Appendix VI

United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/58

Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recallingits resolution 55/33 D of 20 November 2000,

Stressing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, a goal to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under its article VI, 1

Recognizing that disarmament and non-proliferation are essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming the necessity of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2 and the necessity of upholding their commitments in associated decisions and final documents agreed upon at the 2000 and 1995 Review Conferences,

Noting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996, 3

Noting the importance attached to the issue of reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons by the Secretary-General in his report to the Millennium Assembly, 4

Stressing the commitment made in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference to the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, 5

Concerned that the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpile still amounts to many thousands,

Reiterating that it is the particular responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States for transparent, verifiable and irreversible reductions of nuclear weapons, leading to nuclear disarmament,

Emphasizing that further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded priority and be carried out in a comprehensive manner,

1. Agrees that reductions and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be included as an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process;

2. Agrees also that reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner;

3. Agrees further on the importance of preserving, reaffirming, implementing and building upon the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation on non-strategic nuclear weapons;

4. Calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to formalize their presidential nuclear initiatives into legal instruments and to initiate negotiations on further effectively verifiable reductions of their non-strategic nuclear weapons;

5. Stresses the importance of special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States in possession of such weapons to take the necessary steps in this regard;

6. Calls for further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;

7. Calls also for concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session an item entitled "Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons".

Notes:

1 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", para. 15:6.

2 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

3 A/51/218, annex; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226.

4 See A/54/2000.

5 See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", para. 15:9.

Appendix VII

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 58/51

Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 53/77 Y of 4 December 1998, 54/54 G of 1 December 1999, 55/33 C of 20 November 2000 and 57/59 of 22 November 2002,

Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons is a threat to the survival of humanity and that the only real guarantee against the use or threat of use of these weapons is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be used or produced again,

Convinced also that the retention of nuclear weapons carries the inherent risk of proliferation of those weapons and their falling into the hands of non-State actors,

Reaffirming that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are equally important and mutually reinforcing processes requiring continuous irreversible progress on both fronts,

Declaring that the participation of the international community as a whole is central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability, and that international security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement,

Declaring also that internationally negotiated treaties in the field of disarmament have made a fundamental contribution to international peace and security, and that unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complement the treaty-based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament,

Noting the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996,1

Declaring that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security,

Declaring that each article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons2 is binding on the States parties at all times and in all circumstances and that it is imperative that all States parties be held fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty, and that the undertakings therein on nuclear disarmament have been given and implementation of them remains imperative,

Expressing its deep concern at the limited progress made to date in implementing the thirteen steps on nuclear disarmament and determined to implement these thirteen practical steps to which all States parties agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,3

Expressing its deep concern at the continued failure of the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives,

Expressing grave concern that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty4 has not yet entered into force,

Stressing the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the successful completion in September 2002 of the first phase of the Trilateral Initiative, involving the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, which aims to enable the placement of excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons under international safeguards,

Convinced that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons constitutes an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process,

Noting that, despite bilateral agreements, there is no sign of engagement of all of the five nuclear-weapon States in the multilateral process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Declaring that it is essential that the fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility apply to all nuclear disarmament measures,

Expressing its deep concern at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapon option by those three States, India, Israel and Pakistan, that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, in particular given the effects of regional volatility on international security, and, in this context, the continued regional tensions and deteriorating security situation in South Asia and the Middle East,

Expressing also its deep concern at the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and at its decision to restart the Yongbyon nuclear reactor without International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Expressing concern that the development of missile defences could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space,

Stressing that no steps be taken that would lead to the weaponization of outer space,

Expressing its deep concern about emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including rationalizations for the use, and the possible development, of new types of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming further the progress made in the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration,5 in which the heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

Taking into consideration the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all the States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty,6

1. Reaffirms that any possibility that nuclear weapons could be used represents a continued risk for humanity;

2. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear-arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

3. Calls upon all States to fulfil all their obligations under international treaties and international law in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

4. Calls upon all States parties to pursue, with determination, the full and effective implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,7 the outcome of which provides the requisite plan to achieve nuclear disarmament;

5. Agrees on the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications required to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;4

6. Calls for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

7. Underlines the urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the context of the progress achieved in implementing the international monitoring system;

8. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement the commitments made in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,2 as well as in other nuclear disarmament or reduction agreements or initiatives, and to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment;

9. Acknowledges that the reductions in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty")8represent a positive first step, and calls on the United States of America and the Russian Federaiton to make the Treaty verifiable irreversible and transparent and to address non-operational warheads, thus making it an effective nuclear disarmament measure;

10. Agrees that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded a higher priority as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and be carried out in a comprehensive manner, including:

(a) Further reductions in and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process;

(b) The implementation of reductions in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner;

(c) The preservation, reaffirmation and implementation of the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives of the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation on non-stratgegic nuclear weapons;

(d) The formalization by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of their presidential nuclear initiatives into legal instruments and the initiation of negotiations on further reductions of such weapons;

(e) The enhancement of special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials through, inter alia, the placing of such weapons in physically secure central storage sites with a view to their removal and subsequent elimination by the nuclear-weapon States as a part of the nuclear disarmament process to which they are committed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the necessary steps to be taken by all nuclear-weapon States in possession of such weapons in this regard;

(f) The achievement of further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapon systems;

(g) The achievement of concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems so as to reduce the risk of use of non-strategic nuclear weapons;

(h) The undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States that possess these weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types of these weapons or rationalizations for their use;

(i) The prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that have already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and the development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of these weapons;

11. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures;

12. Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should establish, without delay, an appropriate ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament;

13. Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives;

14. Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should complete the examination and updating of the mandate on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, as contained in its decision of 13 February 1992,9 and re-establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible;

15. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

16. Notes that the third and, as appropriate, fourth meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, taking into account the deliberations and results of the previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a report containing recommendations to the Review Conference;

17. Stresses the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

18. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States parties;

19. Notes the proposals on security assurances that have been submitted to the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference to allow time to thoroughly consider the matter of security assurances at its third meeting so as to make recommendations to the Review Conference on how to take the matter forward;

20. Calls upon those three States, India, Israel and Pakistan, which are not yet parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition, to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, consistent with the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997,10 for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;

21. Reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament;

22. Expresses concern at tensions in the Middle East and South Asia and renews support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

23. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol;

24. Calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reconsider its recent announcements, with a view to being in full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in this connection supports all diplomatic efforts for an early, peaceful resolution of the situation and for the establishment of an area free of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula;

25. Stresses that the International Atomic Energy Agency must be able to verify and ensure that nuclear facilities of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are being used for peaceful purposes only, and calls upon States to cooperate fully and immediately with the Agency in resolving issues arising from the implementation of their respective obligations towards it;

26. Calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to approach the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out the verification requirements set forth in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement signed by the two States on the basis of the model legal framework that has been agreed and that is now available to be used in new verification agreements between the Agency and each of the two States;

27. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing, as soon as practicable, of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

28. Affirms that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;

29. Acknowledges the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 57/59,11and requests him to prepare a report, within existing resources, on the implementation of the present resolution;

30. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session an item entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: a new agenda", and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

Notes:

1A/51/218, annex; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226.

2United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

3 See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", para. 15.

4 See resolution 50/245.

5 See resolution 55/2.

6 See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", para. 15:6.

7 See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I.

8 See CD/1674.

9 CD/1125.

10 International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

11 A/58/162 and Add.1.

Appendix VIII

United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/50

Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 55/33 D of 20 November 2000 and 57/58 of 22 November 2002 and 57/59 of 22 November 2002,

Stressing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under its article VI,1

Recognizing that disarmament and non-proliferation are essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming the necessity of strict compliance at all times and in all circumstances by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons2 and the necessity of upholding their commitments in the decisions and final documents agreed at the 2000 and 1995 Review Conferences,

Noting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996,3

Reiterating the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States for transparent, verifiable and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons leading to nuclear disarmament,

Stressing the commitment made in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference to the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,4

Convinced that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons constitutes an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process,

Concerned about the threat posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons due to their portability, and proximity to areas of conflict, and thus about the risk of proliferation and of use,

Concerned also about emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including the possible development of new types of low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons,

Taking into consideration the lack of transparency and of formal agreements with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons,

Emphasizing that further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded a higher priority, as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, and be carried out in a comprehensive manner,

1. Agrees that further reductions in and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be based on unilateral initiatives and included as an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process;

2. Also agrees that reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner;

3. Further agrees on the importance of preserving, reaffirming and implementing the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation on non-strategic nuclear weapons;

5. Stresses the importance of the enhancement of special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials through, inter alia, the placing of such weapons in physically secure central storage sites, with a view to their removal and subsequent elimination by the nuclear-weapon States as a part of the nuclear disarmament process to which they are committed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,2 and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States in possession of such weapons to take the necessary steps in this regard;

6. Calls for further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;

7. Also calls for concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems so as to reduce the risk of use of non-strategic nuclear weapons;

8. Stresses the need for an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States that possess such weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types of these weapons or rationalizations for their use;

9. Calls for the prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that have already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and the development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of these weapons;

10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons".

Notes:

2 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

3 A/51/218, annex; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226.

4 See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", para. 15:9.

Appendix IX

2000 Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Follow-Up to the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

Working paper submitted by Malaysia and Costa Rica

The Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the commitment, made by the nuclear weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon, to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons,

Recalling also the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996,

Underlining the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

Recalling also General Assembly resolutions 51/45 M of 10 December 1996, 52/38 O of 9 December 1997, 53/77 W of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 Q of 1 December 1999 entitled “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” which called for implementation of the aforementioned obligation by immediately commencing multilateral negotiations leading to the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention;

Concerned that those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, retain the nuclear-weapons option,

Affirms the requirement of States Parties to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty and in accordance with the 1996 International Court of Justice advisory opinion, and to this end:

1. The States Parties agree to commence multilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination under strict and effective international control, and to invite those States that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to join in such negotiations;

2. The States Parties agree to give consideration to the legal, technical and political elements required for a nuclear weapons convention or framework convention. These elements may include:

a) Non-discriminatory general obligations, applicable to States and non-State actors, prohibiting the acquisition, development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons,

b) Interim control, protection and accounting of nuclear weapons and fissile material holdings,

c) Phases and steps for the systematic and progressive destruction of all nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles,

d) An international organisation to coordinate verification, implementation and enforcement under strict and effective international control;

3. The States Parties agree to take appropriate interim steps, including unilateral measures and the achievement of other mutually reinforcing bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral instruments to remove the role of nuclear weapons from security doctrines and to further the reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals.