A JUST DEFENCE POLICY FOR BRITAIN

Armed Forces
Maintain conventional forces for the non-provocative defence of Britain and to give military support to the UN.
Promote the role of armed forces in preventing conflict and protecting the environment.
Establish a standby pool of ex-military personnel available to the UN for disaster relief and other humanitarian work.
Renounce the Bomb, scrap Polaris and Trident, and get rid of Britain's nuclear arsenal by 2005.
Dispose of other weapons incompatible with non-provocative defence, such as nuclear attack submarines and main battle tanks.

More Democratic Defence
Britain, notorious for official secrecy, could make good her democratic deficiencies in defence policy by opening it to proper Parliamentary scrutiny and international inspection.

A New World Role
Lead negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention to be in place by 2005.
Lead the integration of NATO with a greatly strengthened Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Lead UN reform for better planning and control of its military operations, including revival of the Military Staff Committee.

Swords Into Ploughshares
Britain should end her encouragement of the arms trade. Instead, she should set a responsible example by adopting a plan for arms conversion and promoting peaceful products through a Defence Diversification Agency.
She should lead initiatives to:
* create an international arms conversion agency
* help outlaw inhumane weapons like anti-personnel landmines
* put in place a monitoring system to ensure international compliance

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DETERRING WAR RESPONSIBLY
A NEW DEFENCE POLICY FOR BRITAIN

Dr Frank Barnaby
and
Commander Rob Green RN (Ret'd)

'...traditional ways of dealing with conflict no longer seem to work.'

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If you would like to know more about Just Defence, please write to the Secretary: Cdr Rob Green RN (Ret'd), 2 Chiswick House, High Street, Twyford, Berks RG1O 9AG (Tel/Fax: 01734-340258).
INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War was meant to herald peace, prosperity and a new world order. Yet the world remains a dangerous place and the outlook is even more uncertain. Around us are conflict, terrorism, crime, pollution and poverty.

We are still armed to the teeth. Yet traditional ways of dealing with conflict no longer work. Politicians and military experts are trapped in old thinking.

We in Just Defence believe that many of Britain's problems are connected to this, and to undue dependence on arms production for the nation's livelihood.

As our contribution to the security debate, we focus on:

* what is wrong with Britain's defence policy;

* how to correct it.

We offer ideas on how the world could become safer for all, and how Britain could help lead the way.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH BRITAIN’S DEFENCE POLICY

Traditionally, we have been taught to equate security with military strength. Then Chernobyl struck; hurricanes, floods and droughts caused devastation – Saddam Hussein set the Kuwait oil wells ablaze; ethnic conflict erupted.

The many threats to our security are increasingly seen to be beyond solution by military might – take former Yugoslavia for a current example. It certainly cannot protect our planet’s life-support systems, the degradation of which is one of the greatest threats to humankind.

Adding to our insecurity is the continuing high level of military spending and arms sales. This diverts resources from basic needs like clean water, food, shelter, health care, employment and education. It also aggravates conflict.

Yet in Britain, military defence policy dominates security thinking. And it has a sacred cow: the Bomb. Our so-called “independent nuclear deterrent” so distorts and clouds foreign and defence policy that some myths about it must be exposed.

What the bloody hell is it for?”
Field Marshal Lord Carver, former Chief of the Defence Staff, 1983

“There is no military need for Britain to maintain an independent strategic strike force...it is purely a matter of political judgement whether it is worth the money spent on it and the bad example it sets in respect of the greatest danger – proliferation – in order to provide the political status symbol it is supposed to produce”
Lord Carver, 1993

A Useless Menace

Nuclear weapons are useless in war because of their huge and indiscriminate destructive power and poisonous effects. This is now widely recognised. Their threatened use, far from being “strong on defence”, amounts to nuclear terrorism.

The Bomb is useless for deterring dictators and terrorists – who would most like to get it. Saddam Hussein was not deterred from attacking nuclear-armed Israel with Scud missiles. Meanwhile in Whitehall the IRA just missed wiping out the entire Gulf War Cabinet with mortar bombs fired from a van. They were not deterred by Polaris: yet a more direct threat to the Government could barely be imagined.

“It is difficult to see deterrence operating securely against proliferators”
Rt Hon Malcolm Rifkind, UK Secretary of State for Defence,
16 November 1993

No sane leader would use the Bomb. Nuclear weapons are self-defeating. The US in Korea and Vietnam, and USSR in Afghanistan, preferred withdrawal to the ultimate ignominy of resorting to nuclear revenge. For an aggressor, a nuclear strike would mean taking over territory made useless through devastation and radioactive poison, with unmanageable survivors amid a health catastrophe – remember that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only very small A-bombs, a fraction of the yield of today’s H-bombs.

The Bomb directly threatens security, both of those who possess it and those it is meant to impress. Indeed, it is a security problem, not a solution. This is because it provokes the greatest threat:
namely, the spread of nuclear weapons. If Britain insists on having it to guarantee her security, why should not Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and every other nation with clear regional threats to their security?

**The Bomb undermines democracy.** Nuclear deterrence is about threatening the most indiscriminate violence, unrestrained by morality or the law. It is therefore a policy of gross irresponsibility, and the antithesis of democratic values.

Furthermore, democracy within a nation operating a nuclear deterrence policy is inevitably eroded by the need for secrecy and tight control of equipment, technology and personnel. The history of Britain’s Bomb shows that every major decision was taken without even full Cabinet knowledge, let alone approval. Thatcher decided to replace Polaris with Trident despite disagreement among the Chiefs of Staff: Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, First Sea Lord at the time, called Trident “a cuckoo in the Naval nest”.

**Britain’s Bomb has never been independent.** Polaris needs US goodwill, spare parts, and satellite intelligence, guidance and communications. Trident is even more dependent on US facilities and know-how.

**What if terrorists try nuclear blackmail?** Rule 1: on no account try to oppose them with a threat of nuclear retaliation. They will just call your bluff, and relish taking as many others with them as they can.

Our advice would be to emulate how the French dealt with a man who hijacked a class of schoolchildren and threatened to blow them up with him if his demands were not met; he had explosives wrapped round his chest. They exhausted him by long negotiations while installing surveillance devices to determine his condition and location. At an optimum moment Special Forces moved in and shot him with a silenced handgun; we would prefer a tranquilliser dart.

The surest way to minimise the chances of a nuclear hijack is to stop treating the Bomb as top asset in the arms business and the ultimate political virility symbol.

**A virility symbol.** Britain’s politicians see the Bomb as her admission ticket to permanent membership of the UN Security Council. But that makes the UN a stooge of the five recognised nuclear weapon states. It also props up the perception that “nuclear might is right”, which encourages the spread of nuclear weapons. In so doing, it undermines the UN’s standing and effectiveness.

**Which is it to be: Trident or a Royal Navy?** There is growing evidence that Trident’s massive cost is a primary cause of deep cuts in Britain’s other armed forces. It is particularly affecting the Royal Navy, which is facing the withdrawal from service of four new conventional submarines and other useful warships.
This is reducing the effectiveness of the armed forces, and especially the Navy's ability to police the UK coastline and to help keep the peace further afield. The potential savings from scrapping Trident are enormous. (see box)

**Reversing The Spread Of Nuclear Weapons**

"Nuclear proliferation is the biggest security threat that is facing the world this decade"

US Defence Secretary William Perry, 9 January 1995

The main nuclear threat is no longer a nuclear world war. It is the spread of nuclear weapons to states which do not yet have them. Reversing this is a key foreign policy goal of Britain and the other declared nuclear weapon states.

Yet on 13 December 1994 Britain's first Trident submarine HMS VANGUARD, with no rational purpose, started its first operational patrol. No longer targeted against Moscow after the end of the Cold War, this sets an unhelpful example which can only undermine Britain's efforts to stop the Bomb spreading.

Two days later an event happened in the UN in New York which may well doom Trident. In the General Assembly a clear majority of states, despite desperate counter moves by the US, UK and France, passed a historic resolution. This asked the International Court of Justice at The Hague – the World Court – for its urgent advisory opinion on the question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?"

The Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions outlaw those weapons of mass destruction. There is no such specific prohibition on nuclear weapons – yet they have wider and longer-lasting
effects. That is like exempting heroin from a drugs ban.

Nuclear deterrence will now stand trial in the highest court in the world – and the prosecution case is damning. More than that, for the first time since the creation of the UN, the legality of the unwritten qualification for permanent membership of the Security Council has been challenged.

The question hung over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in New York in April-May 1995. The declared nuclear weapon states wanted the NPT extended indefinitely and unconditionally. However, the NPT has the following flaws:

* It institutionalises nuclear apartheid, by allowing five states to have the Bomb while disallowing all others;

* It encourages the development of nuclear energy, which creates the raw materials for nuclear weapons;

* If the World Court were to confirm nuclear weapon threat or use to be illegal, the NPT’s future would be in doubt.

This is why the majority of non-nuclear states wanted a programme of action by the nuclear states to move much more quickly to complete nuclear disarmament. In the event the NPT was extended indefinitely, but with conditions which strengthen the review process in the future.

A World Court advisory opinion outlawing the threat or use of nuclear weapons would not be enforceable. However, the Bomb would be given the same stigma as chemical and biological weapons. The Royal Navy would have to review the legality of Polaris and Trident patrols. Missiles might have to be placed ashore in storage.

International pressure would mount for rapid progress to a Nuclear Weapons Convention, using the widely-acclaimed one for chemical weapons as a blueprint. This would be an enforceable global treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of the Bomb and fissile materials for it.

The moment would loom for the first declared nuclear weapon state to break ranks. The reward would be world-wide gratitude, huge influence in shaping the post-nuclear world order, and a financial windfall. Britain has the smallest nuclear arsenal of the declared nuclear weapon states. With Polaris dangerously old and targetless and Trident a growing embarrassment to the Navy and Treasury, she is best-placed to take this leading role.

"The nuclear weapon is obsolete; I want to get rid of them all…Think of the high moral ground we secure by having none. It’s kind of hard for us to say to North Korea, ‘You are terrible people, you’re developing a nuclear weapon,’ when the US has thousands of them."

USAF General Charles Horner, head of air operations in the Gulf War, head of US Space Command, 1994

**Britain’s Bloated Defence Budget**

Although the Cold War ended some five years ago, the massive Ministry of Defence has not undergone a fundamental reassessment. Trident is not the only huge system in the pipeline: the Eurofighter 2000 project will now cost Britain almost £15,000 million.
In 1994-95 the UK defence budget was over £22,000 million. This equates to £400 for every man, woman and child. What is more, despite trumpeted defence cuts, for the next three years it is expected to remain near that figure.

Over-emphasis on military aspects causes neglect of other security needs, and of other agencies capable of reducing insecurity in the world.

In Britain, this bias towards military spending means that about 30% of scientists work on military research with just under half the nation’s research budget. Think what these resources could produce in civil industries! In July 1994 Germany decided to spend £500 million on civil aerospace research. At that moment Britain’s was being cut to £20 million.

Defence savings are ultimately about making full, productive use of precious human skills which Britain can ill-afford to waste.

**Living Off The Arms Trade**

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (USA, Russia, China, France and Britain) account for over 90% of the arms trade. The April 1994 British Statement on the Defence Estimates boasted of the UK being second to the USA in world arms exports. But arms sales are recognised as a serious threat to international security.

British politicians press ex-Warsaw Pact states to convert their arms production to peaceful uses, while promoting British arms exports. The British government has even linked them to aid (the Pergau Dam affair). It sold Hawk aircraft to Indonesia, despite the invasion of East Timor and massacre of its people.

The arms trade is notoriously unstable. Contracts are subject to sudden cancellation, now more frequent with the end of the Cold War. The problem has grown as ex-Warsaw Pact countries, desperate for hard currency, have swamped the world market with cut-price arms.

This is why Britain’s defence industries have made thousands of workers redundant, leaving them to face “market forces”. Abandoning the Swan Hunter shipbuilding firm on the Tyne is a stark example of the bankruptcy of government thinking.

**Defence In A Democracy**

In Britain, secrecy in defence is rife. To enquire too closely is deemed “against the national interest”. We have already mentioned how every major decision about Britain’s Bomb was taken without full Cabinet knowledge, let alone approval.

Secrecy extends beyond UK facilities. Personnel at Menwith Hill in Yorkshire, the largest US spy base in the world, are warned to report immediately “any contact with foreign nationals” – which includes the British! Pleading “national security”, large sums are voted annually with little Parliamentary scrutiny, and much expenditure is concealed completely.

It is no exaggeration that, with British defence, “truth is often the first casualty”. Both Conservative and Labour governments have misled not only the public but the House of Commons itself. Until recently the British Civil Service had generally been believed to be free of corruption. However, the Ministry of Defence is proving otherwise, particularly in the field of arms procurement and sales. A whole kennel of watchdogs, from the Public Accounts Committee to Parliamentary Select Committees, have highlighted waste, inefficiency and serious mismanagement.

Against this background the North Atlantic Assembly, NATO’s
political adjunct, has been encouraging transparency in national defence policies, budgeting and democratic control. It recognises that there must be effective parliamentary oversight, with real influence on decision-making – not just a rubber stamp.

Britain does not match up well to these principles. Practices in the US and some European parliaments are much more open. It is time Britain acknowledged her democratic deficiencies.

TRANSFORMING BRITAIN'S THINKING ON SECURITY

We have explained why Britain urgently needs a fundamental defence review. However, to avoid it being little more than “re-arranging deck-chairs on the Titanic”, a transformation is needed in how the British think about security.

The political and military establishment are unlikely to lead it. So we offer the following pointers.

Redefining Patriotism

In today’s shrinking world the old concept of “my country, right or wrong” has no place. A more enlightened kind of patriotism embracing the whole Earth is essential. Being willing to die for one’s country, however nobly intended, cuts little ice when survival of the planet is at stake.

Common Security: Many-Sided And Mutual

In the world order as embodied in the UN Charter, under Article 51 every nation has the right of self-defence until the Security Council takes any action to restore international peace and security. Under Article 41 the Security Council is authorised to take non-military action and under Article 42, as a last resort, military action.

Yet the reality is that pursuit of traditional “national security” has achieved only more insecurity. This is because the more we base our defence on threatening others, the more likely it is that others will follow our example. And with nuclear weapons, making enemies dooms us all.
The alternative is to see security as a safety-net for all, not a “win/lose” military game. It recognises that we share a common need for security. It is about meeting human needs and tackling the root causes of our insecurity.

Security is many-sided. We will not be secure while the global environment is at risk; nor while the risk of regional nuclear war is growing. Military strength is useless to starving people. Unrestrained pursuit of wealth is unsustainable and aggravates conflict.

Security is mutual. No nation can feel secure if its neighbour feels threatened. We see that hunger and poverty often lead to over-exploitation of land and water. This may create new desert areas. In turn they affect climatic conditions world-wide.

We have seen how unprincipled arms sales cause or fan regional conflicts, with fleeing refugees and adjacent nations sucked in. Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda – examples abound.

Insecurity is contagious. People in the developing world will eventually tire of living on the edge of survival simply to help the West preserve its comfortable way of life. Moreover, co-operative global action is the only way the biosphere will escape destruction. That is why the Cold War alliances have had their day: we must all be allies now if we are to avoid the disaster that awaits us.

“Food scarcity, not military aggression, is the principle threat to our future... The richest 20% of the world use more than 80% of the global income. The poorest 20% share less than 2%”
Worldwatch Institute, 1994

The Arms Trade And Non-Provocative Defence

The arms trade strives to keep the world in need of a complete range of the latest weaponry, especially those systems which are most destructive and expensive.

LET ME THROUGH.
I'M AN ARMS SALESMAN!

However, new technology offers much improved reconnaissance and targeting systems and less destructive, short-range missiles able to home much more accurately onto a target. With these it is cheaper to destroy an invader's main weapons (large warships, long-range strike aircraft, and tanks) than to buy such weapons oneself.

Such a non-provocative defence system would enable a nation to defend itself lawfully and without long-range weapons. Thereby it would curb the top end of the arms trade, while encouraging professionalism and restraint in the military.

This system can, and should, be more open to inspection. This would help to build mutual trust between neighbouring nations, which would no longer fear invasion.
If Britain adopted a non-provocative defence policy, it would have no need of, for example, Trident, nuclear attack submarines or main battle tanks. Huge savings would be possible.

Arms Conversion

Britain must stop encouraging a "Cold War" economy based on arms exports in which she is a key player. Valuable skills are locked into making destructive products. Politicians and trade unions resist defence cuts because of the risk to jobs. If redundancy comes, British government policy is to hope that "market forces" will soak up the lost skills – which they seldom do.

What the world desperately needs is for Britain to set a responsible example by adopting a proper policy for arms conversion. Conversion is not simply a technical exercise for the defence industries. It is fundamental to evolving a system of common security.

- identify practical projects for arms conversion work, using existing defence skills and technology;
- use the government's role as purchaser of both research and products to radically shift production priorities;
- set up regional agencies to work with local authorities and firms in making local plans for conversion work;
- use financial incentives to favour conversion work at the expense of arms production.

An example of what can be done in Britain, even without government help, is the Arms Conversion Project. Established in 1993 by the Nuclear-Free Local Authorities, it is attracting support from local authorities (including a Conservative-controlled council), trade unions, political parties and citizen groups. (Further details can be obtained from the Project Development Officer, City Chambers, Glasgow G2 1DU.)

The European Union is funding "KONVER – Network Demilitarised", a European partnership of defence-dependent regions helping each other to convert former military bases to other uses. Wiltshire County Council, faced with base closures, is a leading member.

Using some of the savings from a non-provocative defence policy, the arms industry could be helped to switch to peaceful products which would employ more people and have a greater export potential. There are vast growth areas for such products, including energy conservation; development of renewable energy; waste disposal and clean-up; and the modernisation of public transport. Defence industry skills could be re-applied to advanced computers, telecommunications, climate research, medical
electronics – the possibilities and demand are far greater, and more sustainable, than in the arms trade.

Meanwhile, Britain could give a lead in UN initiatives to create an international arms conversion agency; to help outlaw all inhumane weapons such as anti-personnel landmines; and to put in place a monitoring system to ensure compliance.

Renouncing The Bomb

We outlined earlier why Britain could combine necessity with virtue and become the first declared nuclear weapon state to renounce the Bomb.

The logical way ahead for Britain would be to scrap Polaris and Trident as soon as possible, and get rid of her nuclear arsenal by 2005. Meanwhile she could lead the world towards having a Nuclear Weapons Convention ready for ratification by then.

NATO Becomes OSCE

NATO is still casting round for a new enemy. Meanwhile Russia is pressing for NATO to be incorporated into the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This includes every nation in Europe plus North America and the countries of the former Soviet Union. One of the OSCE’s maxims is that “...the security of every participating state is inseparably linked to that of all the others. We therefore pledge to co-operate in strengthening confidence and security among us and in promoting arms control and disarmament.” That is common security in action.

Having been first to renounce the Bomb, Britain could lead the integration of NATO into a greatly strengthened OSCE. This would avoid a separate military organisation within Europe such as the Western European Union (WEU). The way would then be clear to a non-nuclear common European security policy based on OSCE. Britain should advocate new powers for OSCE to conduct peace-keeping operations within its area, acting on behalf of the UN.

The UN Is All We Have

The UN is the only possible organisation through which a global system of common security could work. It has never been in such demand, and it is having a rough time. However, we must never forget that it is only as good as its member states make it.

Britain played an important part in creating it. Her ability to lead in its much-needed reform would be dramatically increased if she were the first permanent Security Council member to renounce the Bomb.

If nations were to be encouraged to adopt a non-provocative defence policy, the UN’s ability for military intervention would need a radical overhaul. This should start with improving planning and control of its military intelligence and operations. The Military Staff Committee, hitherto prevented from functioning by the five permanent Security Council members, should be revived.

The forces for UN intervention would need a minimal selected long-range capability to curb fighting, stop it spreading and support peace-building. There would, of course, be no place in its armoury for weapons of mass destruction.

Above all, the UN cannot fulfil growing expectations and responsibilities without more resources. World arms spending
dwarfs what is spent on the UN. Transfer to the UN of some of
Britain’s NATO defence budget, and of some of the savings
following adoption of a non-provocative defence policy, would set
a good example and hasten reform.

THE ULTIMATE DEFENCE: BEYOND WAR

There is a limit to what military intervention can achieve. Indeed,
modern war has been shown to be extremely costly, hazardous to
the environment, and often counterproductive. It is a truism to say
that wars are avoidable; but traditionally the effort put into
avoidance compared with war preparation has been minimal.

The ultimate goal of security policy must be to abolish war, and
should become the hallmark of a civilised society.

The role of armed forces should be to deter and prevent war by
building peace. If war nevertheless breaks out, their aim should be
to limit and then halt it. For that to be possible, a global system of
common security would be needed.

This could be pioneered by Britain’s armed forces, who have
demonstrated their skills as UN peace-makers and peace-keepers.
Now, however, they would become guardians of the environment
as well as protectors of the innocent.

They would follow non-provocative defence principles, and
exclude from their armouries any long-range and indiscriminate
weapons. Negotiating and language skills would become as
important as military ones. They would need to learn ways of
preventing conflict by building trust in their impartiality.

“We take very seriously the message that the environment is a
global security issue”
Colonel Ellery, Director of Studies, Joint Service Defence Staff College,
Greenwich, 1993

Progress is being made. Britain’s Joint Defence Staff College at
Greenwich now includes training in disaster relief and
humanitarian aid. Students are given a copy of “What Is Proper
Soldiering?” by Brigadier Michael Harbottle, a member of Just
Defence, in which he argues that these roles plus concern for the
environment are central to the work of today’s military
professional.

Meanwhile, the developing world is desperately short of skills
expensively acquired by armed forces. How about the British
government subsidising a pool of ex-military personnel available
to the UN for disaster relief and other humanitarian tasks, instead
of letting such skills and enthusiasm go to waste? Britain would
gain new respect if it were to choose such an imaginative way of
helping civilised society, rather than persisting with the stale, self-
defeating game of power politics.
COMMON SECURITY AND JUST DEFENCE

Common security is not just wishful thinking. Changes which appear unimaginable do happen: witness the collapse of the Berlin Wall and of apartheid in South Africa, and the IRA ceasefire.

Common security recognises the real world with all its imperfections. It does not have all the answers. It is not yet widely understood, let alone accepted, by governments; but more and more people in positions of influence are supporting its philosophy.

In Just Defence we welcome vigorous debate on these questions. We have the advantage of being independent and non-party. Our belief is that Britain’s security can and must be achieved in better and less costly ways.

The times when we tried to feel secure by making others feel insecure are over. Every day that passes points out the urgent need for resources to be released from outdated tasks and applied to the real threats to our security. Britain has a heavy responsibility, and an unrivalled opportunity, to lead the world to a better way to manage its affairs and give hope to present and future generations.

THE AUTHORS

FRANK BARNABY, Chair of Just Defence, is a nuclear physicist by training. He worked at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston (1951-57) and was on the senior scientific staff of the Medical Research Council when lecturing at University College, London (1957-67).

He was Executive Secretary of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (1967-70); Director of SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1971-81); Guest Professor at the Free University, Amsterdam (1981-85); and Visiting Professor, Stassen Chair at the University of Minnesota (1985).

He is currently a defence analyst and writer on military technology. His books include ‘The Invisible Bomb’ (Taurus, 1989) and ‘The Automated Battlefield’ (Sidgwick and Jackson, 1987).

ROB GREEN served in the Royal Navy from 1962-82. As a Fleet Air Arm Observer, he flew in Buccaneer carrier-borne nuclear strike aircraft (1968-72), then in anti-submarine helicopters equipped with nuclear depth-bombs (1972-77).

On promotion to Commander, he spent 1978-80 in the Ministry of Defence as Personal Staff Officer to the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy), who was closely involved in the replacement for Polaris. In his final appointment he was Staff Officer (Intelligence) to Commander-in-Chief Fleet at Northwood HQ, in charge of round-the-clock intelligence support for Polaris as well as the rest of the Fleet. Having taken voluntary redundancy in the 1981 Defence Review, he was released after the Falklands War.

After his aunt Hilda Murrell, an anti-nuclear power campaigner, was murdered in 1984, he was led to examine and then challenge the hazards of nuclear power generation. The Gulf War and break-up of the USSR caused him to speak out against nuclear weapons. He is now campaigning full-time for non-nuclear defence and energy policies.