudeau could link his advocacy of a change to NATO policy. Although the NPT contains a multilateral nuclear disarmament obligation, neither in customary nor treaty law is there any explicit, comprehensive prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear weapons—a point highlighted subsequently by the ICJ in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{148} In the absence of an explicit legal prohibition on the threat or use of nuclear

\textsuperscript{144} As will be seen in the following chapter, the persuasion mechanisms that function at the bureaucratic level do not seem to hold true to the same degree for political elites.


\textsuperscript{146} Donaghy, “The Ghost of Peace,” 52.

\textsuperscript{147} Head and Trudeau, \textit{The Canadian Way}, 294.

weapons, nuclear deterrence remains the dominant *descriptive* norm, or international practice, related to nuclear weapons.\(^{149}\)

This final observation points to a counterfactual that serves as a tentative hypothesis arising from this case. Officials and colleagues opposed Trudeau’s desire to review NATO strategy; from a constructivist perspective, this was due to the Hotel California effect, reinforced by these people’s habituation to nuclear deterrence norms which were entrenched in practice and codified in writing. Arguably, the presence of an international legal norm condemning the threat or use of nuclear weapons would have strengthened Trudeau’s willingness to more persistently pursue the issue of NATO strategy. In this regard, for example, the previous chapter demonstrated that the existence of international anti-nuclear weapon norms in the form of the NPT, the PTBT, and regional NWFZ which also banned nuclear testing increased the willingness of New Zealand politicians to strongly advocate an end to nuclear testing. The political dynamics of these two situations are, of course, quite distinct, but the underlying principle is the same, and constitutes a hypothesis worthy of further consideration.

\(^{149}\) On the different types of norms, see, Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, 40–43.
7. The obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons

Even if it may not yet be possible to say that, in every circumstance, international law proscribes the threat or use of nuclear weapons, there can be little doubt that the law has been moving in that direction. In New Zealand’s view, the sooner that point is reached, through the progressive development of international law, including the negotiating process, the more secure the international community will be.

— New Zealand statement to the ICJ, 1995

Introduction

Between 1994 and 2000, New Zealand pursued several high-profile nuclear disarmament initiatives, often strongly opposed by its former allies and other nuclear weapon states. In 1994, New Zealand was the only Western-aligned country to vote in favour of a UNGA resolution brought about by a civil society campaign—the World Court Project (WCP)—requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legal status of nuclear weapons. In the resulting ICJ hearings, New Zealand argued in favour of outlawing nuclear deterrence and stated that international law was moving in that direction. Among other things, the Court found unanimously that there is a legal obligation to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. New Zealand then linked this normative precedent to more progressive disarmament objectives, advocating strongly for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1995, New Zealand also undertook a range of high-profile unilateral and multilateral protests to oppose renewed French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. In the late 1990s, initially by itself and later, in collaboration with its New Agenda

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Coalition (NAC) partners, New Zealand sought and elicited ‘an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.’ Strikingly, most of this nuclear disarmament advocacy occurred under a government led by the conservative National Party, which until a few years prior had been strong critic of the country’s nuclear free policy and law.

This chapter demonstrates that a central driver for New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the 1990s was an internalised anti-nuclear weapon identity in the New Zealand public—termed here a ‘New Zealand nuclear taboo.’ The activation of this identity by norm entrepreneurs, who linked it to new disarmament objectives, drove proactive nuclear disarmament advocacy by the New Zealand government. Initially, this advocacy was caused by largely instrumental dynamics. Later in the decade, however, the increasing levels of persuasion about anti-nuclear weapon norms among officials and arguably, the prime minister, led to strong, universalistic advocacy based on genuine commitment to the national security value of pursuing nuclear disarmament.

National identities

Political elites

The National Party adopted a nuclear free policy in 1990 due to overwhelming public support for the policy, and won the general election the same year. However, senior National MPs such as the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don McKinnon still strongly supported a return to US alliance, including by amending or repealing the nuclear free law if necessary. Generational change was altering the dynamics within the party caucus, however. There had been a large influx of young National Party MPs in the 1990 election, many of whom had become politically active during the 1980s and thus either genuinely supported the nuclear free policy,

4 For details around the policy reversal, see chapter four, ‘Internalisation of an anti-nuclear identity.’
or did not share the views of the party leadership about US alliance as an essential security guarantor.⁶

In late September and early October 1991 respectively, President George H. W. Bush and the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, announced significant unilateral reductions in the numbers and deployments of their countries’ strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals.⁷ Most importantly from the perspective of the New Zealand government, President Bush announced that all tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from surface vessels ‘under normal circumstances.’⁸ Senior New Zealand government members now saw the country’s ban on nuclear propulsion as the only obstacle to the resumption of ANZUS ties.⁹ The government established a Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion in early 1992 to study the issue, and National’s hopes were further buoyed when Bush stated in July that removal of nuclear weapons from surface ships seemed to ‘clear the way for resolutions of differences we’ve had with some countries, but that’s up to them to decide…I’m thinking of New Zealand.’¹⁰ In fact, this was not a credible position. The US neither confirm nor deny policy remained in place, and is incompatible with the legal obligation of the New Zealand prime minister to affirm in writing his belief that any visiting warship is not carrying nuclear weapons.¹¹ Moreover, President Bush’s ‘under normal circumstances’ caveat provided no guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be redeployed on vessels during times of heightened international tension. In December 1992, the Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion reported that the radiation risk to New Zealand from US or UK nuclear powered naval vessels was ‘so remote that it cannot give rise to any rational apprehension.’¹² Despite this conclusion and the public overture from President Bush, the National Government shelved the Committee’s report and did not seek to change the nuclear

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¹¹ NZHR, New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act, section 9(2).
¹² Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion, “The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships,” vi.
free law. McKinnon acknowledges that overwhelming public support for nuclear freedom made such an option impossible.

In addition, the international reputational benefits of nuclear freedom, and recognition that the policy had not caused economic problems, contributed to the decision not to try to change the law. In late 1992, New Zealand was elected by secret ballot to the UN Security Council for the 1993-1994 term. This was in large part thanks to voting support from non-aligned countries, who admired the stance New Zealand had taken with its nuclear free policy, seeing it as principled and independent. Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration had made clear that it would not retaliate to the nuclear free policy economically, and New Zealand exports to the United States almost doubled between 1984 and 1991. Patman and Hall argue that the conservative government concluded in 1993 that ‘the political disadvantages of amending New Zealand's non-nuclear legislation for the sake of improving relations with the US outweighed problems associated with retention of the status quo.’ In other words, it was an instrumental decision, not an expression of genuine commitment to anti-nuclear weapon norms.

Officials

In the late 1980s, an internalised national identity among most officials unquestioningly saw great power alliance as a primary national security interest. Some senior officials believed the country’s nuclear free policy was the worst ever foreign policy mistake the country had made, due to the severance of the US alliance that resulted. At the UNGA, officials thus ignored government policy in this period and continued to vote along Cold War alliance lines and support

13 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 510–511.
14 McKinnon, “Private Interview.”
16 Statistics New Zealand, “NZ Trade Data.”
17 Patman and Hall, “New Zealand-US Relations in a Globalising World: Moving Together or Moving Apart?,” 120.
resolutions affirming the value of nuclear deterrence;\(^{19}\) this practice was halted in 1989 by civil society monitoring and lobbying from PACDAC, the public advisory committee created by the 1987 nuclear free law.\(^{20}\) Foreign affairs officials also repeatedly included positive references to nuclear deterrence in speeches written for Foreign Minister Russell Marshall.\(^{21}\) At the CD in 1988, for example, Marshall read a speech provided by officials which affirmed an important role for nuclear deterrence in ensuring international security,\(^{22}\) much to the frustration of the prime minister, who forced him to recant publicly.\(^{23}\)

In the early 1990s, this perspective was still very much the mainstream among officials. McKinnon reports that when he became foreign minister in 1990, a strong majority of foreign affairs officials working on international security issues were either somewhat or very antagonistic to the policy.\(^{24}\) Over the course of the 1990s, however, bipartisan political support for nuclear freedom—even if instrumentally-driven in the National Party—introduced new institutional dynamics that forced officials to reconsider their positions. These dynamics are described in the main section of the chapter, and appear to have resulted by the late 1990s in an increasingly genuine commitment among foreign affairs officials to nuclear disarmament norms and identities. In this later period, officials developed much closer working relationships with civil society disarmament experts, and showed a much greater willingness to oppose nuclear weapons in principle, regardless of the reaction from New Zealand’s traditional allies.

**Public**

By the late 1980s, the dominant national identity in the New Zealand public was defined by opposition to nuclear weapons. A broad-based, anti-nuclear public constituency was made up of

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\(^{21}\) Dewes, “The World Court Project,” 158.


\(^{23}\) Lange, *Nuclear Free*, 183–188.

\(^{24}\) McKinnon, “Private Interview.”
ordinary New Zealanders who ‘had had enough of Reaganite/Brezhnevite Cold War strategies and attitudes.’ A national opinion poll taken in September 1987—three months after the passage of the nuclear free zone law, and more than a year after the US alliance had been severed as a result of the nuclear free policy—found 76% support for the ban on nuclear weapons.

Over several decades, the peace movement had consistently framed New Zealand’s opposition to nuclear testing in the Pacific not just as a strategic choice, but also as one that exemplified a moral strand to the nation’s policies. This story contained both national heroes, such as Prime Minister Kirk and the civil society activists that sailed to Mururoa to protest, and what was proudly perceived as a foreign policy victory: the end of French atmospheric nuclear testing.

Chapter four demonstrated that when political upheaval created space for a fundamental reconsideration of national identity, a new mainstream of public opinion was formed, in which New Zealand could contribute to international peace and lessen the likelihood of nuclear war by rejecting nuclear weapons.

By the early 1990s, the Nuclear Free Zone Act had become ‘virtually sacrosanct’ for the majority of the New Zealand public, and since then, ‘antipathy to all things nuclear has become deeply embedded in [the New Zealand public’s] collective psyche.’ In his dealings with US representatives, for example, Foreign Minister McKinnon (1990–1999) often compared the passion of the New Zealand public for nuclear freedom to the attachment of some US citizens to their constitutional right to bear arms. New Zealand’s ambassador for disarmament, Clive Pearson, told the UNGA First Committee in October 1999, ‘New Zealanders care deeply about the need for nuclear disarmament and the imperative of pushing the agenda forward.’ In effect, an anti-nuclear weapon norm had been internalised in the public; as discussed in chapter

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25 Norrish, “Merwyn Norrish,” 141. See also on this point, Newnham, Peace Squadron: The Sharp End of Nuclear Protest in New Zealand, 55.
28 Clements, “New Zealand’s Role,” 399–400. See also chapter 5 of Clements, Back from the Brink.
30 Templeton, Standing Upright Here, 511; Young, “Lange Offered to Quit over ANZUS.”
31 McKinnon, “Private Interview.”
two, this does not imply unanimity of support for the related vision of national identity. However, the support was sufficiently uniform that it created an overwhelmingly clear political mandate for particular policy options supportive of nuclear disarmament. This point was reflected in public opinion polling published in 1995, which showed 76 percent support for New Zealand endorsing the World Court Project—a civil society action that aimed to challenge the legality of nuclear weapons, discussed in more detail below—and 80 percent support in general terms for the New Zealand government actively promoting nuclear disarmament. As per constructivist expectations, anti-nuclear norm internalisation led public attention and debate over nuclear issues to drop away quickly in the early 1990s, as pro-disarmament policy preferences became taken for granted. This diminishing attention to nuclear issues was also facilitated by contextual factors such as the end of the Cold War and a range of new collaborative security initiatives between the superpowers, which reduced nuclear threat perceptions.

**Nuclear disarmament advocacy**

**Advocating the illegality of nuclear weapons**

Domestic nuclear weapons-related civil society activity was waning in New Zealand by the early 1990s, for reasons already discussed. One initiative, however, maintained a relatively high profile and was able to activate internalised public anti-nuclear sentiment and consequently, to influence New Zealand policy significantly in this period. The WCP was initiated in New Zealand in 1986, and led to a significant extent by New Zealanders; it aimed to have an authorised

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34 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 904.
35 See, for example, T Kassenova, *From Antagonism to Partnership: The Uneasy Path of the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction, Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society* (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2007).
international body request an ICJ advisory opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons. The Project had its international launch in 1992, supported by three main co-sponsoring organisations: the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, International Peace Bureau and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War—the latter two being Nobel Peace Prize laureates. In December 1994, the WCP realised its first major objective when the UNGA adopted resolution 49/75K, calling for the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on the question, *Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?* New Zealand was the only Western-aligned country to vote in favour of the resolution.

At the UNGA the previous year, the Western nuclear weapon states—that is, New Zealand’s traditional allies—had prevented a vote on a similar resolution by threatening trade and aid relationships with NAM states. The Canadian and Swedish disarmament ambassadors respectively described the ‘hysterical’ behaviour of Western nuclear powers, who used ‘supreme power politics’ to stop a vote on the 1993 resolution. The Western powers again fiercely opposed resolution 49/75K in 1994, as did all European Union (EU) members apart from Ireland. In other words, there was no external pressure for New Zealand to support the WCP resolution based on violation of international norms, and the significant ‘others’ who had traditionally shaped New Zealand thinking on nuclear issues were deeply opposed to the initiative. In theoretical terms, this distinguishes New Zealand’s vote in favour of the WCP resolution from the dynamics described by the ‘spiral’ and ‘boomerang’ models of normative change, both of which account for policy influence by referring to norm entrepreneurs who

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38 For detailed histories of the Project, see, Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project”; Dewes, “The World Court Project.”

39 UNGA, “Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (A/RES/49/75K)” (New York, December 15, 1994). The WCP also elicited a World Health Organisation request for such an advisory opinion, but the ICJ declined to respond on technical legal grounds. See, Dewes, “The World Court Project”, ch. 9 and pp. 330-334.


41 See, for example, the comments of the Swedish and Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament about the extreme nature of coercion used, in, Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project,” 66; Mark Schapiro, “Mutiny on the Nuclear Bounty,” *The Nation* 257, no. 22 (December 27, 1993): 798. For detailed discussion, see Dewes, “The World Court Project” Chapter 11.


43 Dewes, “The World Court Project”, ch. 8 and 11. For more on EU states’ positions, see the French and German statements in UNGA, “A/49/PV.90,” 25–27.
activate international norms.\(^{44}\) In contrast, the New Zealand government experienced significant external pressure \textit{not} to support the WCP resolution, and pressure from \textit{within} New Zealand to vote in favour of the resolution on the basis of consistency effects. That is, domestic advocates linked this new nuclear disarmament objective to previous normative commitments from the government, as described below.

New Zealand’s support for resolution 49/75K came despite earlier hesitancy from both major parties to support the WCP.\(^{45}\) In early 1994, the National Government was still uncommitted to the idea.\(^{46}\) However, intense pressure from the peace movement, public opinion, and sympathetic National and Labour MPs appears to have shifted the government’s position.\(^{47}\) In March 1994, for example, eight National MPs issued a joint statement declaring their support for the WCP.\(^{48}\) Similarly, 32,000 New Zealanders signed ‘Declarations of Public Conscience’ condemning nuclear weapons in support of the WCP in the early 1990s.\(^{49}\) Dewes argues that strong public support, along with ‘the untiring efforts of a few individuals who devoted much of their time to this initiative for nearly a decade’ led to New Zealand’s vote in support of resolution 49/75K.\(^{50}\) The government’s statement to the ICJ lends credibility to this argument, with the New Zealand attorney general explicitly acknowledging the hard work and ‘major role’ that civil society, especially from New Zealand, played in bringing the issue to the Court.\(^{51}\)

Don McKinnon, the National MP who had most staunchly opposed the party’s adoption of the nuclear free policy due to its impact on ANZUS, was now New Zealand foreign minister and deputy prime minister. After National’s leadership conceded in 1993 that it would be impossible to change the nuclear free law, McKinnon actively tried to shift focus away from nuclear issues.\(^{52}\) Nevertheless, he was regularly asked in public for confirmation that the nuclear free policy would not be changed; moreover, since National had adopted a policy that rejected nuclear deterrence, he felt an obligation to represent the policy as a matter of political credibility.\(^{53}\)

\(^{44}\) Keck and Sikkink, \textit{Activists Beyond Borders}, 12–13; Risse and Sikkink, “Socialization of International Human Rights Norms,” 17–19.
\(^{45}\) Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project,” 63; Dewes, “The World Court Project”, ch. 7.
\(^{47}\) Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project,” 67.
\(^{48}\) Ibid. See also, Leadbeater, \textit{Peace, Power & Politics}, 260.
\(^{49}\) Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project,” 67. For more detail, see, Dewes, “The World Court Project,” 261–262.
\(^{50}\) Ibid., 105.
\(^{52}\) McKinnon, “Private Interview.”
\(^{53}\) Ibid.
These observations have strong echoes of a consistency effect, facilitated by domestic nuclear disarmament advocates. That is, having adopted a nuclear free policy for instrumental reasons while framing the decision as a genuine response to a changed international situation, the government became rhetorically entrapped. The strength of the New Zealand nuclear taboo made it possible for civil society and political norm entrepreneurs to generate significant political pressure by highlighting the government’s prior normative commitments and linking them to support for the WCP. It was on this basis that the government became the only official Western supporter of a civil society initiative designed to challenge the legality of nuclear deterrence.

In the ICJ hearings following the passage of resolution 49/75K, WCP activists worked hard to ensure as many countries as possible made strong arguments to the Court in favour of the illegality of nuclear weapons. This included, for example, consulting with and advising many of the governmental legal teams; delivering almost four million ‘Declarations of Public Conscience’ to the Court from individual citizens around the world asserting the inhumane, illegal nature of nuclear weapons; and successfully advocating for the first time ever for the Court to hear evidence from ‘citizen witnesses’ who had personally suffered the effects of nuclear weapons.

In its submission to the ICJ, New Zealand stopped short of declaring nuclear deterrence illegal, but argued that the legal/normative trend was moving in that direction. It stated that nuclear weapons reduce international security and concluded unambiguously, ‘the answer to the question put to the Court should be no; the threat or use of nuclear weapons should no longer be permitted under international law.’ New Zealand also argued that the laws of war, known as international humanitarian law, apply to the threat or use of nuclear weapons, just as to any weapon.

On 8 July 1996, the ICJ delivered its Advisory Opinion, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.* The most significant aspect of the Opinion—in terms of understanding subsequent

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54 On the creation and significance of these public declarations, as well as their influence in the New Zealand context, see, New Zealand, “Note Verbale,” 15, para. 65; Dewes, “The World Court Project,” 246–248, 260–263, 381.

55 For a summary analysis of the World Court Project, see Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project.”

56 New Zealand, “Note Verbale,” 23–24, paras 100-101; ICJ, “CR 95/28,” 19. Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans went even further, declaring that the use, threat of use, acquisition, development, testing and possession of nuclear weapons are illegal, since ‘nuclear weapons are by their nature illegal under customary international law.’ He also argued that ‘all States are under an obligation to take positive action to eliminate completely nuclear weapons.’ See, ICJ, “Public Sitting (CR 95/22),” October 30, 1995, 36, https://goo.gl/lxQO8N.


58 ICJ, “Legality.”
nuclear disarmament advocacy by both New Zealand and Canada—was the Court’s unanimous conclusion that ‘there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.’\(^{59}\) The normative significance of this affirmation lies in its assertion of an obligation to achieve, as opposed to merely pursue, multilateral nuclear disarmament.\(^{60}\) In a second key aspect of the Opinion that would later inform Canadian and New Zealand policy, the Court found unanimously that any threat or use of nuclear weapons must respect international humanitarian law, and in a split vote, that ‘a threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.’\(^{61}\) Civil society nuclear disarmament advocates in New Zealand immediately began linking these findings to their policy claims.\(^{62}\) This demonstrates how such international legal/normative precedents increase the perceived legitimacy of related policy preferences, increasing the likelihood of nuclear disarmament advocacy by the New Zealand government, as will be seen below.

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\(^{59}\) Ibid., 267, para. 105 (2)(F).


\(^{61}\) ICJ, “Legality,” 266, para. 105 (2)(E). One judge died immediately prior to the hearings, leaving an even number of judges. Voting on the incompatibility of the threat or use of nuclear weapons with international humanitarian law was split 7-7, with the President’s vote deciding the matter. However, it is worth noting that three out of the seven judges who opposed the finding that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is ‘generally’ illegal did so not because they felt that this finding went too far in legal terms, but rather, because it didn’t go far enough. These three judges believed the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal in any and all circumstances. Thus, on this point, the Court was effectively split 10-4 in favour of legality. ICJ, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeeen,” 1996, 376, 378, 426–427; ICJ, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry,” 1996, 433; ICJ, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma,” 1996, 556.

\(^{62}\) See, for example, Alyn Ware, “Clarification of Nuclear Law Hugely Significant,” *The New Zealand Herald*, September 4, 1996.
Opposing French nuclear testing

Concurrently with these WCP/ICJ developments, several nuclear weapons-related events were unfolding internationally. In mid-May 1995, NPT members unanimously agreed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty—an option that New Zealand supported. NPT extension was predicated in part on the basis of a consensus decision that ‘Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint’ with regard to nuclear testing. Three days after the close of the Review and Extension Conference, China began a new series of underground nuclear tests. Many governments around the world, including New Zealand, condemned this action.

French President Jacques Chirac then announced on 13 June 1995 that France would also conduct a new series of underground tests in the South Pacific. Unlike China, which had been conducting tests until six months prior to the NPT extension, France had halted nuclear testing several years before; its announcement of new tests thus provoked ‘an immediate barrage of protest across the world,’ including in New Zealand. In fact, this was the only nuclear issue other than the WCP that attracted significant New Zealand public attention in the 1990s. All New Zealand political parties united in condemning the French plans. Greenpeace collected seven million signatures globally calling for an end to nuclear testing.

In protest at the French decision, the New Zealand government cut New Zealand–France military links, excluding emergency and humanitarian cooperation. Officials, however, advised the

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government to avoid actions that would aggravate relations with France, fearing that France might impose trade sanctions against New Zealand, as had happened when two French spies were prosecuted in New Zealand for their involvement in the bombing of the *Rainbow Warrior*. The government followed this advice; it avoided the ‘more drastic measures’ advocated by opposition MPs and protesters, such as boycotting French goods or suspending diplomatic relations with France. In late June, Foreign Minister McKinnon defended the actions that the government had taken to date and suggested that there were no plans for further unilateral New Zealand initiatives. In identity terms, this demonstrates the degree to which both officials and the conservative government were pursuing anti-nuclear policies for instrumental reasons. That is, nuclear weapons policy was debated and weighed against other perceived interests, and in this case, economic interests trumped the desire among the wider public for strong nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Protesters and opposition MPs, however, were demanding greater action from the government. A poll in early July 1995—a month after France’s announcement—showed 81 percent support for stronger protest action and 86 percent support for direct protest action by the government. A broad-based public campaign produced public demonstrations, letters to the editor and opinion pieces in newspapers; the media was also often supportive of anti-testing sentiment. Further protest activities included the Council of Trade Unions calling for a consumer boycott of France; major retail chains suspending trade in French goods; a delegation of 38 local body politicians, educators and activists travelling to France to coordinate protest with French anti-nuclear groups in September 1995; and a petition calling for an end to nuclear testing supported by 60,000 signatures, mainly collected in rural, conservative-voting constituencies. Several analysts have noted that this significant public advocacy forced a much stronger policy...

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73 Ibid., 109.
response from the government; Henderson, for example, notes that the government changed its position several times in less than two months.\textsuperscript{79}

Two points of theoretical interest deserve mention, and are elaborated on below. First, the timing of policy changes in 1995 suggests that one particular event with strong national identity resonance played a significant role in shifting government policy—the violent storming by French commandos of the Greenpeace ship \textit{Rainbow Warrior II}. Secondly, the government’s expanded response to French testing in 1995 directly emulated several precedents set by the anti-nuclear protests of the Kirk government in the 1970s.

The Greenpeace ship \textit{Rainbow Warrior II} had sailed to Mururoa to protest in 1995, with two New Zealanders on board. On 10 July—ten years to the day that the French government bombed the original \textit{Rainbow Warrior} in Auckland Harbour—French commandos rammed the \textit{Rainbow Warrior II}, lobbed tear gas into the ship’s bridge, and battened Greenpeace crew members.\textsuperscript{80} Media coverage of the event inflamed already-high public anti-nuclear sentiment in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{81} Initially, Prime Minister Bolger resisted taking further action, saying on 11 July that there was ‘little more’ the government could do.\textsuperscript{82} Pressure continued to mount from public and political protests, however. Responding to public outrage, Bolger wrote an open letter to President Chirac on 14 July—France’s national day. Bolger affirmed New Zealand’s ‘deep concern’ about the testing decision, which ‘runs directly counter to the world-wide trend away from the development and use of nuclear weapons’ and which he said risked undermining post-Cold War disarmament progress and disrupting CTBT negotiations.\textsuperscript{83} Bolger gave notice that he had also—as Kirk had in 1973—written to heads of government around the world that day, ‘to underline our concerns on this important issue’.\textsuperscript{84}


\textsuperscript{81} Dewes and Green, “The World Court Project,” 69.

\textsuperscript{82} As reported by Helen Clark and acknowledged by the Prime Minister in NZHR, “Questions for Oral Answer: Nuclear Testing - Protest,” July 18, 1995, \url{http://www.vdig.net/hansard/archive.jsp?y=1995&m=07&d=18&o=5&p=5}.

\textsuperscript{83} Jim Bolger, “Open Letter to the President of France on His Government’s Nuclear Testing at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific,” July 14, 1995, \url{https://goo.gl/te6ERz}.

\textsuperscript{84} A full copy of this letter to other heads of state was not found. Hoadley writes that it used ‘notably circumspect’ phrasing, ‘perhaps reflecting the advice of caution tendered by his officials.’ Hoadley, \textit{New Zealand and France}, 112.
Both the prime minister and foreign minister had earlier resisted the idea—promoted by civil society and opposition MPs, who invoked the memory of the Kirk government’s action in June 1973—of sending a Navy vessel to Mururoa to protest. Shortly after the storming of the Rainbow Warrior II, however, the government changed tack. Bolger told Parliament on 18 July that the government was consulting with officials and civil society about which vessel would be most appropriate. He noted, for example, that Greenpeace preferred that the vessel be unarmed. At this point, Bolger stated that the Navy vessel would sail to Mururoa solely to ensure the safety of ‘individual New Zealanders who want to express their abhorrence at the thought of a return to nuclear testing in the Pacific.’

Over the coming weeks, however, the government’s justification for the dispatch of the Navy vessel also changed. On 2 August, Bolger told parliament that the cabinet had decided an unarmed Navy research vessel, HMNZS Tui, would sail to Mururoa ‘for the primary purpose of demonstrating that the New Zealand government—meaning both Parliament and the Executive—formally and unequivocally oppose the proposed nuclear test by France.’ He noted the Tui would also offer emergency aid to civil society protest boats, 14 of which sailed from New Zealand in 1995. When the Tui departed on 10 August, the National and Labour parties each sent an MP with the ship, symbolising the bipartisan support for this direct protest, in contrast to 1973 when National had strongly opposed the government’s frigate protest and only Labour sent an MP with the Otago.

On 8 August, the government also decided to revisit the ICJ Nuclear Tests case that New Zealand had taken against France in 1973–1974—the third initiative that emulated the Kirk government’s 1973 actions. The 1974 ICJ ruling held that New Zealand’s case was rendered moot by France’s public commitment to move testing underground, but that ‘if the basis of this

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86 NZHR, “Questions for Oral Answer: Nuclear Testing - Protest.”
88 Leadbeater, Peace, Power & Politics, 267.
In 1995, the foreign ministry advised the New Zealand government against revisiting the case ‘on grounds of costs, likelihood of success, and time involved since no verdict could be expected before the tests ceased.’ The prime minister and attorney general both publicly acknowledged they had received legal advice against pursuing an ICJ case; both also reported that the two core considerations in deciding to return to the ICJ were lobbying from Greenpeace, and ministerial consultations with opposition parties. The significance of these specific points is discussed further in the theoretical implications section, below.

In terms of content, New Zealand’s 1995 ICJ case was based on new developments in environmental law and governance, and on new scientific evidence that pointed to the potential for dangerous radioactive contamination from underground nuclear testing; it was on these grounds that the New Zealand government believed the basis of the 1974 ruling had been affected, despite the fact that France had not renewed atmospheric testing. In the end, however, the ICJ refused New Zealand’s application on narrow technical grounds, without considering substantive arguments. The Court ruled that the basis of its 1974 judgment was France’s commitment to end atmospheric testing and that only a resumption of such testing would justify revisiting the case.

In the second half of 1995, New Zealand also took several multilateral initiatives of the kind the country had pursued for many years under both Labour and National Party governments. This included drafting a UNGA resolution calling for an immediate end to French testing; sponsoring an anti-nuclear testing resolution at the October 1995 meeting of the Inter Parliamentary Union; cooperating with Australia to convince the ASEAN Regional Forum to issue a statement calling

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92 Thakur, “The Last Bang before a Total Ban: French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific,” 483. See also, East, “New Zealand’s Attempts to End Nuclear Testing at Mururoa Atoll through the World Court”, para. 11a.
93 See, Ibid., para. 11; Office of the Prime Minister, “A Brief History of New Zealand’s Attempts to End Nuclear Testing at Mururoa Atoll through the World Court” (Wellington, 1995), http://goo.gl/3Wuj4Y, para. 11.
for an immediate end to testing,\textsuperscript{96} and attaching a protest note to the final communiqué of the 1995 CHOGM, hosted in Auckland.\textsuperscript{97}

In June 1996, New Zealand was invited to become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). New Zealand had participated on an ad-hoc basis in the work of the CD since at least 1983, and had formally requested full membership in 1988, under the Lange Labour government.\textsuperscript{98} Upon being granted CD membership, the government established the new post of ambassador for disarmament,\textsuperscript{99} with the inaugural ambassador, career diplomat Clive Pearson, serving in the role from 1997 to 2002.\textsuperscript{100} The ICJ Advisory Opinion was delivered a month after New Zealand gained CD membership; as with civil society advocates,\textsuperscript{101} the New Zealand government immediately began incorporating the content of the Advisory Opinion into its nuclear disarmament advocacy.

In early August 1996, for example, Prime Minister Bolger and South African President Nelson Mandela signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on Disarmament and Arms Control.\textsuperscript{102} South Africa had recently become the first country to disarm an indigenously developed nuclear arsenal.\textsuperscript{103} The New Zealand-South Africa Memorandum affirmed that the NPT created an obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons, and explicitly highlighted the findings of the ICJ Advisory Opinion in that regard. Speaking in Cape Town following the signing of the Memorandum, Bolger called on the nuclear weapon states to ‘unmistakably commit themselves to total nuclear disarmament.’\textsuperscript{104} A few days later, the Australian government-sponsored Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons—a panel of eminent international nuclear experts—released its Report.\textsuperscript{105} The Canberra Commission Report called on the NPT

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\item \textsuperscript{96}“Chairman’s Statement: The Second ASEAN Regional Forum” (Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, August 1, 1995), 11, para. 11.4.
\item \textsuperscript{97}Hoadley, \textit{New Zealand and France}, 112.
\item \textsuperscript{99}CD, “Decision on Expansion of Membership of the Conference (CD/1406)” (Geneva, June 17, 1996).
\item \textsuperscript{101}Ware, “Clarification of Nuclear Law Hugely Significant.”
\item \textsuperscript{102}New Zealand and South Africa, “Memorandum of Cooperation on Disarmament and Arms Control,” 1996.
\item \textsuperscript{103}Burgess and Kassenova, “The Rollback States.”
\item \textsuperscript{104}Jim Bolger, “Speech to the State Banquet” (Cape Town, August 8, 1996), https://goo.gl/p0eq4i.
\item \textsuperscript{105}Commissioners included, for example, a former French prime minister, US secretary of state and Brazilian foreign minister, and former disarmament ambassadors from Australia, Japan and Sweden,
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nuclear weapon states ‘to give the lead by committing themselves, unequivocally, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons’ and affirmed that the ICJ’s finding of an obligation to achieve total nuclear disarmament ‘is precisely the obligation that the Commission wishes to see implemented.’\textsuperscript{106} At the UNGA in 1996, New Zealand voted for a Costa Rican resolution following up on the ICJ Opinion, which called for negotiations to begin the following year to implement the obligation to disarm.\textsuperscript{107}

In April 1997, a New Zealand working paper to the NPT Preparatory Commission repeated language reminiscent of Bolger’s Cape Town speech and the Canberra Commission’s report. The working paper called for the NPT nuclear weapon states to ‘declare unequivocally their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start immediately on the practical first steps and negotiations required for its achievement.’\textsuperscript{108} Both New Zealand and South Africa were invited to join the NAC the following year. As will be seen below, a primary objective for the NAC in the late 1990s was to elicit from the nuclear weapon states precisely the unequivocal commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons that New Zealand called for in its 1997 NPT working paper. From 1997 onward, New Zealand also supported an annual UNGA resolution calling for all states to immediately commence negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{109}

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\textsuperscript{106} Ib\textsuperscript{id}, 17, 15. With a change of leadership in Canberra, however, the new Australian government—formed by the Liberal Party, which is actually more akin to a conservative party in traditional terms—preferred not to promote disarmament policies that might alienate its nuclear allies. Ramesh Thakur, “Defence by Other Means: Australia’s Arms Control and Disarmament Policy,” in \textit{Handbook of Global International Policy} (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2000), 159–160, \url{http://goo.gl/ErxkAL}.


\textsuperscript{108} New Zealand, “Proposed Elements for Inclusion in the Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its First Session (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/3),” in \textit{Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference} (New York, 1997), 1–2, \url{http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/2000-PCI-docs/npt-conf2000-pci-3.pdf}, para. 4(c). Since New Zealand was proposing this language for inclusion in an NPT document, this call did not include the nuclear armed states which are not members of the NPT.

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A new agenda for the elimination of nuclear weapons

The NAC is a group of like-minded countries established on an Irish initiative and designed ‘to inject fresh momentum and thinking into the nuclear disarmament process.’\(^{110}\) It was launched in Dublin in June 1998, with a joint foreign ministers’ declaration entitled, ‘Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda.’\(^{111}\) Planning for the NAC began prior to the ‘disarray’ at the 1998 NPT Preparatory Committee and the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, but these factors added further urgency to calls for disarmament.\(^{112}\) Foreign Minister McKinnon called the Indian and Pakistani tests a ‘gross insult’ and recalled the New Zealand high commissioner from New Delhi.\(^{113}\) At the 1998 UNGA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand co-sponsored a resolution condemning the tests and calling for India and Pakistan to join the CTBT.\(^{114}\)

The NAC was conceived as a bridge-building group, aiming to facilitate consensus across the deep ideological and political divides defined by groups such as the NAM, NATO, and the Western European and Others.\(^{115}\) The Coalition therefore deliberately brought together a set of countries broadly representative in terms of geography, political alignment and developmental status, and with a history of strong disarmament advocacy; the European Parliament acknowledged the value of this approach in November 1998.\(^{116}\) Initially, the NAC comprised Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, though Slovenia and Sweden withdrew in 1998 and 2013 respectively. Given the discussion in the preceding chapter of the disarmament/deterrence conundrum facing nuclear alliance members, it is worth noting that the Slovenian and Swedish decisions to leave the NAC—and thus, to end their

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111 NAC, “A/53/138.”
115 Barnes, “Middle Powers as Norm Entrepreneurs,” 24.
association with the group’s nuclear disarmament advocacy—were driven by their respective
governments’ desires to join NATO, and to improve political and security ties with the Alliance.\(^{117}\)

The 1998 NAC ministerial declaration explicitly drew normative precedence in legal terms from
the ICJ Advisory Opinion, and in political terms from the Canberra Commission Report.\(^{118}\) The
declaration highlighted, for example, the ICJ finding of an obligation to achieve complete nuclear
disarmament and the Canberra Commission’s statement that ‘The only complete defence is the
elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again.’\(^{119}\) The
declaration also called on the governments of all eight nuclear armed states to commit
themselves ‘unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear
weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and
negotiations required for its achievement.’\(^{120}\) The significance of this objective was that, despite
aspirational rhetoric in this direction, the nuclear states had never explicitly committed
themselves to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The NAC immediately received strong civil society support. The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI),
for example, was a civil society project that aimed to facilitate cooperation between civil society
nuclear disarmament experts and like-minded governments.\(^{121}\) MPI incorporated organisations
and individuals that had led the WCP, including several New Zealand experts, thus benefitting
from existing civil society ties with pro-disarmament governments.\(^{122}\) Between July 1998 and
November 2000, MPI delegations made 24 visits to the capitals or UN Missions of Western
aligned or NATO states, promoting NAC policies among politicians, officials and the public.\(^{123}\) The
credibility and high public profile of the initiative were assisted by the participation of North
American political and military experts, such as former Canadian Senator and Ambassador for
Disarmament Doug Roche; ex-US President Jimmy Carter; ex-US Secretary of Defense Robert

\(^{117}\) Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo*, 358; Robert Green, *Fast Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons: The Middle
Powers Initiative: A Briefing Book*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Middle Powers Initiative, 1999), 12,
http://goo.gl/niXXOh.

\(^{118}\) Another nuclear disarmament-related international initiative in this period was the Japanese
Government’s Tokyo Forum, established in August 1998, and reporting in August 1999. However, this
did not affect the genesis of the NAC or its diplomatic initiatives. See, Hanson, “Advocating the
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” 60–61.


\(^{120}\) NAC, “A/53/138,” 2.


\(^{122}\) Burford, “Principled Pragmatism,” 70–71.

Beginning in late 1998, the NAC sponsored a series of annual UNGA resolutions that received strong support, with co-sponsors growing in number from 34 in 1998 to 60 in 1999, and 65 in 2000.\(^{124}\) The 1998 resolution repeated the call for an unequivocal commitment from the nuclear weapon states to eliminate nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the obligation arising from NPT Article VI to achieve complete nuclear disarmament.\(^{125}\) The Western nuclear armed states—especially France and the United States—lobbied intensively for all countries, but particularly NATO allies, to oppose the 1998 NAC resolution.\(^{126}\) In contrast, the European Parliament passed a resolution in November 1998 calling for all EU states—the majority of which are also NATO members—to vote for the NAC resolution, and calling for states that opposed the resolution to explain why.\(^{127}\) Despite intense pressure from their nuclear armed allies, non-nuclear NATO members for the first time ever refused *en masse* to toe the alliance line; 12 out of 13 of them abstained on the 1998 NAC resolution rather than opposing it. US allies Australia and Japan also abstained.\(^{128}\) The NAC’s 1999 UNGA resolution repeated the same central points as the 1998 one.\(^{129}\) 14 out of the now 16 non-nuclear NATO allies abstained on the resolution, including Turkey, which had opposed it the previous year.\(^{130}\)

In November 1999, a new Labour government was elected in New Zealand led by Prime Minister Helen Clark (1999–2008), who had been a key advocate of the country’s nuclear free policy and


\(^{127}\) European Parliament, “Resolution on the New Agenda Coalition on Nuclear Disarmament”, op. paras 1, 6.


\(^{130}\) Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in March 1999. For the voting record on the 1999 resolution, see, UNGA, “69th Plenary Meeting (A/54/PV.69)” (New York, December 1, 1999), 14.
law. In this context, it is unsurprising that New Zealand nuclear disarmament advocacy remained strong. Four weeks after the election, Clark issued a statement affirming that ‘New Zealand will increase its efforts to lobby other countries for the elimination of nuclear weapons…New Zealand has a proud record in the vanguard of the nuclear disarmament movement.’  

On 23 February 2000, the New Zealand Parliament unanimously adopted a motion recalling the ICJ Advisory Opinion and calling on UN member states, ‘especially the nuclear weapons states, to join with New Zealand in fulfilling the obligation’ to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. Symbolising the strong government collaboration with civil society in this period, this parliamentary motion was a verbatim reproduction of a text sent by Harold Evans, the initiator of the WCP, to all New Zealand MPs in 1998. The chief parliamentary backer of the motion acknowledged its civil society roots.

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, New Zealand saw further international reputational benefits from the country’s consistent nuclear disarmament advocacy. Ambassador for Disarmament Pearson was elected to chair the subsidiary body tasked with negotiating disarmament agreements at the Conference. Minister for Disarmament Matt Robson reported to the New Zealand cabinet that the Conference president and a NAM representative approached him personally to request that New Zealand chair these disarmament negotiations. Robson noted the ‘real leverage’ that New Zealand gained from its association with the NAC, reporting considerable media interest in the NAC and in New Zealand’s position, with CNN, BBC World, and members of the UN press gallery seeking interviews with him. Robson was strongly personally supportive of nuclear disarmament, and had made clear his intention to push the issue strongly as minister. However, given that New Zealand rarely

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134 See Peter Dunne, 23 February 2000, in NZHR, “Motion-Nuclear Disarmament.”
137 Ibid., para. 26
138 Editorial Staff, “New Zealand Government Vows.”
makes international news, such attention constitutes strong external reinforcement of the value of the relevant policies.

The widespread support for NAC diplomacy in the preceding years, along with the invitation for New Zealand to chair the disarmament negotiations at the 2000 Review Conference, meant that those negotiations revolved around key language from NAC texts. When the negotiations became bogged down due to disagreements between nuclear and non-nuclear states, the United States reached out to the NAC in particular to negotiate on behalf of non-nuclear weapon states, demonstrating that the Coalition was seen as the most coherent, credible negotiating block among the non-nuclear states. In the end, NPT parties agreed to 13 ‘practical steps’ for disarmament reflecting several key NAC objectives, including most importantly in normative terms the Coalition’s central demand—‘an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.’ This commitment was a significant normative advance since, as noted above, the nuclear weapon states had never previously committed collectively to the elimination of nuclear weapons. However, this agreement also had legal interpretive significance as a unanimous ‘subsequent agreement’ between NPT parties that NPT Article VI creates a legally-binding obligation not just to pursue nuclear disarmament, but to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Disarmament advocates saw the Review Conference outcome as a great success. Harald Müller, a German nuclear expert who has attended numerous NPT meetings as an advisor to his government’s delegation, writes that the 2000 Conference ‘was the most successful NPT ever.’ Ambassador Pearson reported to Wellington that the 13 steps were ‘a huge advance both in scope and in substance’ over disarmament language in the Treaty itself and the decisions made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference; he had ‘never envisaged...that such a comprehensive package of undertakings could ever be obtained...the profile, cohesion and

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140 “NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II),” 14, para. 15; quotation at para. 15(6).
support of the New Agenda was a critical factor, it having assumed the intellectual and political lead in the nuclear debate.\textsuperscript{144}

**Theoretical implications**

The case study presented in this chapter adds to a small, but growing literature debunking the myth that nuclear weapons policy is immune to public influence.\textsuperscript{145} James Headley and Andreas Reitzig, for example, argue that the development of New Zealand’s nuclear free policy is a key example of grass roots influence on the country’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{146} Similarly, Richard Devetak and Jacqui True write, ‘the non-nuclear issue in New Zealand illustrates the power of a norm embedded in national culture to shape state identity through foreign policy regardless of the geopolitical and political (and potentially economic) costs associated with it.’\textsuperscript{147}

By the early 1990s, an anti-nuclear weapon national identity was internalised in an overwhelming majority of New Zealanders.\textsuperscript{148} In effect, the public’s preference for strong nuclear disarmament advocacy had achieved a taken-for-granted status.\textsuperscript{149} This fact, along with international contextual developments, less to significantly reduced public attention to nuclear issues, as expected in constructivist terms.\textsuperscript{150} This internalised public anti-nuclear weapon norm, which can be thought of as a ‘New Zealand nuclear taboo,’ strongly influenced New Zealand nuclear disarmament policy in the 1990s. The content of the New Zealand taboo differs from Nina Tannenwald’s famous ‘nuclear taboo,’ which relates to the delegitimisation of the first use

\textsuperscript{144} Clive Pearson, ‘NPT: Nuclear Disarmament’, cable to MFAT, Wellington, 20 May 2000, provided by MFAT under the OIA.

\textsuperscript{145} See also in this vein, for example, Lawrence S Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb, Stanford Nuclear Age Series, vol. 1–3 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Evangelista, Unarmed Forces; Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo; Knopf, “Domestic Sources of Preferences.”


\textsuperscript{147} Devetak and True, “Diplomatic Divergence in the Antipodes,” 254.

\textsuperscript{148} Levine, Spoonley, and Aimer, Waging Peace Towards 2000, 90, 145, 146.

\textsuperscript{149} Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” 697–698.

\textsuperscript{150} Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 895.
of nuclear weapons by the United States.\footnote{Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo.} The New Zealand nuclear taboo rejects not just of the use of nuclear weapons, but also their development or possession. A unique theoretical contribution of the current chapter, therefore, is to map the processes and psychological mechanisms through which the public nuclear taboo has both constrained the expression of pro-nuclear preferences among policymakers, and actively motivated nuclear disarmament advocacy by the New Zealand government.

In theoretical terms, this distinguishes New Zealand’s vote in favour of the WCP resolution from the dynamics described by the ‘spiral’ and ‘boomerang’ models of normative change, both of which account for policy influence by referring to norm entrepreneurs who activate international norms.\footnote{Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 12–13; Risse and Sikkink, “Socialization of International Human Rights Norms,” 17–19.} In contrast, the New Zealand government experienced significant external pressure \textit{not} to support the WCP resolution, and pressure from \textit{within} New Zealand to vote in favour of the resolution on the basis of consistency effects. That is, domestic advocates linked this new nuclear disarmament objective to previous normative commitments from the government, as described below.

Individuals and groups may comply with norms for reasons related to genuine persuasion, social conformity, or due to identifying with an important other.\footnote{Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 18–20.} The events in this chapter were driven by the first two of these mechanisms in particular. The analysis below highlights how officials’ practice of norms out of social conformity, if continued for long enough, can produce normative persuasion—even on nuclear weapons-related beliefs with existential implications. This shows that nuclear disarmament policy is not immune to the social mechanisms that function in other areas of political life. This point has policy relevance for those seeking to advance nuclear disarmament, in terms of contributing to understandings of how the international community might, as discussed in the introduction chapter, ‘get to persuasion’ about the value of disarmament.

The effect of the New Zealand nuclear taboo on the country’s nuclear policies can be thought of as occurring in three stages. The first stage in the early 1990s was characterised by social conformity, as the New Zealand nuclear taboo constrained government policy by ruling out the conservative government’s preference, shared by most officials, for resumption of a US alliance. The removal of alliance norms from policy discourse constituted a significant change to a key
contextual factor. As seen in chapter five, for example, the overarching priority of maintaining strong US relations had set implicit boundaries on the scope of New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the past. In the 1970s, New Zealand focused on the limited objective of stopping nuclear testing and for the most part, avoided broader issues of nuclear deterrence and nuclear defence in general. In the 1990s, the strength of the New Zealand nuclear taboo meant that politicians were forced for electoral reasons to refrain from making any arguments in public that implied even the possibility of acquiescence to nuclear deterrence. This meant that there was no competitor for anti-nuclear weapon norms in policy debates, making their active expression easier for disarmament advocates to achieve.

The second stage of public influence occurred in the mid-1990s, as civil society and political norm entrepreneurs exploited the circumstances described above to pursue new, more progressive disarmament-related objectives. During this phase, the strength of the New Zealand nuclear taboo, combined with rhetorical entrapment, offer a credible explanation for the government’s actions. Bolger had effectively argued in 1990 that the National Party’s adoption of a nuclear free policy was due to changing New Zealand interests in a rapidly changing international environment. Having publicly defended the policy reversal in these terms, it became difficult to oppose domestic calls for further disarmament advocacy. Facing fierce opposition from its former great power allies, for example, and without any support from other Western countries, New Zealand voted for the 1994 WCP/UNGA resolution designed to challenge the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence. New Zealand then argued in Court that outlawing nuclear deterrence was a normative priority and would increase international security. McKinnon acknowledges that instrumental dynamics were driving New Zealand policy in this period.

Similar dynamics account credibly for the government’s responses to renewed French nuclear testing in 1995. The government was immediately inclined to protest, as governments from both left and right had done for decades. However, protest was initially tempered by concerns—reinforced by advice from the foreign ministry—not to disrupt economic relations with France. Thus, both senior ministers and officials viewed expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment as secondary to economic interests. An external trigger with significant national identity implications, however, shifted the government’s priorities. The French bombing of the Rainbow

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154 Kirk’s occasional critiques of nuclear deterrence were an exception to this point, which can credibly be accounted for by his personal abhorrence of nuclear weapons.
155 Clifton, “McKinnon Quits.”
156 McKinnon, “Private Interview.”
Warrior in Auckland in 1985 had been strongly linked with the development of the New Zealand nuclear taboo. A decade later, the French storming of the Rainbow Warrior II as it protested at Mururoa resonated powerfully with the New Zealand public, further heightening already strong anti-nuclear sentiment. The government again felt obliged to provide material support for protesters, and to pursue more robust nuclear disarmament advocacy.

Two aspects of the conservative government’s heightened response at this point—the ICJ case, and the dispatch of the Tui to Mururoa—reinforce a point raised in the theoretical discussion in chapter five. That is, direct anti-nuclear weapon activism had become more acceptable, mainstream behaviour in New Zealand by the mid-1990s, in part due to the precedents set by the Kirk government in 1974-1974. In 1972, for example, the violent French assault on Greenpeace activists at Mururoa triggered an 81,000-strong CND petition calling for New Zealand to take an ICJ case against France. The foreign ministry advised against the idea, however, and the conservative government barred public and media from the petition’s hearing, then ushered the petition through parliament without debate. In stark contrast, the conservative government in 1995 applied to revisit the ICJ Nuclear Tests case against the advice of the foreign ministry, and stated publicly that its decision was the result of consultations with prominent anti-nuclear activists and opposition MPs.157

Similarly, National Party leader Jack Marshall complained in 1973 about the ‘flamboyant publicity stunts’ of the Labour Government when the latter sent frigates to Mururoa in protest.158 In 1995, however, Bolger eventually stated that HMNZS Tui—with National and Labour MPs on board—travelled to Mururoa to protest on behalf of the entire New Zealand parliament, and to support civil society protesters. In effect, the conservative government was actively engaging in, and supporting civil society to engage in, direct anti-nuclear activism. These developments can be accounted for in part by the observations above about rhetorical entrapment. However, as the discussion below makes clear, it is also likely that persuasion dynamics were influencing Prime Minister Bolger’s beliefs, and those of many officials, with regard to the legitimacy of public engagement in national security policymaking.

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157 East, ”New Zealand’s Attempts to End Nuclear Testing at Mururoa Atoll through the World Court”, para. 11.
The third phase of influence deriving from the New Zealand nuclear taboo came in the mid-to-late 1990s. During this period, the cumulative psychological effects of the anti-nuclear weapon norms that had been institutionalised in New Zealand's bureaucratic structures and political practices appears to have altered the national identities of officials and arguably, of Prime Minister Bolger. Additionally, the normative context changed significantly in 1996, as the ICJ Advisory Opinion established a strong, pro-disarmament international legal norm to which disarmament advocates could link more progressive policy objectives. Advisory opinions do not create direct legal obligations in the way that the Court’s judgments bind the parties to contentious cases, but coming from the world’s ‘premier arbiter of international law,’ advisory opinions have broad legal interpretive value.159

At the individual, psychological level, Bolger’s experience offers insight into the mechanisms through which politicians experience socialisation effects. As National Party leader, Bolger was the public face of the party’s decision to reverse its policy and endorse nuclear freedom. Shortly thereafter, election to the UN Security Council brought prestige to his government, largely thanks to the nuclear free policy. In July 1995, it was Bolger who announced the decision to send a Navy vessel Tui to Mururoa, and who affirmed publicly that the Tui’s protest voyage was on behalf of the entire New Zealand Parliament. The same month, New Zealand’s challenged the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence in its ICJ statement.160 Under Bolger’s leadership, New Zealand was granted full CD membership, a further international reputational boost, and appointed an ambassador for disarmament. It was Bolger who co-signed the Memorandum of Cooperation with Mandela, when the latter was at the height of his political fame and prestige. These were all developments that strengthened Bolger’s public connection to expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment, increased New Zealand’s profile on issues central to international security, and brought with them personal links to influential international figures.

In sum, it is hypothesised here that Bolger’s personal expression of support for nuclear disarmament norms was initially motivated by instrumental logic, but over time, the consistency


with which he was publicly associated with pro-disarmament policies, and the prestige it brought his government and him personally, led to a significantly increased personal commitment to those norms. This finding is supported by Bolger’s continued engagement, following his retirement from politics, with the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament.161

These human-level, persuasion dynamics also appear to have affected New Zealand officials in this period. Since officials ‘practice’ policy norms on a daily basis, collective learning processes are likely to lead to norms ‘growing their own legs.’162 In the New Zealand context, the 1987 nuclear free law created bureaucratic structures such as a ministerial portfolio and a public advisory committee with a mandate to advise the government. These institutional factors helped to shift officials’ outward behaviour away from support for nuclear deterrence in the late 1980s. Across the 1990s, a cyclical socialisation process developed among officials, as New Zealand’s expression of anti-nuclear sentiment—most commonly through the agency of foreign ministry officials—was rewarded with backpatting by international peers.163 increased international prestige, and further access to and establishment of institutional platforms where expression of anti-nuclear sentiment was appropriate or indeed, expected. These dynamics were evident, for example, in New Zealand’s election to the UN Security Council, membership in the CD, establishment of an ambassador for disarmament, and invitations to join the NAC and to chair the disarmament negotiations at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. At the human, psychological level, this cycle of positive feedback and increasing institutionalisation of related norms increases the likelihood of individuals becoming personally persuaded about the normative value of nuclear disarmament, by linking increased personal and national prestige with high-profile condemnation of nuclear weapons. In this context, a psychological consistency effect comes into play as a medium-term policy driver.164 The increasing regularity and intensity of interaction between New Zealand officials and civil society disarmament advocates in the mid-to-late 1990s, through initiatives such as the WCP and later, MPI, also reinforced the dynamic of increasing persuasion to anti-nuclear weapon norms.165

162 Cialdini, Influence, 84.
163 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 17–18.
164 Ibid., 216.
165 For an example of intensive consultations between MPI and NAC officials, see, Middle Powers Initiative, “Long-Range Strategy Planning Meeting: Pugwash, Nova Scotia, July 20-22, 2000: List of
Further support for this persuasion hypothesis, in relation to both Bolger and to New Zealand officials, is provided by considering the changing political pressures on these constituencies in the second half of the 1990s. New Zealand public attention to nuclear issues was very low in the late 1990s—a result both of the public nuclear taboo, and the lack of external triggers or civil society campaigns to activate public anti-nuclear sentiment. In this context, rhetorical entrapment cannot readily explain the government’s proactive nuclear disarmament advocacy, such as the New Zealand–South Africa Memorandum, or New Zealand’s championing of an obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Similarly, there was limited political pressure on officials to pursue nuclear disarmament in the second half of the decade. Of the senior National Party MPs, McKinnon had most strongly opposed adoption of the nuclear free policy, and as foreign minister in the early 1990s, sought to side-line nuclear issues in order to repair New Zealand-US relations. In 1996, McKinnon became disarmament minister in addition to his existing role as foreign minister. In 1997, a leadership coup removed Bolger from power. Bolger’s departure, McKinnon’s key disarmament policy roles, and the absence of public attention to nuclear issues created political space for officials—if they were so inclined—to reduce the emphasis they placed on nuclear disarmament advocacy. In fact, the opposite occurred; New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the late 1990s became increasingly strident, characterised by universalistic, anti-nuclear weapon normative claims that went beyond any the country had previously promoted.

Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt have shown that ‘the probability of nuclear renunciation declines with the duration of nuclear weapons activities and the accompanied institutionalization and bureaucratization of such activities.’ The findings in the current chapter support the hypothesis that the dynamic holds true in reverse. That is, the institutionalisation of anti-nuclear weapon norms increases the likelihood of consistent nuclear disarmament advocacy across time, even if officials are not initially persuaded about the disarmament policies that they are promoting at the government’s behest. As the discussion here has shown, moreover, the consistency of this nuclear disarmament advocacy may come to be driven by genuine normative persuasion, as officials come to internalise anti-nuclear weapon

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166 McKinnon, “Private Interview.”
norms as a result of their constant practice. Most significantly, these findings, along with the discussion above about Bolger’s experience, demonstrate that politicians and officials working on nuclear weapons issues are not immune to the human-scale social dynamics—shaming and social conformity or conversely, backpatting and persuasion—that operate in other areas of foreign policy.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{168}}\] This observation supports Rublee’s suggestion that internalisation of norms in elite constituencies may take place through ‘the creation of bureaucratic apparatus, complete with budgets and personnel to protect and defend the commitments the state has made.’ Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, 46, note 46.
8. Challenging NATO’s nuclear strategy

The challenge of moving toward the prohibition of nuclear weapons remains fundamentally political and moral. The Committee is convinced that Canada has the vision, talent and credibility to play a leading role in finally ending the nuclear threat overhanging humanity.

Canadian Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, 1998

Introduction

In the late 1990s, Canada called for NATO to advance nuclear disarmament by reviewing the Alliance’s nuclear strategy and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons in defence planning. A key norm entrepreneur in this context was Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy (1996-2000), who is strongly personally committed to anti-nuclear weapon norms. The Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy was triggered by an international normative development, the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion, which heavily influenced the policy development process. In parallel with several other NATO members, Canada promoted consideration of a revision to NATO’s ‘strategic concept.’ This is a central alliance policy document, which defines NATO’s approach to ensuring allied and global security, including the role of nuclear weapons in that task.

As in other areas of Canadian disarmament policy at this time, such as the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, the foreign minister collaborated closely with civil society on nuclear weapons issues. Referring implicitly to international humanitarian law—which had been invoked in the ICJ Advisory Opinion—Axworthy publicly questioned the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons.

1 SCFAIT, “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge”, ch. 5.
3 Hanson points out, however, that the nuclear policy initiative was actually a forerunner to the major Canadian government focus on landmines. Hanson, “Advancing Disarmament,” 20.
This point conflicted sharply with NATO’s explicitly-stated willingness to use nuclear weapons, and to be the first to do so in a conflict. In effect, the Canadian initiative was an attempt to deconstruct the primary normative barrier to nuclear disarmament: nuclear deterrence theory.

An evolution in national identities among left-leaning political elites, including in the governing Liberal Party, meant that there was strong support in principle for revision of NATO policy. Axworthy led efforts in this regard, portraying NATO’s nuclear deterrence policies as legally questionable, as well as outdated and dangerous in the rapidly transforming post-Cold War world. Despite strong anti-nuclear weapon identities among politicians and overwhelming public support for Canadian leadership on nuclear disarmament, however, most government ministers and officials still saw a strong US alliance relationship as a primary security interest. As a result, strong push-back from nuclear allies triggered alliance solidarity norms—particularly as NATO began bombing Serbia in April 1999 without a UN mandate. This curbed the enthusiasm of Canadian politicians for the promotion of specific changes to NATO strategy—such as adoption of a no first use policy, for example—which Canadian civil society and Axworthy himself preferred. This case shows one mechanism through which nuclear disarmament advocacy can be constrained by a pro-US alliance identities, even when government elites and the public hold strong anti-nuclear weapons preferences. The case provides further evidence of the contradictory identities that compete to determine Canadian nuclear weapons policies, the mechanism through which they are expressed, and the contradictory or anomalous policy outcomes that result.4

National identities

Political elite

The dominant national identity among governing Liberal Party MPs in the 1990s had shifted significantly from the position in the early 1980s, described in chapter six. In fact, the majority opinion among all left-leaning MPs was strongly in favour of challenging the nuclear status quo.

This preference was reflected in a 1998 report from the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, the central recommendation of which was that the Canadian government should ‘work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination.’ Reducing the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons necessarily implied challenging central aspects of NATO’s nuclear deterrence strategy, which was premised at the time on the idea that alliance nuclear forces needed ‘to be perceived as a credible and effective element’ of NATO strategy.

Axworthy’s foreign policy agenda explicitly aimed to develop international norms that he saw as reflecting ‘Canadian values.’ Like Trudeau, Axworthy was an academic before entering politics. As foreign minister, he invoked Lester Pearson’s internationalist legacy, stating that it ‘contributed to a uniquely Canadian identity and a sense of Canada’s place in the world.’ This vision of Canadian internationalism (as opposed to thinking primarily in bilateral, Canada-US terms) was also reflected in the views of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (1993–2003), who ‘came to office determined to distinguish himself from his predecessor whom he accused of having far too close a relationship with the Americans.’ This created considerable domestic political leeway for Axworthy to pursue progressive nuclear weapons policies.

Canada’s decision not to acquire an indigenous nuclear arsenal in the 1940s also informed Axworthy’s beliefs about nuclear weapons. He saw the lack of domestic debate over this decision as a natural reflection of Canadian national identity, setting the country apart and giving it a ‘special vocation’ in nuclear issues. Significantly, Axworthy was also suspicious of the way that Canada’s alliances locked the country into the web of US global strategy. Axworthy was ‘no fan

7 Howard and Neufeldt, “Canada’s Constructivist Foreign Policy: Building Norms for Peace,” 12.
11 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 358–359.
12 Donaghy, Tolerant Allies, 113–114.
of NATO—at least a nuclear NATO.’  

In the early 1980s, for example, he vehemently opposed cruise missile testing in cabinet debates and in public.

A countervailing identity dynamic derived from the widespread, arguably internalised belief in the Liberal Party that US alliance was the primary guarantor of Canadian security. As will be seen below, this was an important determinant of the limited scope of nuclear disarmament advocacy pursued by the Canadian government, despite the widespread and strong anti-nuclear weapon sentiment among Liberal and other left MPs, and strongly held views of the foreign minister.

**Officials**

The United States dominates Canadian foreign policy thinking, as noted previously, and since the 1970s, there had been a rapid increase in the integration between Canadian and US bureaucratic networks, ‘generating an increasing array of ‘transgovernmental’ communications between various components of the American and Canadian governmental systems.’ The result of this interaction was the further entrenchment of a constituency and institutional structures in Canada that viewed the national interest in all foreign policy—of which nuclear issues play only a very small part, as noted previously—in terms of protecting Canada-US ties. Officials’ policy preferences regarding nuclear disarmament are thus affected not just by the alliance dynamics discussed previously, but also by Canadian economic concerns, which generally command more interest from cabinet than do security matters. At the turn of the millennium, for example, 80 percent of Canadian trade was with the United States. In this context, nuclear policy is rarely a top priority for Canadian officials in their dealings with US counterparts.

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13 Hampson, “The Axworthy Years.”
14 English, *Just Watch Me*, ch. 17, unpaginated.
In addition to this broader context, the daily practice of international security officials in Canada is strongly guided by the beliefs and concepts surrounding the practice of nuclear deterrence, a perennial touchstone for Canada-US security relations. Unless individuals come into the foreign affairs department with particularly strong personal beliefs about nuclear weapons or deterrence, those individuals quickly become acculturated to the daily ‘practice’ of deterrence. In the late 1990s, this had been the case for several decades; the result was a strongly entrenched, pro-nuclear identity in the bureaucracy.

In the late 1990s, the radical transformations in relations across the former East-West divide led to occasional calls for similarly radical action regarding Canadian security alliances. A former Canadian Ambassador to Russia, for example, called in 1997 for Canada to leave NATO, on the basis that the planned expansion of the organisation would do more harm than good, and would not bring stability to Eastern Europe.19 On the whole, however, the broader concerns described above relating to US relations dominated official thinking in this period.

Public

The competing strands of national identity among the Canadian public in the late 1990s are strikingly similar to those seen in New Zealand in the late 1980s (see chapter four, ‘Internalisation of an anti-nuclear identity’). That is, a strong majority of Canadians viewed the country’s security as tied to relationship with the United States, but at the same time, an overwhelming majority also held strong anti-nuclear weapon identities. Though just outside the timeframe of the current case study, a 2002 poll by the Centre for Research and Information on Canada showed that 75 percent of Canadians were either satisfied with current levels, or preferred greater military collaboration, with the United States.20 This necessarily meant maintaining support for nuclear deterrence, a central aspect of US global security strategy. Meanwhile, the public were ‘more or less evenly divided on whether or not Canada should take a more independent approach to its partnership with the US in matters of security or

20 “Canada and the United States: An Evolving Partnership” (Centre for Research and Information on Canada, August 2003), 11.
diplomacy.’ Conversely, a 1998 poll conducted by Angus Reid showed 93 percent support among Canadians for the elimination of nuclear weapons and 92 percent support for the Canadian government ‘to take a leadership role in promoting an international ban on nuclear weapons.’

Despite this very strong anti-nuclear public preference, it is important to note that active public engagement on arms control issues has often been low historically, albeit it has been a flashpoint for debate on specific policy issues, as demonstrated in chapters four and six. The public experience in the late 1990s was characterised by this lack of active engagement on nuclear weapons issues. Between 1995 and 2000, for example, of 63 Gallup national opinion polls that surveyed issues of contemporary political debate, none address nuclear weapons. An occasional question in these polls which arguably was the most salient to the current research asked respondents to name the biggest problem facing Canada. The proportion of respondents answering ‘world peace / war’ ranged between 0.1 and 1.2 percent.

The most significant conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that public national identity was not a significant political driver that might push Canadian nuclear disarmament policy strongly in one direction or another. Nevertheless, the idea of Canada as a force for good in the world that balances against the excesses of US dominance is one that resonates with the Canadian electorate. As will be seen below, Axworthy’s own beliefs resonated strongly with that vision, and on that basis, he sought—and received—a public mandate on which to base his nuclear disarmament advocacy.

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21 Ibid.
25 See the respective codebooks for the months listed above at, Ibid.
Nuclear disarmament advocacy

From January 1996 to October 2000, Canada foreign policy adopted an ‘activist’ flavour under Axworthy’s leadership;27 this included promoting nuclear disarmament by advocating a change to Canadian nuclear weapons policy, by delegitimising nuclear weapons, and by calling for a fundamental rethink of nuclear deterrence—a central aspect of NATO strategy.28 The concept of no first use also began reappearing in policy discussions in some non-nuclear NATO states during this period, including Canada, as a potential evolution for Alliance strategy.29 NATO was due to issue an updated strategic concept at a heads-of-state summit in April 1999, which marked the 50th anniversary of the Alliance. The events described here are best understood in the context of this forthcoming strategic concept.

Axworthy’s international security initiatives sometimes angered policymakers in the United States,30 but the tacit support of Prime Minister Chrétien meant that the foreign minister had some leeway to act. In the late 1990s, contextual factors such great power relations, the international normative context and civil society activity facilitated expression of the anti-nuclear weapon sentiment that was widespread in the political leadership and overwhelming among the public. Conversely, entrenched beliefs about the importance of US


28 In the first half of 1996, Canada was also engaged in CTBT negotiations in the CD. Since the focus of this case study is on the broader Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy in this period, the CD negotiations are not considered further. Rauf, “Non-Nuclear Policies,” 233.

29 The concept was not new; China adopted such a policy immediately following its first nuclear test in 1964, while the Soviet Union did so in 1982. A group of eminent former US policymakers had also promoted the concept for NATO in 1982, but it had never seriously been considered by the Alliance. Russia renounced the no first use policy after the Cold War. Harold A. Feiveson and Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review 10, no. 2 (2003): 92; McGeorge Bundy et al., “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs 60, no. 4 (1982): 753–68.

alliance ties among political elites and officials had a strong, constraining effect on Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy.

The post-Cold War optimism regarding great power cooperation ‘had already run aground in Somalia and Bosnia’ in 1996,\(^{31}\) though when Axworthy first launched his nuclear policy initiatives, there was still hope for arms control and disarmament issues.\(^{32}\) As the 1990s wore on, however, great power relations were steadily deteriorating, due in part to Russian concerns about the development of US ballistic missile defences,\(^ {33}\) and to tensions surrounding NATO expansion and activity.\(^ {34}\) The 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests added to a sense of malaise.\(^ {35}\) Increasing international frictions caused concern among disarmament advocates that a post-Cold War window of opportunity for great power cooperation was being missed.

A vital and influential piece of normative context in this case was again the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion, released six months after Axworthy took office. Of particular interest was the Court’s findings that ‘A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law,’ and that therefore, ‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.’\(^ {36}\) Given that NATO nuclear strategy is based on a constant, implicit threat to use nuclear weapons,\(^ {37}\) the Advisory Opinion raised serious questions about the legality of NATO and Canadian policies—a point that Canada raised with its NATO allies, as discussed further below. In sum, as the Canadian

\(^{31}\) Axworthy, *Navigating a New World*, 2.

\(^{32}\) Hanson, “Advancing Disarmament,” 20–21.

\(^{33}\) Reuben Steff, *Strategic Thinking, Deterrence and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Project from Truman to Obama* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 117–118.


\(^{35}\) Axworthy, *Navigating a New World*, 363.


government later wrote, that Advisory Opinion added ‘new ideas and impetus to the [nuclear weapons] debate,’\(^{38}\) and catalysed Canada’s nuclear disarmament advocacy;

Other international normative developments contributed to what has been described as an ‘abolitionist upsurge’ in this period,\(^ {39} \) thus supporting Canadian expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. In August 1996, the Canberra Commission released its final report, which called for the elimination of nuclear weapons as the only complete defence against the threat from nuclear weapons.\(^ {40} \) For Canada, this was an important political development, given Australia’s similar status as a US ally and nuclear umbrella state. The adoption of the CTBT text by the UNGA in September 1996 also advanced nuclear disarmament norms in this early period of Axworthy’s tenure.

Domestic civil society activity also provided support for the Canadian government’s pursuit of nuclear disarmament. As in the New Zealand context in this period, peace movement activity in Canada declined across much of the 1990s\(^ {41} \) after its strong presence in the 1980s.\(^ {42} \) Nevertheless, groups of nongovernmental disarmament experts continued to monitor nuclear developments and to engage with their own and other like-minded governments. Project Ploughshares, for example, saw a window of opportunity for nuclear disarmament arising from recent developments, such as the ICJ Advisory Opinion; the Canberra Commission Report; the CTBT completion; and the formation of the Abolition 2000 alliance, an international civil society network aiming to generate political will to complete negotiations by the year 2000 on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons.\(^ {43} \) Ploughshares planned a series of public meetings in 18 cities across ten of the 13 Canadian provinces to discuss the implications of these developments for

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\(^{39}\) Lennox, \textit{At Home and Abroad}, 67. Another report in this vein, the Japanese Government’s Tokyo Forum Report was released in August 1999, following the events discussed in this chapter. As such, it is not discussed here.


\(^{41}\) The bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 reignited the peace movement, though its members disagreed over whether the emerging concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ was justifiable. David Langille, “The Long March of the Canadian Peace Movement,” \textit{Canadian Dimension} 42, no. 3 (2008), https://goo.gl/FU9ZPZ, online, unpaginated.

\(^{42}\) Dewes, “The World Court Project,” 81.

Canadian nuclear weapons policies. Douglas Roche, a former conservative MP and Canadian ambassador for disarmament, led the meetings.\textsuperscript{44} Roche writes,

\begin{quote}
...just as the Roundtables were beginning, Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy posted on the Department’s website three questions, soliciting the Canadian public’s views on how Canada should respond to the World Court Advisory Opinion...Thus, Mr. Axworthy’s questions became an added incentive for participants at the Roundtables to express their views.
\end{quote}

Roche’s report, \textit{Canada and the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons}, concluded that ‘a broad cross-section of Canadian society would enthusiastically welcome and rally behind clear leadership by the Canadian government in working immediately—not in the distant future—to secure an international nuclear weapons abolition program.’\textsuperscript{45} According to Roche, the roundtable discussions emphasised that Canada ‘should put its commitment to international law ahead of allegiance to NATO,’\textsuperscript{46} and that ‘Canada’s obligation to follow the admonition of the World Court supersedes the outmoded alliance solidarity of NATO, which has prevented Canada from expressing the humanitarian values of Canadians against the continued possession of nuclear weapons.’\textsuperscript{47} In theoretical terms, the Ploughshares report, along with the developments noted above, created strong normative precedents to which Axworthy could link his nuclear disarmament policy preferences, generating greater legitimacy for them.

In November 1996, citing the ICJ Opinion and the Canberra Commission and Project Ploughshares reports, Axworthy requested the parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) to review Canadian nuclear weapons policies.\textsuperscript{48} He called for SCFAIT to examine fundamental issues such as whether Canada should maintain its reliance on US nuclear weapons for Canadian defence, and offered a somewhat unenthusiastic endorsement of NATO, saying that ‘at the moment we are committed to NATO.’\textsuperscript{49} Axworthy then ‘worked closely behind the scenes to ensure that the [SCFAIT] Report...contained recommendations calling for substantive moves toward eventual disarmament, the de-alerting of all nuclear forces, and an open debate on NATO’s nuclear policy.’\textsuperscript{50}

\begin{small}
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., Executive Summary.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., Executive Summary.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., “Answers to Mr. Axworthy” section.
\textsuperscript{49} Sallot, “Canada Reviewing Nuclear-Weapons Policy.”
\textsuperscript{50} Hampson, “The Axworthy Years.”
\end{small}
Despite Axworthy invoking Pearson’s memory, the policy-making process in the Axworthy years was a significant departure from Canadian diplomatic tradition, in terms of the degree of influence that he sought to ensure for civil society and the style of initiatives that he took.\footnote{Stairs, “The Changing Office,” 19; Hillmer and Chapnick, “The Axworthy Revolution.”} Government consultations with civil society had begun in the lead up to the first UN special session on disarmament in 1978, and had waxed and waned over the years. According to Regehr, these consultations reached their zenith under Axworthy, who made a semi-formal commitment for the government to consult with civil society.\footnote{Regehr, “Private Interview.”} Roche calls the late 1990s the ‘high-water mark for productive interaction between civil society and the federal government’ on disarmament issues.\footnote{Douglas Roche, How We Stopped Loving the Bomb: An Insider’s Account of the World on the Brink of Banning Nuclear Arms (Toronto: James Lorimer, 2011), 80–81.} Axworthy stated in 1997,

> One can no longer relegate NGOs to simple advisory or advocacy roles in this process. They are now part of the way decisions have to be made. They have been the voice saying that government belongs to the people, and must respond to the people’s hopes, demands and ideals.\footnote{Axworthy, cited in Alison Van Rooy, “Civil Society and the Axworthy Touch,” in Canada among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 253.}

Axworthy’s diplomatic style was often politically-focused as opposed to technical, and when seized of an issue, he would engage in direct and forceful public advocacy.\footnote{Dean F Oliver and Fen Osler Hampson, “Pulpit Diplomacy,” International Journal 53, no. 3 (1998): 379–406.} In contrast to these observations, the vision of Pearsonian internationalism that shaped traditional Canadian foreign policy thinking was elite-driven and had little time for engagement with civil society; it emphasised alliance solidarity above all, and favoured quiet consultation with and coordination among allies.\footnote{Thordarson, “Cutting Back on NATO, 1969,” 175–76. See also, Stern, “Forging New Identities,” 94.}

While Axworthy’s NATO policy preferences were controversial, however, they did not come out of the blue; in fact, they had some relatively significant domestic policy precedents. Canadian policy towards NATO began to shift as the Cold War came to an end.\footnote{Johnson, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference.”} In 1992, the conservative government withdrew the last Canadian troops from NATO deployment in Europe, and ‘emphasized the United Nations as the more appropriate vehicle for Canada’s pursuit of its...
international interests.\(^{58}\) Similarly, in the Liberal Government’s foreign and defence policy reviews in 1994 and 1995, ‘NATO was clearly given a lower priority than the UN as a multilateral instrument for the pursuit of Canada’s international security objectives.’\(^{59}\) Moreover, Axworthy’s personal views on nuclear weapons policy were legitimated in democratic terms by public opinion. A March 1998 Angus Reid poll showed overwhelming anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the public: ‘93% of Canadians support the abolition of nuclear weapons; 92% of Canadians want the Government of Canada to take a leadership role in promoting an international ban on nuclear weapons; [and] 75% of Canadians believe that nuclear weapons pose a threat to world security.’\(^{60}\)

By the late 1990s, other non-nuclear weapon states—including NATO allies—were also starting to question the nuclear status quo. In 1998, for example, the so-called ‘NATO-5’—Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway—began collectively presenting progressive disarmament proposals to the CD, and later, to NPT meetings.\(^{61}\) The NAC called in its June 1998 ministerial declaration for a legally-binding no first use agreement regarding nuclear weapons.\(^{62}\) On 20 October 1998, a new German coalition government unifying the Social Democrats and the Green Party included in its official policy manifesto the promotion of a no first use policy for NATO, and reductions in the alert status of nuclear weapons.\(^{63}\) In sum, Axworthy’s nuclear disarmament initiatives had strong public support and policy precedents domestically, and strong normative precedents internationally.

On 24 October 1998, the \textit{Washington Post} reported that Axworthy was promoting revision of NATO nuclear strategy, including calling for a no first use policy.\(^{64}\) Tom Keating appears to imply, though it is not clear, that civil society was responsible for spurring the Canadian discussion of no first use as a possible policy platform for NATO.\(^{65}\) Given the strong government-civil society


\(^{59}\) Delvoie, “Curious Ambiguities,” 40.

\(^{60}\) Canadian Peace Alliance, “Globalizing Peace,” 30.


relations at the time, this is certainly possible; MPI, for example, which was established in November 1997 and the launched internationally in March 1998, was promoting no first use. It has not been possible to confirm this specific point, however. The no first use concept had strong support from the Bloc Quebecois (the third largest parliamentary party at the time) and the New Democratic Party; it was opposed by the official Opposition Reform Party, and by the Progressive Conservatives, who believed ‘Canada should approach any changes to NATO’s nuclear strategy with great caution.’

In late October, the first draft of the NAC’s 1998 UNGA First Committee resolution called for exploration of no first use options. Under pressure due to strong opposition from the Western nuclear weapon states—as will be seen below—this language was watered down in subsequent negotiations. The version adopted by the First Committee on 13 November instead called for the nuclear weapon states to explore ‘measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines.’ Despite pressure from the Western nuclear weapon states to oppose the NAC resolution, 15 out of 16 non-nuclear NATO members and US allies instead chose to abstain. This response to the NAC initiative was evidence of the frustration among EU and NATO non-nuclear allies at the lack of progress on multilateral nuclear disarmament.

In late November 1998, the German foreign minister was still pursuing no first use policy, and on 3 December, just days before a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, the Dutch Parliament passed a resolution calling on the alliance to consider a no first use stance. The following day, the UNGA plenary adopted the NAC resolution, with the vast majority of NATO allies again abstaining, as they had on the First Committee draft. Tannenwald argues that following this, ‘the political debates in many countries over the UN [NAC] resolution prompted non-nuclear

66 Burford, “Principled Pragmatism,” 70.
70 UNGA First Committee, “A/53/584,” 37, para. 78(c).
71 Ibid., 38–39.
72 Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, 358.
74 Mendelsohn, “NATO’s Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for ‘No First Use.’”
states Germany and Canada to push harder for a reexamination of NATO strategies, in particular the policy of first use of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{76}

At this point, however, the Canadian government was experiencing strong pressure from its nuclear armed allies not to promote no first use. Axworthy writes that this issue in particular created strong opposition and lobbying from the UK and US representatives in Ottawa, who feared that if Canada were to adopt such a policy, others in NATO would do the same.\textsuperscript{77} UK and US diplomats lobbied SCFAIT members intensively, making—in Axworthy’s words, ‘not so veiled warnings of consequences, not unlike those issued by Ambassador Cellucci that our non-participation in the Iraq war could affect border issues.’\textsuperscript{78} Axworthy concludes,

If I had ever believed that policy-making in Canada is a simple exercise, or that solely domestic forces dictate the result, this experience dispelled such notions. The scrutiny and pressure from outside and the full court press being executed by the nuclear states, especially the Americans, had an effect...several of my colleagues, to say nothing of certain officials in DFAIT [the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade] and DND [the Department of National Defence], were discovering serious reservations to the nuclear review strategy.\textsuperscript{79}

In theoretical terms, the reservations that officials and political leaders were experiencing highlights the identity-related arguments advanced in this thesis. That is, the presence of a strong anti-nuclear weapon sentiment creates a preference for actively pursuing nuclear disarmament—in this case, by reviewing NATO strategy to minimise reliance on nuclear weapons. However, the dominant nuclear weapons-related norms practiced within NATO run directly counter to these preferences. When this inconsistency is highlighted by external actors, it threatens the stability of the dominant security-related identity in Canada, and this threat is resolved by reaffirming alliance structures; nuclear disarmament preferences are put aside.

At the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting on 8-9 December 1998, the German foreign minister raised the issue of no first use, but the UK and US representatives strongly opposed revision of NATO strategy.\textsuperscript{80} Axworthy did not call for a no first use policy, though he did promote a comprehensive review of NATO nuclear weapons strategy, saying the updated strategic concept

\textsuperscript{76} Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, 358.
\textsuperscript{77} Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 362.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 362–363.
'should underline that as a consequence of a changed security environment, nuclear weapons are far less important to Alliance strategy than they were in the 1980s and early 1990s.' He also noted that 92 percent of Canadians supported their government taking a lead in working for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Axworthy argued that NATO should take into account ‘international law, humanitarian imperatives and political realities,’ and commit to pursuing greater progress in nuclear disarmament. Finally, and significantly, Axworthy challenged the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence, by stating that ‘using Alliance nuclear capabilities—even in retaliation—raises very difficult questions of means, proportionality and effectiveness that cause us significant concerns.’

This last point needs to be unpacked. Invoking concerns about means and proportionality relating to nuclear weapons implies that the use of such weapons is unlikely to comply with international humanitarian law, of which these two concepts collectively form a key aspect. This implication derives from the massively disproportionate effects of nuclear weapons compared to most conceivable military threat or objective. Since NATO deterrence policy is based on a willingness to use nuclear weapons, Axworthy’s statement constituted a challenge to the legitimacy of NATO strategy. Once again, this reflects the influence of the ICJ Advisory Opinion, which found that ‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.’

The SCFAIT report that Axworthy requested, *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge*, was tabled in parliament on 10 December 1998, the day after the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting. This was a major report—‘the product of two years of extensive research, public hearings, and expert testimonies,’ which considered in detail the question of Canadian national interests in the post-Cold War world, and created a strong, clear mandate for future policy. The SCFAIT report called for the Canadian government to adopt a strong, activist-type role on nuclear disarmament; its primary recommendation was that Canada ‘work consistently to reduce the

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83 Axworthy, “Address [to the North Atlantic Council Meeting].”
84 Ibid.
political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination. The report also argued that the Canadian government should argue forcefully for NATO to review its nuclear strategy. SCFAIT labelled the civil society–government collaboration on the successful landmines campaign a ‘Canadian approach’ to disarmament, and recommended that the government seek to replicate the landmines success by focusing on humanitarian, rather than military/technical issues; by engaging civil society; and by working with like-minded states outside traditional groupings if necessary—including the NAC.

The SCFAIT report did not call for Canada to promote a no-first use policy for NATO, though the Canadian ambassador for disarmament, Peggy Mason, was still promoting the idea in early April 1999, just weeks before the Washington summit to mark NATO’s 50th Anniversary. Mason questioned the legality of NATO nuclear weapons policy, saying, ‘current NATO nuclear policy is seriously at odds with the majority opinion in the ICJ ruling, which, while not binding, is considered an “authoritative” statement of international law.’ Her main argument, however, was that NATO’s refusal to revise its nuclear policy was hypocritical, and was thus undermining the whole regime built around the NPT. She stated that NATO’s intransigence meant betraying the commitment, made in 1995 in order to secure the indefinite extension of the NPT, to the ‘determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally.’ This sentiment was later reflected in a private report commissioned by DFAIT, which highlighted the importance of changing NATO policy for nuclear disarmament:

> Because it is centrally important to any of these efforts to delegitimise nuclear weapons as instruments of security, NATO’s strategy takes on particular importance...While NATO operationally considers nuclear weapons essential to providing security against any form of attack, it is in no position to suggest that such weapons are not equally important to any others.

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87 SCFAIT, “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge”, ch. 1, recommendation 1.
88 Ibid., Recommendations 15.
89 Ibid., “Pursuing a Canadian Approach” section.
90 Ibid., ch. 4, recommendation 15, and ch. 5 respectively. On the NAC, see, Ibid., ch. 1, recommendation 3.
92 Ibid., 635.
94 Mutimer, “Confidence-Building,” iv.
On 19 April, five days before the NATO 50th anniversary summit, the Canadian government responded to the recommendations in the SCFAIT report, as it is required by law to do. The government endorsed 14 out of 15 of the Committee’s specific recommendations,95 including the main recommendation, regarding working to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons, and asserted that ‘the NPT is the central instrument in which Canada's nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy is rooted.’96 This, of course, it highly questionable. In fact, as suggested by the earlier discussion of the Hotel California effect, the central instrument that guides Canadian nonproliferation and disarmament policy is the North Atlantic Treaty and is associated norms.

NATO held its 50th anniversary summit in Washington, from 24-26 April 1999. The Alliance had not long previously begun its controversial bombing campaign in Serbia, without a mandate from the UN Security Council.97 The vehement opposition from Russia and China to this campaign resulted in a focus at the NATO summit on reaffirming alliance solidarity; media were given little opportunity to interact directly with government leaders, and ‘nuclear policy was kept deliberately low key, with careful avoidance of the questions raised in late 1998 by Germany, Canada and others about retaining first-use doctrine [sic] and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.’98 The Canadian prime minister made no mention of nuclear issues, and stated ‘the only true guarantee of long term security is collective security’ and therefore, ‘the need for NATO is as great as ever.’99 The updated NATO strategic concept presented at the summit stated that nuclear weapons ‘make a unique contribution’ to deterrence and thus ‘remain essential to preserve peace.’100

The summit did agree that NATO would ‘consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament.’ On this basis, Axworthy continued to promote what was essentially a no first use policy: ‘one where nuclear weapons would be used only in clear response to a nuclear attack, not in response to

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95 The only recommendation the government did not endorse was the idea of not burning mixed oxide (MOX) fuels in Canadian nuclear reactors as a means of disposing of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons. Canada, “Government Response,” 12.
96 Ibid., 1.
97 For detailed discussion of this issue, including Canadian perspectives, see, Keating, Canada and World Order, 216–219.
100 NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, para. 46.
conventional or biological or chemical attack.' However, the response to this campaign demonstrates the institutional barriers to nuclear disarmament advocacy that this thesis has highlighted throughout. In Axworthy’s words:

...these ideas were not met with much enthusiasm. One big problem was the inertia, if not opposition, within the bureaucracy of NATO and the permanent representatives to the council. They are basically averse to rocking the boat, and there is still a dominant military culture amongst NATO decision makers.

After hitting the twin ‘brick walls’ of the election of George W. Bush, and then the terrorist attacks of 9/11, ‘the idea of a serious review was shelved’ in NATO. When Axworthy retired from politics in October 2000, Canada’s high profile advocacy of a change to NATO policy came to an end.

Theoretical implications

The dynamics described in this chapter again highlight the tension between two competing and often, largely contradictory visions of Canadian national identity. In effect, the debate between the supporters and critics of Axworthy’s policies ‘underscores Canadians’ longstanding ambivalence about what our role or mission on the international stage should be.’ Should Canadian security be understood in terms of US defence alliances—in which case, policymakers should prioritise maintenance of solidarity with the United States, including through NATO—or should Canadian security be understood in terms of international solidarity, symbolised by the pursuit of international law and principled objectives such as disarmament?

In terms most relevant to the core research question of this thesis, the conflict in this particular case study between these two visions of Canada can be summarised as follows: on one hand, a strong anti-nuclear weapon identity was held by an influential constituency of political actors such as Axworthy and many other Liberal and left-leaning MPs, supported by civil society and

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101 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 364.
102 Ibid., 364–365.
103 Ibid., 365.
104 Hampson, “The Axworthy Years.”
overwhelmingly supported by public opinion. The preferences of these groups constituted the active driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy.

On the other hand, many in the political and bureaucratic constituencies experienced a conflict between this preference, and the activation of their primary security related national identities, related to solidarity with the United States and NATO. This conflict was triggered by external advocacy from great power allies, and the result was a diminution of the scope that politicians were willing to afford to official Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy. As Axworthy noted, for example, bureaucratic inertia created a strong constraint to pursuit of a change to NATO policy, with transnational NATO elites ‘basically averse to rocking the boat.’

The conflict between these two visions of Canadian national identity—a conflict that epitomises the Hotel California effect—was evident in two nuclear policy statements the Canadian government made in April 1999. These statements were characterised by a fundamental conceptual conflict. First, Canada endorsed the SCFAIT recommendation to ‘work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination.’ But just days later, Canada endorsed the collective NATO assertion that ‘nuclear weapons make a unique contribution’ to allied security on the basis of their deterrent effect, and thus ‘remain essential to preserve peace.’

Opinion polling in the late 1990s showed that this conceptual conflict is equally entrenched in public sentiment. Canadians overwhelmingly supported the elimination of nuclear weapons and Canadian leadership towards that objective, but also strongly supported either maintaining or increasing military integration with the United States, which necessarily meant endorsing and supporting nuclear deterrence norms. Reflecting on his many years of personal experience interacting with the Canadian public, Roche writes, ‘Many Canadians want their government to take a more active role in disarmament, but they are ambivalent about where Canada’s duty, in the interests of security, lies.’ In this vein, Gabriel Stern points out that despite strong support in principle for nuclear disarmament, ‘in policy terms, such a sentiment is too general to

105 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 364–365.
106 Canada, “Government Response,” 1; NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, para. 46.
represent any sort of significant consensus.” Thus, there was no consistent electoral pressure on politicians to pursue particular policies, such as a no first use policy.

Chapter six introduced discussion of the psychological bind created by the Hotel California effect, in which nuclear disarmament advocates seek to check out of the hotel, but are incapable of actually doing so, for fear of the existential crisis this would create. The highly dismissive language used in NATO circles to describe Canadian policy in this period is again suggestive of this heightened psychological tension in nuclear deterrence adherents. Gendered language was used, for example, in an attempt to undermine the country’s policies, with Canada being labelled by critics within NATO as a ‘nuclear nag.’ A US diplomat who served in the Ottawa Embassy from 1992-1996 subsequently called Canada’s nuclear policies under Chrétien /Axworthy ‘breathtakingly arrogant in their ignorance.’

It is important to note, however, that constraints on Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy are not only created by institutional inertia or the Hotel California effect. As acknowledged throughout this thesis, a broader concern that often constrains the expression of Canadian anti-nuclear weapon sentiment is fear of damaging Canada-US relations in other policy areas, such as trade or border cooperation. Axworthy suggests that this fear was not merely perceived by Canadian officials and MPs in the late 1990s, it was deliberately invoked by veiled threats from UK and US diplomats. New Zealand’s experience in the 1980s reflects a similar dynamic, although the economic concerns were largely imaginary; as noted previously, New Zealand exports to the United States almost doubled between 1984 and 1991.

Canada’s policies in this period, nevertheless, constitute an explicit attempt to address the disarmament/deterrence conundrum. The policy process that Axworthy activated on the basis of the ICJ Opinion led to significant domestic debate about issues such as ‘whether nuclear weapons are illegal/illegitimate and should be totally eliminated; whether nuclear deterrence is

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110 Stern, “Forging New Identities,” 93.
113 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 362.
114 Statistics New Zealand, “NZ Trade Data.”
an obsolete concept; and whether NATO should adopt a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{115}

If nuclear deterrence works—in other words, if nuclear weapons have political value, as the SCFAIT report put it—then delegitimising those weapons reduces their political value. Similarly, the introduction of a no first use policy would create predictability about NATO intentions, and thus make deterrence less credible. For this reason, senior US leaders such as then-Secretary of Defence William Cohen saw the policy changes advocated by Axworthy as undermining NATO’s nuclear deterrent.\textsuperscript{116}

Turning to the question of how contextual factors influenced Canadian policy here, with the exception of alliance-based norms and identities discussed above, contextual factors both supported and stimulated Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy in the late 1990s. The ICJ Advisory Opinion gave Canadian politicians and officials a legally-significant, if not legally binding, document on which to base policy, providing a legitimising basis for expression of anti-nuclear weapon identities. The Opinion both catalysed and served as a constant touchstone for Canada’s disarmament advocacy in this period. In political/normative terms, the Canberra Commission was a further legitimating factor for disarmament advocacy, coming as it did from a like-minded nuclear umbrella state. Meanwhile, the NAC enabled non-nuclear NATO members to express discontent about NATO nuclear policy in a forum where the Western nuclear powers had less ability to constrain the expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. Civil society activity had an enabling effect for Canadian nuclear disarmament advocacy, in the sense that without the WCP, there would have been no ICJ Advisory Opinion. Civil society also provided constant reinforcement of Axworthy’s personal inclination to pursue disarmament, and some specific policy objectives such as no first use.

Finally, in terms of the influence of great power relations on Canadian policy, the end of the Cold War triggered a rapid transformation of the international system, challenging social, political and security structures. Though hopes for a fundamental transformation of the world order were fading, ongoing international upheavals meant it was still possible to contemplate new roles and identities for Canada. Axworthy’s 2004 book was entitled, \textit{Navigating a New World: Canada’s

\textsuperscript{115} Delvoie, “Curious Ambiguities,” 40.
Global Future. The implication of the title is clear: the international system was experiencing dramatic changes, and Canadian foreign policy must account for these changes. In the current case, however, international upheaval did not sufficiently disrupt the existing consensus about Canada’s place in the world to allow for an alternative national identity to dominate nuclear policy. Two key differences, when compared to New Zealand’s experience of identity change in the 1980s and policy evolution in the 1990s, arguably prevented lasting change to Canadian identity. First, despite the dramatic international upheaval in the early 1990s, there was no high-profile condemnation of Canada from an external constituency about which Canada cared. In this sense, Canada’s role as a good international citizen was not being questioned, so there was no identity crisis in Canada. Secondly, the role of geography as a powerful reality constraint cannot be ignored. Canada was still the northern neighbour of the world’s only superpower. This point had led over many years to the institutionalisation of a range of economic, military and political structures, and these created powerful constraints on change to key security beliefs and norms.

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117 Axworthy, Navigating a New World.
9. Conclusion

This thesis examines in detail the relationship between national identity and nuclear disarmament policy. Building on the foundational constructivist premise that identity determines interests and thus, policy preferences, the thesis demonstrates that the activation of anti-nuclear weapon national identities offers a compelling, theoretically coherent explanation for why democratic, non-nuclear weapon states undertake nuclear disarmament advocacy.

The thesis present real-world examples of the mechanisms through which anti-nuclear weapon norms, or conversely, pro-nuclear deterrence norms (and relatedly, pro-alliance norms, though the two are not the same), come to be embedded in the dominant national identity beliefs of different portions of a population. Identities associated with these fundamentally opposing norms competed for primacy as policy drivers in the cases examined. Drawing on the political psychology literature, the thesis documents the dynamics that characterise this competition within the foreign policy process.

Four comparative case studies, two each from Canada and New Zealand, examine nuclear disarmament policymaking processes across three decades from the early 1970s to the early 2000s. This set of cases allows for the comparison of findings across time and national boundaries. The comparisons across time allow for examination of the cyclical, mutually-constitutive relationship between the identities and norms which determine nuclear disarmament policy. In this regard, the thesis contributes to the literature on agent-structure dynamics, and has relevance to broader international security studies. The cross-national comparisons allow for consideration of the unique policy influences in each country, such as the role of geography as a reality constraint, for example, or the essential role of human agency in activating/highlighting and linking particular identities and related norms. In general terms, the comparative nature of the study, and the selection of cases representing a range of different policy outcomes, increases the generalisability of findings.

National identity is understood here as dynamic and often contested. The concept of identity is operationalised by analytically segmenting the case study populations into senior ministers, officials and the public, and identifying the dominant security-related beliefs about national identity in each of these societal segments. The case studies then trace the processes through which various actors seek to have the resulting preferences expressed in policy. In this way, the thesis provides a fine-grained analysis of how competition between divergent national identity beliefs across different parts of democratic society inform nuclear disarmament policy. The case studies also examine whether and how contextual factors intervene to augment or attenuate the expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. Contextual factors include alliance dynamics, normative context, civil society activity, and great power relations. Assessing the influence of these contextual factors amounts to seeking alternative causal explanations for observed outcomes, thus strengthening the internal validity of case study findings.

The following section briefly recaps the findings of each case study. On that basis, this chapter compares and contrasts the case study findings, highlighting key theoretical patterns and conclusions that emerge. This enables the production of tentative hypotheses about the patterns which characterise the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy. Finally, the thesis concludes with discussion of how these findings related to nuclear disarmament dynamics more broadly.

### Case study findings

Chapter five showed that in the early 1970s, strong and widespread anti-nuclear weapon identities in New Zealand— informs by geography and an increasing desire to express sovereign independence—provided the active driver for nuclear disarmament advocacy. However, this advocacy was limited in scope—constrained by internalised pro-alliance, though certainly not pro-nuclear, identities. Bipartisan anti-nuclear sentiment drove New Zealand government protests against French nuclear testing in the South Pacific from the early 1960s onwards, framed in terms of support for nuclear disarmament. However, the late-1972 election of an anti-nuclear norm entrepreneur, Prime Minister Norman Kirk, triggered New Zealand’s most proactive nuclear disarmament advocacy, which was strongly informed by close Labour Party links to civil society disarmament advocates. Most famously, New Zealand took a case against
France in the ICJ, and sent Navy frigates to protest at the test site at Mururoa Atoll. In sum, the intensity of disarmament advocacy closely reflected partisan distinctions in the strength of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment among key decision-makers, and relatedly, the priority they gave to independence, morality and trade as foreign policy interests.

Chapter six examined the high-profile burst of nuclear disarmament advocacy known as the Trudeau peace initiative, from late 1983 to early 1984. The initiative was triggered by Prime Minister Trudeau’s personal need to reaffirm his commitment to the vision of Canada as a pro-disarmament peacemaker, based on the profound cognitive dissonance Trudeau was experiencing as a result of massive public protests at the Canadian government decision to allow US nuclear-capable cruise missile testing in Canada. While most political and bureaucratic elites saw cruise testing as a natural expression of alliance solidarity, the public condemned Trudeau personally for betraying Canada’s pro-disarmament identity. During the peace initiative, Trudeau questioned NATO’s extended nuclear deterrence policy, but strong push-back from officials and colleagues at home and abroad led Trudeau to soft-pedal the issue, despite his personal doubts. The peace initiative, and the cruise testing decision that catalysed it, demonstrate the contradictory policy outcomes that occur when two conflicting Canadian national identities are strongly activated simultaneously.

Chapter seven showed that a New Zealand public nuclear taboo overruled the policy preferences of both officials and conservative government ministers in the early 1990s, as the latter became rhetorically entrapped by earlier, instrumentally-motivated anti-nuclear commitments. Civil society initiatives and external triggers activated internalised anti-nuclear sentiment in the public, generating immense electoral pressure for politicians to actively pursue nuclear disarmament advocacy. New Zealand supported a legal challenge to nuclear deterrence; emulated earlier protests under Kirk by taking legal and direct protest action against renewed French nuclear testing; and began making universalistic nuclear disarmament claims, rejecting any legitimacy for nuclear weapons. In the second half of the 1990s, a consistency effect led to increasing anti-nuclear persuasion among officials, who had been defending nuclear disarmament norms for over a decade, despite an earlier preference for resumption of US alliance. Similarly, the conservative Prime Minister Bolger, after years of publicly association with high-profile nuclear disarmament initiatives, developed a personal sense of pride in New Zealand’s anti-nuclear identity.
In chapter eight, Canada’s advocacy of a change to NATO’s strategic concept in the late 1990s was driven by the strong nuclear disarmament preferences of Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, but catalysed by a normative development—the ICJ Advisory Opinion. Anti-nuclear weapon sentiment among left-leaning MPs strongly supported challenging the nuclear status quo, as did widespread dissatisfaction among non-nuclear NATO members. Ambivalent, if not contradictory, strands of national identity were apparent in the public, highlighting both the imperative of nuclear disarmament and the importance of US alliance, though the latter was most strongly highlighted after NATO began its bombing campaign in Serbia. Nuclear deterrence norms related to alliance memberships remained deeply entrenched in transnational bureaucracies, and when external pressure from Western nuclear powers activated these norms, enthusiasm for advocacy of a specific change to NATO nuclear policy was significantly reduced.

Core theoretical findings

Identity dynamics

Across all four case studies, the most prominent national identity-related dynamic was the competition between anti-nuclear weapon and pro-US alliance norms. In this regard, the thesis finds that the presence of a nuclear alliance makes broad-scope nuclear disarmament advocacy much less likely. Internalised norms determine the boundaries of policy options from the outset by ruling certain options in and others out, and by making some options appear natural and others, unthinkable. Anti-nuclear weapon identities, held either by the public, key political elites, or both, provided the positive drivers for nuclear disarmament advocacy, while in three out of the four cases, internalised pro-alliance identities created a countervailing constraint on such advocacy. In the New Zealand case in the 1990s, however, the opposite was true. Political and bureaucratic elites preferred resumption of a nuclear alliance, but internalised anti-nuclear

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weapons norms in the public prevented this option, and instead, generated universalistic nuclear disarmament-related normative claims.

Viewing the case studies through the prism of public beliefs about national identity, it is noteworthy that in all four cases, there was significant public support for expression of anti-nuclear weapon sentiment. Only when this was strongly activated around a specific policy objective, however, did public national identity influence nuclear disarmament policy. In 1970s New Zealand, strong public anti-nuclear weapon sentiment was triggered French nuclear testing in the Pacific, leading to consistent anti-testing advocacy by New Zealand, with policy nuance determined by the identities of political elites. In early 1980s Canada, the trigger for public anti-nuclear sentiment was Canadian support for cruise testing, which the public demanded be reversed. The government was unwilling to take such action due to internalised, pro-alliance identities. But Trudeau was deeply sympathetic to the protesters’ calls; the result was the peace initiative.

In New Zealand in the early-to-mid 1990s, an internalised, public anti-nuclear weapon norm had by far the strongest influence on nuclear policy of the four cases. The strength of this identity created extremely strong instrumental motivations for politicians to avoid expressing pro-nuclear preferences in public, even in the name of alliance. This effectively muted any ideational competitors for expression of nuclear disarmament preferences in policy debates. The result was that activation of public anti-nuclear sentiment forced a conservative government to pursue proactive, universalistic nuclear disarmament advocacy, against the preferences of officials and political leaders. This finding is significant in IR theoretical terms, since so much of the literature—including constructivist writings—privileges system-level factors, or governmental elites, in explanations for security policy.³

Turning to the influence of internalised pro-alliance norms, chapters five and six show cases in which these norms were largely taken for granted domestically and thus, had a significant constraining effect on nuclear disarmament advocacy. New Zealand’s focus in the early 1970s was limited to opposing nuclear testing precisely because of the internalised belief across all three societal segments that strong commitment to the ANZUS alliance served the national interest. It was therefore unthinkable—at least in the eyes of most officials and politicians, at least—that New Zealand would challenge the nuclear deterrence doctrines of its great power

³ See, for example, Stern, “Forging New Identities,” 377, 386; Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 16; Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, 1.
allies. Norm entrepreneur Kirk did question the value of extended nuclear deterrence. Given that he died with 15 months remaining of his prime ministerial term, how this would have affected policy if Kirk had lived is a fascinating historical question.

The Trudeau peace initiative was triggered because conflicting, internalised anti-nuclear and pro-alliance norms were both activated in Trudeau at the same time. Trudeau’s own instincts in this situation—to publicly challenge established beliefs about extended nuclear deterrence—conflicted with the dominant preferences among both officials and colleagues at home and abroad. The world was in the midst of a crisis in superpower relations which, according to the logic of nuclear deterrence, made alliance norms such as solidarity and relatedly, threat credibility, even more important. In this context, Trudeau’s desire to question NATO’s extended nuclear deterrence strategy was by far the most controversial aspect of the peace initiative, and in the end, was constrained to a significant degree due to urging from domestic and allied officials and peers.

In Canada in the late 1990s, there was relatively limited domestic pressure constraining nuclear disarmament advocacy; rather, this pressure came largely from great power allies. Canadian public anti-nuclear sentiment was extremely strong, but its influence on policy was weak, since such sentiment was generalised rather than focused on a specific policy objective. In fact, public sentiment was also in favour in generalised terms of US alliance, but this was not an active policy debate. The dominant national identity among Liberal politicians had also shifted markedly in comparison to the early 1980s case; Trudeau’s colleagues had urged him to avoid the issue of NATO strategy. In contrast, Axworthy received a mandate for strong nuclear disarmament advocacy in the form of the SCFAIT report, including the recommendations that Canada should work to delegitimise nuclear weapons, and argue forcefully for NATO to review its nuclear strategy. International political and normative actors provided further legitimating bases for such advocacy. All these factors. However, were insufficient to outweigh external coercion from NATO nuclear weapon states, which activated solidarity norms and prevented promotion of a no first use policy for NATO. Advocacy of a revision to NATO strategy did not outlast Axworthy’s tenure as foreign minister.

Another unique contribution that this thesis makes to the nuclear weapons literature is the empirical evidence it provides for the conclusion that persuasion dynamics led to a reversal of

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4 SCFAIT, “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge”, Recommendations 1, 15.
the dominant national identity among New Zealand officials over the course of the 1990s. New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the mid-to-late 1990s was driven by officials who had previously strongly supported resumption of a US alliance ties. This is not to say that officials necessarily came to oppose this view; rather, the normative hierarchy had inverted, and US alliance was now a secondary policy preference to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. This inversion was due to the progressive persuasion of officials, due to the constant, public practice of nuclear disarmament norms—positively reinforced by back-patting from international peers—about the appropriateness of anti-nuclear weapon policies for New Zealand. In effect, an anti-nuclear weapon norm had begun to grow its own legs. Thus, despite public inattention to nuclear issues, and hesitancy on the part of some senior government ministers, New Zealand undertook ever more progressive and assertive nuclear disarmament advocacy in the late 1990s. These observations provide empirical evidence to support Rublee’s supposition that one path to state norm internalisation is through the institutionalisation of anti-nuclear weapon identities and norms in bureaucratic structures.5

**Contextual influences**

The preceding comment points to a vital contextual element that made this normative persuasion possible—the 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone law. Without this law, it is very likely that New Zealand’s most proactive nuclear disarmament advocacy in the 1990s would not have happened. This point has significant theoretical implications; in debates over nuclear disarmament dynamics, the important role of domestic anti-nuclear legislation has been largely overlooked. The Canberra Commission, for example, lauds the potential role of international law in entrenching global norms, but fails to mention the role of domestic law in this regard.6

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the dominant, security-related norm hierarchy among senior New Zealand politicians and officials saw maintenance of US alliance ties as the unquestioned priority. The preference among governmental elites was thus to abandon the nuclear free policy and resume US alliance ties. New Zealand’s anti-nuclear weapon law, however, prevented such an outcome by significantly raising the political bar for policy reversal. The law thus played a

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significant constraining role on the enactment of pro-nuclear weapon policies. By thus extending the period in which officials were required to practice nuclear disarmament norm for instrumental reasons, the legal institutionalisation of anti-nuclear weapon norms also contributed to the socialisation through which officials became persuaded of the value of those norms. This constraining effect of New Zealand’s nuclear free law points to an important distinction between domestic and international law, and one which makes domestic law all the more important in terms of theorising nuclear disarmament. That is, while it is impossible to coercively enforce legal nuclear disarmament norms in inter-state relations, as discussed in the introduction chapter, anti-nuclear weapon laws are enforceable domestically, due to the sovereign mandate that grants domestic police the right to maintain the rule of law, including by force if necessary. In fact, as noted in chapter four, the 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act establishes extraterritorial anti-nuclear weapon legal norms for agents of the state. Arguably, replicating such domestic anti-nuclear weapon legislation is a necessary condition for moving towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, as Richard Tanter points out: “Passage to a nuclear free world will require surely more New Zealands.” Moreover, the establishment of anti-nuclear weapon legal institutions at the domestic level norm may also bring with it downstream persuasion dynamics, as the previous section highlighted. As Wendt points out, “institutionalization is a process of internalizing new identities and interests, not something occurring outside them and affecting only behavior; socialization is a cognitive process, not just a behavioral one.”

In addition to the importance of domestic law, this thesis has highlighted the importance of international legal norms as a stimulant to nuclear disarmament advocacy. Overall, the metanorm of sovereignty was important in the progressive development of an anti-nuclear weapon identity in New Zealand, as the two issues were linked by norm entrepreneurs, and came to inform the country’s anti-testing advocacy in the 1970s by giving it a legal strand. Several cases highlighted the role that other aspects of international law played in either catalysing or legitimising pro-disarmament policies, and thus making politicians more likely to enact pro-disarmament policies and advocacy. For example, in the late 1990s, both Canadian and New Zealand policies were strongly informed by the ICJ Advisory Opinion.

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The focus in this thesis on ideational factors does not negate the importance of material reality constraints, nor rule out the influence of unplanned events, in the process of persuasion. Internalisation of an anti-nuclear weapon national identity in the New Zealand public—the ‘New Zealand nuclear taboo’—was aided substantially by the country’s unique geography, for example. Equally, several external events contributed to the creation of the New Zealand nuclear taboo, including an identity crisis caused by international condemnation; perceived US bullying aimed at changing New Zealand’s nuclear policies; an act of state terrorism perpetrated in New Zealand by a former ally, France, seeking to quash anti-nuclear protest. It is important to recall, however, that the meaning or effect of such factors cannot be taken for granted.

It cannot be assumed, for example, that New Zealand’s physical isolation makes nuclear weapons more of a threat than a security benefit, and therefore, makes nuclear disarmament advocacy more likely. Consider, for example, that for several decades during the nuclear age, New Zealand saw itself as small and vulnerable, and therefore, believed that nuclear alliance was essential to New Zealand security, as Prime Minister Holyoake stated in 1962. In other words, none of the reality constraints or external events described above would have produced an internalised anti-nuclear weapon identity without decades of strong civil society and political norm entrepreneurship, which crafted a new national narrative about New Zealand’s place in the world. As ever, human agency is key.

The Hotel California effect

The disarmament/deterrence conundrum—that is, the inherent tension between the norms of nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence—has been a characteristic of the international system since early in the nuclear age. Norms related to nuclear deterrence are deeply entrenched in the national identities and foreign policy institutions of many countries around the world and as a result, have become self-reinforcing. Given the fundamental conceptual and political contestation between nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence, the interaction

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10 UNDC, “DC/201/Add.2,” 48.
11 Müller, “Agency Is Central.”
12 See, for example, ICJ, “Legality”, p. 246, paras 48; p. 254, para. 66, 67; p. 255, para. 73; p. 263, para. 96. See also the Dissenting Opinion of ICI Vice-President Schwebel, in, ICJ, “Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Schwebel,” ICJ Reports, July 8, 1996, 311.
between these two norms must be a primary focus for researchers seeking to understand disarmament dynamics.

The conflictual identity dynamic between Canada the peace-making disarmer and Canada the solidarist US ally represents a ‘quintessential dilemma’ in Canadian foreign policy: ‘the diplomatic necessity of supporting NATO military plans and strategies, despite inner doubts among Canadians about their arms control and strategic logic, because the only alternative would be to support the adversary.’¹³ This observation was made during the Cold War, but its relevance appears to have outlived that era. In the post-Cold War case study in chapters eight, for example, challenges to nuclear deterrence theory and practice provoked decidedly undiplomatic responses from NATO diplomats. A former US official called Axworthy’s nuclear policies ‘breathtakingly arrogant in their ignorance,’¹⁴ while the ‘hysterical’ opposition of US, UK and French diplomats to the 1994 UNGA resolution calling for an ICJ Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons was characterised by extreme coercive threats.¹⁵

This thesis has argued that the reason for these extreme responses is that promotion of nuclear disarmament has a dual destabilising effect for adherents of nuclear deterrence, based on both institutional and psychological dynamics. Institutionally, elite NATO constituencies have been habituated to alliance-based nuclear norms for decades. Any challenge to long-established practices is likely to generate at least some resistance. This is a relatively unremarkable response to the desire for identity stability. However, the extremity of the responses documented here, and the steadfast commitment to nuclear deterrence theory despite the fundamental transformation of the system to which it was designed to respond cannot credibly be attributed simply to habituation. Rather, for those who have internalised the norms of nuclear deterrence, nuclear disarmament advocacy creates a more fundamental psychological challenge.

In psychological terms, the logic of nuclear deterrence creates a conceptual cul-de-sac referred to here as the nuclear Hotel California; in other words, there is no way out. The Eagles famously sang that at the Hotel California, ‘you can check out any time you like, but you can never leave.’ The conceptual logic of nuclear deterrence theory creates a Hotel California effect in the minds of its proponents. An individual who has internalised the security rationale of nuclear deterrence is incapable of seeing any means that rational actors can leave the hotel—that is, achieve nuclear

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¹³ Tucker, “Canada and Arms Control,” 644.
¹⁴ Jones, “Canada and the US,” 40.
disarmament—even if they desire to do so. In effect, the logic of nuclear deterrence not only promises existential security, but at the same time, makes it logically impossible to abandon the practice of nuclear deterrence without risking global nuclear catastrophe. Nuclear disarmament thus appears logically impossible, and existentially threatening.

At the same time, however, policymakers who are committed to supporting nuclear deterrence for the most part do everything they can not to have to discuss the specific details of the theory in public. The reason for this is that the theory itself is conceptually incoherent, devoid of real-world reference data, and informed by a ‘myriad of unverifiable assumptions’ about human responses to annihilation threats. In other words, nuclear deterrence is ‘a bet portrayed as a certainty.’ It is deeply psychologically destabilising to acknowledge that one’s existential security is based on a theory that is deeply flawed, and which, if it fails, will likely destroy all humanity. Thus, policymakers who are committed to nuclear deterrence theory can only remain confident in their belief that nuclear deterrence provides existential security as long as they do not actually have to consider the credibility of the theory’s logic chain. This exacerbates the Hotel California effect.

To understand how this point has influenced the policy outcomes described in the current thesis, it is useful to consider briefly a fundamental flaw in nuclear deterrence theory: its internal incoherence. The central, though not unique, role ascribed to nuclear weapons under deterrence theory is to deter the retaliatory use of such weapons by adversaries. The theory is that no national leader would risk starting a nuclear conflict, because to do so would be pathologically irrational—it would produce catastrophic, and likely, omnicidal results. For this deterrent effect to work, however, the threat must be credible. In other words, the leaders of nuclear states must

17 For a deterrence-based perspective on the destabilising nature of ‘devaluation’ of nuclear weapons, see, Schulte, “The Strategic Risks of Devaluing Nuclear Weapons.” For a counterpoint, see, Berry et al., Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence, 11–12.
18 Robert Green, Security without Nuclear Deterrence (Christchurch, NZ: The Disarmament & Security Centre, 2010).
22 NATO, for example, insists that this is the primary role for its nuclear weapons, but also insists it is willing to use nuclear weapons first in an armed conflict, as discussed previously.
believe that their nuclear adversaries will actually use their nuclear weapons if sufficiently provoked.\textsuperscript{23} The ‘credibility’ of the willingness to use nuclear weapons is thus seen as essential to preventing nuclear war. In sum, nuclear policymakers must believe at the same time that they, and their adversaries, are rational actors that will not use nuclear weapons—and thus, are capable of maintaining stable deterrent relationships in perpetuity—and at the same time, believe that they and their adversaries are pathologically irrational actors that are willing to use nuclear weapons.

Now consider the central policy recommendation in the SCFAIT report: ‘that Canada work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons.’\textsuperscript{24} Since devaluing or delegitimising nuclear weapons—depending on the definition one takes of those concepts—either reduces the perceived benefits or increases the perceived costs of using nuclear weapons, both concepts undermine the credibility of any threat to use the weapons. According to the logic that drives nuclear deterrence theory, delegitimising nuclear weapons thus actually increases the risk of nuclear war. In this context, saying that one supports both nuclear deterrence and the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons as ways to prevent nuclear war appears conceptually schizophrenic; logically speaking, both statements cannot be true at the same time. Effectively, you are purporting to believe A while working to achieve B. Yet from the vantage point of A, actually achieving B dramatically increases the likelihood of global nuclear catastrophe and thus, national annihilation. For adherents of nuclear deterrence, support for disarmament in principle is negated in practice by its perceived dangers. Welcome to the Hotel California.

**Future research**

An obvious extension of the research presented in this thesis would be to apply the analytical framework developed here to nuclear weapons policies of additional non-nuclear weapon states. Such case studies would help to test and refine theoretical findings regarding nuclear disarmament dynamics, by providing further empirical data on which to build typological theories. In particular, given the centrality of the disarmament/deterrence conundrum explored


\textsuperscript{24} SCFAIT, “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge”, Recomendation 1.
in this thesis, it would be useful to investigate the policies of other countries that subscribe to nuclear deterrence theory. Australia is the most obvious candidate for comparison to Canada and New Zealand in this regard. Australia is a liberal, parliamentary democracy, and also, a US ally. In contextual terms, Australia faces an interesting combination of the factors that have influence Canadian and New Zealand policies. In 1985, for example, while promoting and negotiating the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, Australia was also grappling with a US request to test nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles off the Southeast Australian coast, and seeking to ensure that the Zone did not outlaw passage of nuclear-armed US warships. Similar candidates for analysis include other US allies, such as Japan and various NATO states—for example, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey—which have also pursued nuclear disarmament advocacy. The variations in electoral system in these different countries would need to be accounted for, but in principle, the framework would be applicable.

A further question that arises from this thesis is the difference between the socialisation effects that function at the bureaucratic level, and those that function at the political level. While long-term practice of anti-nuclear weapon norms led to persuasion effects in New Zealand officials, the same does not appear to be true of conservative politicians. While this thesis argues that conservative Prime Minister Jim Bolger developed a strengthened personal commitment to anti-nuclear weapon norms due to his repeated, public association with New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament policies, National Party politicians have not reflected such a shift in the long term. In 2011, for example, the conservative New Zealand government disestablished the role of minister for disarmament—a role established by the 1987 Nuclear Free Zone Act. Presumably, Foreign Minister Murray McCully is now responsible for disarmament policy, yet neither the idea of a disarmament portfolio nor the word disarmament feature on the McCully’s governmental or National Party websites. In campaigning for a seat on the UN Security Council in 2013-2014, New Zealand did not highlight or promote its nuclear free policy.

25 Maclellan, “Delaying the Nuclear-Free Zone in the Pacific.”
26 NZHR, New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act, Section 18(1).
27 Press releases regarding McCully’s trips to the UNGA in New York also omit any reference to disarmament. See, for example, Murray McCully, “McCully to EU and UN,” Beehive.govt.nz, September 18, 2015, https://goo.gl/fr4hLd.
28 While New Zealand won the Security Council seat in 2014, despite not highlighting its nuclear free policy, this outcome is congruent with the argument in chapter seven that the reputational benefits of nuclear freedom assisted the victory in 1992 (and arguably, again in 2014). This is because, due to the commitment of officials to nuclear disarmament norms, New Zealand has maintained strong nuclear disarmament advocacy despite the government dismantling institutional disarmament structures at the political level.
of many New Zealanders with the policy, this omission was incongruous, as Robert Ayson, the Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University, Wellington, notes.\textsuperscript{29} Similarly, when McCully visited the United Nations in New York during the 2015 NPT Review Conference, he did not address the Conference or even attend any NPT sessions. Finally, New Zealand is the only country in the NAC—New Zealand’s closest diplomatic allies on nuclear disarmament issues—that has not signed the Humanitarian Pledge.\textsuperscript{30} These observations suggest that the dynamics of normative persuasion that operate at the political level differ from those at the bureaucratic level in the nuclear context, a point that requires further investigation.

Another point of theoretical interest that deserves investigation—and one which has significant policy relevance—is the influence of nuclear disarmament advocacy on international norms. In the constructivist view, norm compliance due to social conformity can lead to normative persuasion as a result of psychological consistency effects—a premise strongly supported by the analysis in chapter seven regarding the evolution of nuclear disarmament policy preferences among New Zealand officials between the late 1980s and the late 1990s. While the analysis in this thesis demonstrates this dynamic at the domestic level, it is reasonable to hypothesise that this same dynamic would play out—albeit with more complex intervening factors—at the international level. In other words, constructivist principles suggest that if the advocacy of anti-nuclear weapon norms results in the institutionalisation of those norms at the international level, this will help over the long term to shape international perceptions regarding the feasibility and desirability of nuclear disarmament, and thus, increase the likelihood of disarmament in the longer term.\textsuperscript{31}

On the basis of the evidence presented here, it is reasonable to hypothesise that if anti-nuclear weapon norms were codified in international legal agreements, this socialisation effect would be amplified. Granted, there is a very large difference between the ability of domestic law to shape individual behaviour, and the ability of international law to shape state behaviour. Internalised notions of sovereignty mean there is almost universal belief in the state’s right to use violence to enforce domestic law. In contrast, the lack of a credible global authority with a mandate to enforce international law is the basis of most rationalist arguments about why states

\textsuperscript{29} “Murray McCully Leaves Nuclear Policy out of UN Bid,” Breakfast (TVNZ, October 1, 2014), https://goo.gl/F2WG9z.

\textsuperscript{30} In 2015, however, New Zealand did vote in favour of a resolution ‘welcoming’ the Pledge. (At time of writing, the voting results have not been published via the official UN system.)

\textsuperscript{31} Wunderlich, “Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics,” 38.
will never disarm. Nevertheless, states are not unitary rational actors, they are made up of individual human beings, who act in their name. If constructivist principles hold true, the development of international legal anti-nuclear weapon norms would, over time, help to socialise people around the world to nuclear disarmament policy preferences. This effect would be most pronounced in countries whose citizens identify strongly with the idea of support for international law as a national interest. If this view of nuclear disarmament dynamics is accurate, then understanding the drivers of nuclear disarmament advocacy has significant policy relevance for those seeking to advance nuclear disarmament.

Finally, in terms of possible extensions to the theoretical arguments developed in this thesis, the preceding discussion points to several fascinating issues at the intersection of constructivism and international legal theory. First, it would be useful to examine the degree to which nuclear disarmament advocacy by non-nuclear weapon states has succeeded in institutionalising nuclear disarmament norms at the international level. This, of course, requires an ability to accurately define the norms that are embedded in international institutions. In other words, it is necessary to define collective international expectations regarding appropriate nuclear disarmament behaviour in order to assess how non-nuclear weapon states have influenced those norms. Here, constructivist scholars have work to do; despite the widespread constructivist assumption that norms affect behaviour, there is no broad agreement on how the content of individual norms should be defined. International legal theory seems an obvious place to turn in this task.

Finnemore writes that ‘international legal scholarship is an interesting object of study for constructivists in that part of its mission is to make new norms. One of the functions of legal scholarship is to articulate and codify norms and rules for states.’ This suggests that legal methodology may provide a means of accurately defining the content of international norms—or at least, can provide a standardised framework for debating the content of international norms that is lacking in the constructivist literature. This interdisciplinary synthesis between constructivism and international legal studies makes sense, since both often focus on the same empirical material—the negotiations, texts and implementation of international treaties.

The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is the authoritative international agreement regarding treaty law. VCLT Articles 31-33 codify the rules for interpreting treaty provisions—rules which the ICJ, other international courts and tribunals, and many national-

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33 “VCLT.”
level courts have consistently recognised as reflecting customary international law.\footnote{Gardiner, \textit{Treaty Interpretation}, 12–19.} This customary law status means that VCLT Articles 31–33 apply to all treaties, including those that pre-date the VCLT, and to all states, regardless of whether or not they are VCLT signatories.\footnote{On the universal applicability of the VCLT rules, see, Gardiner, \textit{Treaty Interpretation}, p. 13; Daniel H. Joyner, \textit{Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 22.} The VCLT rules for treaty interpretation thus provide an appropriate methodology for defining the content of treaty-based nuclear disarmament norms, as the Canberra Commission Report pointed out in 1996.\footnote{Canberra Commission, \textit{Report}, 102.} A few scholars have attempted VCLT-based analyses of NPT Article VI.\footnote{Kiernan, “‘Disarmament’ under the NPT”; Ford, “Debating Disarmament”; Joyner, \textit{Interpreting the NPT}.} However, these analyses have either been undertaken purely as a political tool to claim that the United States is not required to take further nuclear disarmament steps, and/or have been based on a deeply flawed or selective application of the VCLT method.\footnote{Burford, “Defining the Nuclear Disarmament Norm.”} In sum, there is a need for much more rigorous and detailed VCLT-based analysis of NPT Article VI.

Lastly in terms of the link between international legal theory and IR constructivism, chapter five highlighted the parallels between the concept of customary international law and constructivist understandings of norm dynamics. Specifically, customary international law exists when there is uniform state practice of a norm; and that practice is guided by \textit{opinio juris sive necessitatis}—the belief that the behaviour is legally required.\footnote{Conforti and Labella, “International Law-Making,” 31.} This state of affairs was summarised by New Zealand’s Attorney General with his assertion that in international relations, ‘when enough people say it, it is the law.’\footnote{Finlay, 28 June, in NZHR, “Appropriations Bill - Financial Statement,” 1779–1780.} Thus, New Zealand’s high-profile legal challenge to nuclear weapons in the 1970s was facilitated by New Zealand’s interpretation of the protocols of customary international law. In sum, states’ understandings of the content of international norms can affect national policy preferences regarding nuclear disarmament. This point reinforces the arguments above regarding the need for further research to examine the impact of nuclear disarmament advocacy on international norms, and the need to further integrate international legal theory with IR constructivism.
Concluding thoughts

This thesis began by outlining two puzzles relating to nuclear disarmament advocacy—one regarding IR theory and the other regarding policy. The theoretical discussion above demonstrates that nuclear disarmament advocacy is not so puzzling when viewed through an ideational lens. On the second puzzle—the enormous gap between aspiration and action on multilateral nuclear disarmament—there is still much work to do.

Despite the nuclear disarmament aspirations of the international community, and despite ever-increasing awareness of the catastrophic consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, a survey of the international strategic landscape reveals a bleak picture. The post-Cold War nuclear arsenal reductions were driven largely by a logic of economic rationalisation which sought to save money by retiring militarily redundant weapons and delivery systems. The initially-rapid pace of nuclear reductions has slowed dramatically, giving way to active modernisation and/or life extension programmes in all nine nuclear armed states that would see nuclear weapons retained for up to half century. Collectively, these nine states spend roughly a trillion dollars each decade on their nuclear arsenals.

Meanwhile, new technologies are exacerbating old nuclear threats and creating new ones. The development of hypersonic missile technology is advancing rapidly, implying that the flight times of future intercontinental nuclear missiles may be radically reduced, raising further concerns among military planners over the potential for nuclear first strikes by adversaries and thus,

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increasing the risk of nuclear war. As dual-use nuclear technology becomes cheaper, more advanced and more widespread, the risk of non-state actors acquiring and using nuclear weapons is growing. This includes, for example, the challenges posed by the potential to use 3D printing to develop nuclear weapons, and by the development of laser enrichment, which would make the manufacture of fissile material cheaper, faster, and enormously more difficult to detect.

In the post-Cold War world, globalised, non-military threats render nuclear deterrence theory meaningless in the vast majority of security contexts. Regardless, the nuclear deterrence strategies that created and fed the nuclear arms race have survived the Cold War, meaning that the moment-by-moment existential threat to humanity remains, though the global public is largely ignorant of the fact. Away from the public spotlight, nuclear deterrence strategies have exacerbated tensions in the post-Cold War unnecessarily; the maintenance of institutions dedicated to creating annihilation threats has continued to engender severe mistrust between potential nuclear adversaries, despite the absence of any rational interest in initiating a nuclear conflict. Russia-US relations, exacerbated by sharp disagreements over developments in Ukraine and Syria among other areas, and over issues such as expanding NATO membership and Western missile defence programmes, are in a dramatic downward spiral. Writing in 2015, Russian nuclear expert Alexei Arbatov warns that the world now faces ‘the most serious and comprehensive crisis in the fifty-year history of nuclear arms control.’

The multilateral disarmament picture is equally bleak. The CD, the only forum with a standing mandate to negotiate international disarmament agreements, has been completely deadlocked

46 “Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet” (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, April 2010).
50 Ibid., 91.
51 Ibid., 95–96.
for two decades, leading the last remaining civil society organisation to abandon its monitoring of the Conference in 2015.\textsuperscript{53} The CTBT, signed in 1996, has not yet entered into force and there is little to suggest progress in this regard in the foreseeable future. There has been no progress on commencing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, widely seen as an essential aspect of multilateral nuclear disarmament, despite more than two decades of efforts in this regard. In sum, despite the nuclear disarmament aspirations of the international community, there has been zero tangible progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament for 20 years.\textsuperscript{54} As nuclear risks expand, the nuclear status quo is clearly inadequate.

For disarmament advocates, a rare point of policy-relevant hope arising from this thesis is that, as New Zealand’s experience demonstrates, it is possible to leave the nuclear Hotel California. There is no simple prescription for replicating anti-nuclear weapon identities or policies; the thesis has been careful to point out the unique historical factors that led to New Zealand’s decision to exit the Hotel—not least, the country’s geography. Nevertheless, the observations presented here regarding the social-psychological dynamics that inform nuclear disarmament policy in Canada and New Zealand suggest various avenues that policymakers to advance disarmament objectives might explore. An important principle driving the focus here on nuclear disarmament advocacy is that all political change begins with an act of advocacy. Understanding the causes of that advocacy bring us closer to understanding how change occurs. Most importantly, the thesis shows that nuclear weapons policy is not immune to the socialisation effects that function in other foreign policy fields. The dominance of rationalist theories in the realm of nuclear policy has blinded analysts to a simple, inescapable fact: humans are social beings, not animalistic automatons. Psychologically speaking, individuals respond in meaningfully predictable ways to social cues such as condemnation or affirmation from peer groups, regardless of the specific content attached to those cues. If policies and institutions can be designed around this simple notion, there may yet be hope for nuclear disarmament.


\textsuperscript{54} For summaries of key states’ perspectives on nuclear disarmament, and of the challenges to be overcome in its pursuit, see respectively, Ogilvie-White and Santoro, \textit{Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century}; George Perkovich and James M Acton,\textit{ Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate} (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009).
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