CONTENTS
Author's Note and Acknowledgements
Foreword by General Sir Hugh Beach and General Lord David Ramsbotham
Introduction by Dr Rebecca Johnson

Chapter One: Why I Rejected Nuclear Deterrence

Chapter Two: A Brief History
From Monopoly to Massive Retaliation
The British Debate
UK Dependence on the US
The UK Pay-back
The US: From Massive Retaliation to Controlled Response
From Controlled Response to MAD
Counter-value versus Counter-force
First Use
Post-Cold War US Nuclear War Plan Changes
US Nuclear Posture Review 1993–97
NATO's Post-Cold War Nuclear Posture
US Doubts about Nuclear Deterrence
The 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review
Implications for US Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine
The Bush Doctrine of Pre-emption
Pentagon Confirms Plan for Pre-emptive Use of Nuclear Weapons
France's Force de Frappe
The Anglo-French Entente Nucléaire
Has Reality Begun to Prevail over Vested Interest?
The Impact of President Obama
Summary

Chapter Three: Nuclear Deterrence in the Real World
The Cuban Missile Crisis
A Question of Credibility
Nuclear Deterrence and the Absence of War between the Major Powers
The 1986 Reykjavik Summit
The Experience of India and Pakistan
Self-Deterrence
'Sub-Strategic' Nuclear Deterrence
Extended Nuclear Deterrence
Escalation is Inevitable
Nuclear Deterrence against Chemical and Biological Weapon Attacks
Nuclear Deterrence is a Two-Way Street
Was Iraq Deterred in the First Gulf War?
Terrorists are Undeterrable with Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear Deterrence Undermines Security
Nuclear Deterrence Creates Instability
Nuclear Deterrence Provokes Proliferation
Nuclear Deterrence Threatens Democracy
Launch on Warning
Summary

Chapter Four: Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation:
Israel, India and Pakistan
Israel
India and Pakistan
Summary

Chapter Five: Morality and Legality
The Nub of the Moral Argument
Nuclear Deterrence and the 'Just War' Doctrine
Nuclear Weapons and Slavery
Stigmatising Nuclear Weapons
Legal Challenges to Nuclear Deterrence
The 1996 World Court Advisory Opinion
NATO's Nuclear Trio Respond
UK Trident, Nuremberg and Prime Minister Blair
Sir Michael Quinlan's Critique of the World Court Opinion
Trident Ploughshares v Scottish High Court
Errors in the Scottish High Court's Findings
Summary

Chapter Six: Safer Security Strategies
Incentives to Find Alternatives
Shifting the Mindset
Terrorists and Nuclear Blackmail
Security Does Not Need Nuclear Deterrence
Strengthening Self-Deterrence
Stand Down Nuclear Forces from High Alert
Start Negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Promote Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
De-Couple Nuclear Weapons from Permanent UN Security Council Membership
From Nuclear Deterrence to Non-Provocative Defence
A Non-Nuclear Strategy for NATO
Safeguards Against Cheating
Securing a Durable Nuclear Weapon Free World
Summary

Chapter Seven: Conclusions

Glossary
Selected Bibliography
About the Contributors
About the Author

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